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ABSTRACT
This thesis is primarily concerned with the concepts and interrelations of 
(i) probability and logical structures, (ii) local causality, and (iii) embedding 
properties, for those physical theories which describe statistical phenomena (and for 
standard quantum mechanics in particular).
In Chapter 1 the distinction between "classical" and "quantum" probability is 
briefly reviewed, and analysed first in terms of qualitative properties of conditional 
probabilities, and second in terms of quantitative properties of incompatible/ 
compatible observables.
In Chapter 2 a characterisation of "statistical theories" is given, which 
incorporates both classical and quantum mechanics, and which allows the 
formulation of an inherent probability and logical structure for such theories. 
Conditions are provided for these structures to be of a "classical" nature, and the 
concept of "covering theories" is introduced to discuss the possibility of embedding 
one such theory/structure within another.
In Chapter 3 the respective roles of joint probability and local causality as 
ingredients to the derivation of the so-called Bell inequalities are clearly identified 
within the framework of statistical theories, where the latter ingredient enters the 
derivation in a weaker form than has previously been required. The significance of 
these inequalities is clarified as a necessary condition for the existence of a "local, 
classical covering theory" for a given statistical theory, and is applied to the case of 
standard quantum mechanics.
In Chapter 4, some physically-motivated requirements are adjoined to the 
statistical theory concept to provide the basis of a new, "statistical theory approach" 
to axiomatic quantum mechanics, which is compared with the so-called quantum 
logic approach.
Finally, in Chapter 5 an analysis is given of a recent thought experiment in the 
literature which suggested a possible violation of local causality by measurements 
on correlated quantum systems. It is shown that non-interaction rather than local 
causality is the key to interpretation of this thought experiment, and subsequent 
discussion in the literature is critically examined in terms of the former concept.
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ABOUT THIS THESIS
The contents of this thesis are presented in a reasonably logical order: the
probability structures of standard quantum and classical systems are considered in 
Chapter 1; a generalisation is made to "statistical theories" in Chapter 2; this 
generalisation is applied to the derivation/discussion of the Bell inequalities in 
Chapter 3 and to an axiomatic basis for quantum mechanics in Chapter 4; and 
Chapter 5, on non-interacting systems, sits fairly much by itself at the end. I 
should here apologise for the lack of a detailed literature review at this end of the 
thesis. With the possible exception of the "quantum logic approach" discussed in 
Chapter 4, I trust that the flavour of earlier developments is found to be sufficiently 
well represented in the text.
Since each chapter has its own introductory and concluding sections, I shall 
not attempt further summary of their contents here. I wish rather to indicate the 
chronological and conceptual order of the research behind this thesis, within the 
context of the related publications listed on page (iii) (in order of appearance in the 
literature).
Very briefly, these publications were written in the order [3], [1], [2], [4], 
where the stimulation for [2] and [4] was provided by [3], and where [1] was 
essentially independent of the others. Now, [2] and [4] are reproduced in 
Appendices I and II of the thesis, while [1] is reviewed in Chapter 5. However, the 
motivating paper, [3], for the former two is not directly represented in the thesis, 
and for this reason I shall outline here the contents of [3], and its links to [2] and 
[4].
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Publication [3] on page (iii), i.e. [Hall, 1989], was stimulated by Fine's 
derivation of the Bell inequalities [Fine, 1982], as properties of classical joint 
probabilities, and apparently without recourse to the principle of local causality. 
Hence it seemed that the violation of these inequalities by some predictions of 
quantum mechanics implied that classical joint probabilities were not applicable in 
general to the observables of quantum systems. Guided by the framework of 
quantum logics [Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936; Jauch and Piron, 1963], I 
proposed that the latter conclusion was indeed already implied by the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and therefore that the Bell inequalities were 
of no fundamental significance within this interpretation [Hall, 1989, §§2, 4]. The 
properties of the "non-classical" joint probabilities required by the Copenhagen 
interpretation were described in terms of the behaviour of "conditional" 
probabilities for quantum systems, and this description is discussed in §1.3 of 
Chapter 1.
Further, I was able to show [Hall, 1989, §§3.4, 3.6] that the derivation of Fine 
did not in fact yield physically measurable inequalities; an extra assumption, 
interpreted as a locality condition, was required to obtain a form of the inequalities 
which was measurable via appropriate coincidence experiments. Thus one had to 
distinguish with respect to the measurability of the various inequalities which could 
be obtained, to determine their interpretational significance.
There was yet another element to the discussion: the above-mentioned locality 
condition [Hall, 1989, equations (14)] achieved its desired effect (essentially that 
spacelike separated measurements of propositions A,B corresponded to 
measurement of the joint proposition A&B ) via a formulation of joint probabilities 
independent of classical probability theory. Such a formulation was conceptually 
necessary for meaningful discussion of both "classical" and "non-classical" joint 
probabilities. The characterisation used [Hall, 1989, equations (2), (9)] was 
suggested by work of Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] for the case of quantum
mechanics, and was based on the notion that one proposition of a physical system 
was "implied" by another such proposition if the probability of verification for the 
first was always greater than that of the second.
It was the desire to find a rigorous conceptual framework for this formulation 
of joint probablity (and "implication") which led finally to the major publication 
related to this thesis [Hall, 1988]. The desired framework was based on a 
characterisation of "statistical theories", and it is reviewed/developed in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4 of the thesis as a powerful tool for discussing certain foundational aspects 
of quantum mechanics (some details are summarised in the Abstract on page (v)). 
A number of papers have very recently appeared (too late to be discussed in this 
thesis) which concern some of these aspects, including Barut et al. [1988], Cohen
[1988] , Omnes [1988a,b,c], Pankovic [1988], Bohm and Hiley [1989], and Piron
[1989] . Current interest in these problems is thus apparent.
Finally, the publication [Hall and Santhanam, 1989] was also conceptually 
linked to [Hall, 1989], stimulated by the nature of an inequality satisfied by the 
earlier mentioned "conditional" probabilities for quantum systems. This inequality 
suggested that a relation analogous to the Heisenberg inequality might exist which 
depended on a measure of incompatibility for quantum observables, rather than a 
measure of uncertainty. Such a relation was found for the case of discrete quantum 
observables [Hall and Santhanam, 1989, equations (9), (15)], and the associated 
measure of incompatibility is discussed and generalised to arbitrary quantum 
observables in §1.4 of Chapter 1.
1CHAPTER ONE
ON QUANTUM PROBABILITY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] demonstrated the existence of generic 
logical structures for the experimental propositions of classical and quantum 
systems, motivated by an analogy between the phase space characterisation of the 
former systems, and the Hilbert space characterisation of the latter. The existence 
of such structures for quantum systems, called quantum logics, underpins the 
development of the "quantum logic approach" to axiomatic quantum mechanics 
[some key papers may be found in Hooker, 1979]; and allows for discussion of the 
non-classical nature of quantum phenomena within the context of the non-Boolean 
nature of quantum logics. Thus Finkelstein [1972] writes the relation:
COMPLEMENTARITY = NONDISTRLBUTIVITY ,
where the left-hand-side refers to the existence of complementary properties for 
quantum systems, and the right-hand-side to the non-Boolean nature of quantum 
logics [see also Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, §10; Putnam, 1969, §IV].
The propositional calculus of quantum logic assigns a joint proposition AaB 
to each pair of experimental propositions of a standard quantum system (see §1.2 
below). Hence a joint probability may also be assigned to each pair (A,B) , 
defined simply as the probability of proposition AAB being verified. The joint 
probability structure thus obtained for standard quantum systems, quantum 
probability, provides an alternative context for discussing the non-classical nature 
of quantum phenomena. Moreover, this context may be considered conceptually
2more accessible than that of quantum logic, given that the physical predictions of 
the quantum theory deal not with logics, but with probabilities.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate two ways in which the non-classical 
nature of quantum probability models complementary properties of quantum 
systems: the first relates these properties to the rules for manipulating "conditional 
probabilities"; and the second characterises the existence of "incompatible" 
observables for quantum systems as an inherent feature of quantum probability.
In §1.2 the basic elements of quantum probability are reviewed, and contrasted 
with the joint probability structure of classical systems. The split between quantum 
and classical probability is then analysed in terms of "conditional probabilities" in 
§1.3, based on and extending some recent work [Hall, 1989, §2]. It becomes 
necessary to distinguish and discuss two possible formulations of these conditionals, 
labelled as "transitional" and "static" formulations. While the transitional 
formulation is relevant in connection with modelling "transition probabilities" in 
quantum mechanics, I shall argue that it brings in conceptual elements irrelevant to 
assessing fundamental distinctions between classical and quantum probability (in 
particular, a discussion of models of measurement becomes necessary). Hence this 
formulation is rejected in favour of the static formulation and the difference 
between classical and quantum probability examined within the context of the 
latter. This difference is characterised in terms of one of the basic laws of classical 
probability theory (the "contradictory inference" p(A |B) + p(A '|B ) = 1 ), which 
must be modified for quantum probability. This modification is interpreted as 
modelling the complementary properties of quantum systems.
The non-classical nature of quantum probability has been previously utilised to 
discuss the compatibility/incompatibility of pairs of quantum observables [e.g., 
Gudder, 1968; Hardegree, 1977; Pulmonovä, 1980]. This is briefly reviewed in 
§1.4, and extended to discuss a quantitative measure of incompatibility for quantum
3observables, based on recent work of Hall and Santhanam [1989; reproduced in 
Appendix I of this thesis]. The main result is a generalisation of the uncertainty 
principle for "absolutely incompatible" observables.
Finally, conclusions are presented in §1.5.
1.2 QUANTUM PROBABILITY 
Standard Quantum and Classical Systems
The description of a standard quantum system is formulated on a complex, 
separable Hilbert space H . The propositions A,B,... of the system, corresponding 
to (equivalence classes of) yes/no experiments for the system, are represented by 
projections A,B,... onto closed subspaces A(H), B(H), ... of H . The state, W , 
of the system is represented by a density operator, W , on H (i.e., W is a 
positive, bounded, unit-trace, self-adjoint, linear operator on H ). If PW(A) 
denotes the probability that proposition A will be verified by a corresponding 
yes/no experiment for a system described by state W , then standard quantum 
mechanics makes the prediction
PW(A) = W[A(H)] := tr[W A] , . (1.1)
where tr[ • ] denotes the trace operation on H . Thus the state W induces a 
probability measure, W[-] , on the closed subspaces of H . Gleason [1957] has 
shown that the density operator representation, equation (1.1), completely 
characterises such a probability measure (for dim H > 2 ).
For the purposes of analogy, one may also consider a "standard classical 
system", described on a measurable phase space T [cf. Birkhoff and von 
Neumann, 1936]. The propositions A,B,... of the system are now represented by 
the characteristic functions of measurable subsets A( T ) ,  B(r)> — of T .
The state, p , of the system is represented by a normalised positive measure dp
4system described by state p , then standard classical mechanics makes the 
prediction
Here, the state p induces a probability measure p[ - ] on the measurable subsets of 
r  . The state is interpreted as describing a random member of an ensemble of 
systems, each characterised by an element of T , with weighting dp . Equations 
(1.1), (1.2) demonstrate an analogy between standard classical and quantum systems 
(with p <—♦ W , dp <—» W , A(F) <—♦ A(H) , and % <—» Ä ), which will be pursued 
in what follows.
Joint Probability
In defining quantum logics, Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] make use of the 
analogy between the representative subsets A(H) , A(r) of H and T 
respectively. In particular, for propositions A,B the joint proposition AaB was 
defined as corresponding to A(T) n B(r) , A(H) n B(H) for standard classical and 
quantum systems respectively. Accordingly, a joint probability, pw (AAB) , for 
propositions A,B of a standard quantum system described by state W , may be 
defined by
pp(A) = p[A(T)] := p %A . ( 1.2)
PW(AAB) := W[A(H) n B(H)] , (1.3)
with an analogous definition
Pp(AAB) := p[A(T) n B(T)] (1.4)
for standard classical systems.
Complements
Having defined the joint probability structure for standard quantum systems by
5(1.3) above, a second element of quantum probability is still required for this 
chapter. In particular, the complement, A ' , of a proposition A must be defined. 
This is done via its corresponding yes/no experiment(s): A ' is verified if and only 
if A is falsified and vice versa. For a standard quantum system A ' is 
represented by the projection
A ' := 1 -  A (1.5a)
onto the orthogonal complement
A'(H) := {|\|/> € H | A |y> =0} (1.5b)
of A(H) , where i denotes the identity operator on H . This is analogous to the 
case of a standard classical system, where A ' is represented by the characteristic 
function
XA' : = 1 - * A d.öa)
of the set complement
A '(D  := {ye r I xACy) = 0) (1.6b)
of A(T) . From equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.5), (1.6) one has
PW(A) + Pw(A/) = 1 (1.7)
Pp(A) + pp(A ') = 1 (1.8)
for all propositions A , and for all states W , p of standard quantum and classical 
systems respectively.
Equations (1.1), (1.3), (1.5), (1.7) constitute the elements of quantum 
probability, certain features of which will be investigated below. The formulation 
is strictly contained within the Hilbert space formalism of standard quantum 
mechanics, and will be generalised in Chapters 2 and 4. However, such a 
generalisation is not required for the present, since only standard quantum 
mechanics is of interest in this chapter.
61.3 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AND THE LAWS OF PROBABILITY
In various axiomatic schemes for classical probability theory [e.g. 
Kolmogorov, 1950; Cox, 1961; Jeffreys, 1961; de Finetti, 1974] so-called 
’'conditional" probabilities inevitably make an appearance. For example, 
Kolmogorov [1950, §1.4] defines the conditional probability p(A|B) as the ratio 
of "absolute" probabilities p(AAB) , p(B) ; while Cox [1961], Jeffreys [1961], and 
de Finetti [1974] in fact deal with conditional probabilities from the outset. In all 
these schemes, two laws of probability always appear, either as axioms or theorems: 
the conjunctive inference,
p(AAB IC) = p(A IBAC) p(B IC) , (1.9)
also known as the law of compound probabilities, or Baye’s Rule; and the 
contradictory inference
p(A|B) + p(A' |B)= 1 (1.10)
also known as the theorem of complete probability. I adopt the "inference" 
terminology from the monograph of Cox [1961], where they constitute the two 
fundamental axioms of classical probability theory, suggested by very general 
considerations of probability and its relation to logic.
In physical theories, such as for standard quantum and classical systems, it is 
possible to formulate the concept of conditional probability in terms of propositions 
and their verification by experiment (equations (1.11), (1.13) below). Thus one has 
an independent characterisation of conditional probability. The question may then 
be posed as to whether these physically defined probabilities satisfy equations (1.9), 
(1.10) above.
In this section I shall consider two distinct physical formulations of the 
conditional probability p(AjB) , and examine which is most appropriate to 
delineate the non-classical aspects of quantum probability. The laws of inference,
7equations (1.9), (1.10) above are discussed for this "appropriate" formulation, and it 
will be shown that while the conjunctive inference may be accommodated for 
quantum probability, the contradictory inference must be modified. This 
modification is interpreted as modelling the existence of complementary properties 
for standard quantum systems.
The Transitional Formulation
In the transitional formulation of conditional probability, the quantity p(A | B) 
is defined to be the probability that proposition A will be verified if tested 
immediately subsequent to a verification of B . In particular, if B is verified for a 
standard quantum (standard classical) system described by state W (p) , then 
denote the state immediately subsequent to measurement by Wß (pß) . The 
transitional formulation then defines
The label "transitional" indicates the intrinsic involvement of the transition 
W —♦ WD , induced by measurement of B .
The most unattractive feature of the transitional formulation in assessing 
fundamental distinctions between classical and quantum probability is that the
which determine the transitions W —♦ Wß , p —► pß . In particular, while the 
contradictory inference (1.10) is automatically satisfied in this formulation (using 
equations (1.7), (1.8), (1.11)), the validity of the conjunctive inference (1.9) is in 
general model dependent. For example, identifying the propositions A , AAA 
(since equations (1.3), (1.4) must hold for all states W or p ), the conjunctive 
inference (1.9) implies that
PW(A IB) = PW (A).
B
Pp(A|B) = Ppß(A) * (1.11b)
(1.11a)
p(A I A) = p(AAA I A) = p(A I AAA) p(A | A)
= P(A I A) p(A I A) .
8
Hence by equation (1.11b) P0 (A) e {0,1}
r  A
is a necessary condition for a standard
classical system to satisfy the conjunctive inference in the transitional formulation 
(indeed, one takes as axiomatic that p(A | A) = 1 in general). But if, for example, 
A refers to a range of momenta, and is tested by some scattering process, this
•f*
condition will not hold in general, thus exhibiting the model dependence of the 
conjunctive inference even in the case of classical systems.
An artificial distinction between classical and quantum probability can be 
obtained by restricting attention to the class of "ideal" or "moral" measurements [cf. 
d'Espagnat, 1971, §3; Bell, 1987, §3], specified in the quantum case by the 
"collapse postulate" model of measurement
(A) tr[W B A B ] 
t r [ W B ]
(1.12a)
(requiring W ß = B W  B/tr[W B] ), and analogously in the classical case by
V A) :=
f  d p  XB XAXB
/  dP
(1.12b)
Then in general the conjunctive inference (1.9) holds for the classical case (using 
equations (1.4), (1.11b), (1.12b)), but not for the quantum case (choose non­
commuting A , B and C ). However, this distinction is made at great cost, first
T For example, if (X,P) denotes the position-momentum configuration of a 
classical system, suppose that momentum is measured via an inelastic collision
process which leaves the system in configuration (X,^ P) . Then if p denotes
an ensemble of such systems with uniform momentum distribution over the 
interval (0,PQ) , and proposition A refers to momentum in some range (0,Pp
with Pj < \  ’ d  follows that p (A) = ^P j/Pq £ {0,1} .
* A
9because only a subclass of measurements are admitted, and second because these 
"ideal" measurements are generally unphysical [cf. d'Espagnat, 1971, §15].
It is seen that the transitional formulation of conditional probability need not 
satisfy the axioms of classical probability even for the case of standard classical 
systems, depending on the model of measurement for the transitions W —♦ WD , 
p —► pB (equations (1.11)). As the aim of this section is to distinguish between 
classical and quantum systems via these axioms, it is appropriate to look for an 
alternative physical formulation of conditional probability which satisfies the laws 
of inference (1.9), (1.10) for classical systems. Such a formulation is given below.
The Static Formulation
In the static formulation of conditional probability, the quantity p(A | B) is 
defined as the probability that both propositions AaB and B are verified if tested 
simultaneously, given that B is verified. The label "static" thus emphasises the 
non-dynamic nature of this formulation. It relies on the concept of simultaneous 
measurements; these are always possible for classical systems, while for quantum 
systems, the relation (AAB)(H) = A(H) n B(H) (following from equation (1.3)) 
implies that [ÄaB, B] = 0 , so that a simultaneous measurement is permitted in 
principle [e.g., von Neumann, 1955, §111.3].
The static formulation leads to the following operational definition for 
p(A IB) . Let NAA3, Nß be the number of quantum (classical) systems for which 
AaB, B are respectively verified by a joint measurement on N systems in state W 
(p) . As N increases, the static formulation (combined with the law of large 
numbers) implies
N AAB/N B p(A I B) ; N A/\B/N  —  P(AAB) ; V 1* P(B) ;
and hence one must have for p(B) * 0
10
PyV( A aB)
(1.13a)
pa(a a B) p[A(n_n B(D]
ptBTTTl (1.13b)
for standard quantum and classical systems respectively.
The derivation of equation (1.13a) for quantum probability using (implicitly) 
the static formulation, was first given in Hall [1989, §2.3]. This formulation does 
not suffer from the criticisms of model dependence applied to the transitional 
formulation above, and will be adopted for the remainder of this chapter. In 
particular, equations (1.13a), (1.13b) are to be regarded as definitions of the 
conditional probabilities pw (A | B) , Pp(A | B) respectively.
The Conjunctive Inference
Noting that the associative law, (AaB)AC = AA(BaC) , holds for propositions 
of both standard quantum and classical systems (using equations (1.3), (1.4)), and 
excluding the case pw (BAC) = 0 , one has
Equation (1.9) then follows immediately (using equations (1.13)); i.e., the
conjunctive inference is true for both classical and quantum probability. Indeed, 
the validity of this inference is seen to be trivial in the static formulation of 
conditional probability.
The Contradictory Inference
Equations (1.13) imply that the contradictory inference, (1.10), is equivalent to 
the relation
p((AAB)AC) p(AA(BAC)) p(BAC) 
P(C) p(BAC) p ( C)  ‘
P(AaB) + p(A, AB) = p(B).
11
This holds for all standard classical systems (using equations (1.2), (1.4), 1.6)). 
However, it is not a generic property of standard quantum systems. For example, 
let H be a two-dimensional Hilbert space with orthonormal basis { |+). | —)} , 
and choose A(H) = span{ |+) + |-)} , B(H) = span{ |+)} , and W = |+) (+| . 
Then from equations (1.1), (1.3), (1.5) it follows that pw (AAB) = p (A 'aB) = 0 , 
and pw (B) = 1 .
The Modified Contradictory Inference
A distinguishing non-classical feature of quantum probability has thus been 
determined to be the breakdown of the contradictory inference. For standard 
quantum systems equation (1.10) must be replaced by the weaker law •
Pw (A|B) + pw ( A ' | B ) < l  (1.14)
(following from equations (1.1), (1.3), (1.5), (1.13a)), which I shall call the modified 
contradictory inference [cf. Hall, 1989, §2.5]. Equality holds in equation (1.14) 
when [A,B] = 0 , i.e., in the case where A and B are simultaneously 
measurable. Thus it is only for the complementary properties of a standard 
quantum system (with [A,B] * 0 ), that the non-classical aspect of quantum 
probability is made manifest. In analogy to Finkelstein [1972] (see §1.1) one might 
write
COMPLEMENTARITY = MODIFIED CONTRADICTORY INFERENCE .
Truth Functions
The consistency of both laws of inference, equations (1.9), (1.10) for standard 
classical systems may be modelled by assuming that associated with each system S
c
described by state p is a truth function T^ on the set of propositions, such that 
proposition A is verified if T^(A) = 1 and falsified if Tj^(A) = 0 . A yes/no
12
experiment corresponding to A is then a measurement of T^(A) . The law of 
large numbers requires that if A is tested on a large number of systems described 
by state p , then
^Tp(A)} —* Pp(A) , (1.15a)
where (• )  denotes the mean value of the measurement results. If it is now 
supposed that proposition AAB is "true" (i.e., Tp(AAB) = 1 ) if and only if A and 
B are both "true” (i.e., T^(A) = Tp(B) = 1 ), then one has
Tp(AAB) = Tp(A) Tp(B) . (1.15b)
Further, by the definition of the proposition A ' (§1.2), one has
Tp(A') = 1 -  Tp(A). (1.15c)
From equations (1.13b), (1.15) the two laws of inference (1.9), (1.10) immediately 
follow in this model.
The modified law of contradictory inference for quantum probability implies 
that a similar model cannot hold for standard quantum systems. Thus one may 
interpret equation (1.14) as saying that truth functions do not exist for these 
systems, i.e., "in general no matter what physical proposition B is tested and found 
to be true for some system, there will be some "complementary" proposition A 
which can not be said, even in principle, to be either true or false" [Hall, 1989, 
§2.5]. This supports the earlier stated connection of the modified contradictory 
inference with complementarity.
Pitowsky [1986, §11.C] suggests an alternative conclusion: that a "quantum"
c
truth function Tw may exist for each state W of a standard quantum system, S 
satisfying the properties
<T^(A)> -> pw(A) (1.16a)
(AAB) < T£(A) t £(B) (1.16b)
13
t £ ( A ' ) - 1 - T * ( A ) . (1.16c)
Comparing these properties with equations (1.15), it is seen that for a quantum 
system one may have a situation where A and B are both "true", but AaB is 
"false". Equations (1.13a), (1.16) immediately imply the modified contradictory 
inference (1.14), as well as the conjunctive inference (1.9). Hence such quantum 
truth functions, if they exist, are a suitable model for quantum probability, where 
the modified contradictory inference is represented by (1.16b).
1.4 A MEASURE OF INCOMPATIBILITY
The modified contradictory inference, being an inequality, can only be a 
qualitative measure of the existence of complementary properties for standard 
quantum systems. In this section the notion of complementary properties is 
sharpened to that of incompatible observables [following Hardegree, 1977], and the 
non-classical features of quantum probability are used to obtain a quantitative 
measure for compatibility/incompatibility [based on Hall and Santhanam, 1989; 
reproduced in Appendix I of this thesis].
Compatibility
Two propositions A,B of a standard quantum system are defined to be 
compatible relative to a system described by state W if
This definition was introduced (explicitly) by Hardegree [1977, §2], and extended 
by him to define two general quantum observables M,N (represented by self- 
adjoint linear operators M,N on H ) to be compatible relative to state W if
[A,B]W = 0 . (1.17)
[Mr Ny ]W = 0 for all X,Y e B(R) , (1.18)
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where B(QR) denotes the Borel subsets of the real numbers, and X —♦ M is the
A
projection-valued measure on B(IR) induced by M via the spectral theorem [e.g., 
Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981, Appendix B.2]. Further, M and N are 
absolutely compatible if condition (1.18) holds for all states W , and absolutely 
incompatible if it does not hold for any state W .
The notion of compatibility is linked to that of simultaneous measurability: if 
condition (1.18) holds then M and N may be expressed as functions f(L), g(L) 
of an observable L , relative to state W (i.e. MW = f(L)W , NW = g(L)W ) 
[Hardegree, 1977; Theorem 4; this is an extension of a result of von Neumann, 
1955, §11.10]. Thus the compatibility condition (1.18) may be interpreted as 
holding if and only if M and N can be simultaneously measured for state W (by 
a measurement of L ).
A result of Gudder [1968, Theorem 3.7] adds a "probabilistic" element to the 
notion of compatibility: M and N are compatible relative to state W if and only 
if there exists a probability measure, , on the Borel "rectangles" of IR“ , 
{XxY I X,Y 6 BOR)} , such that
Pw (MxANy) = [^(X xY ) for all X,Y e B(R) . (1.19)
A useful feature of this result is that it may be applied to standard classical systems 
also, where observables M,N are represented by Borel functions on the phase 
space T (thus Mx is represented by the subset (ye T | M(y) € X) ). Indeed, 
pp(Mx ANy ) is a probability measure on the Borel rectangles of [R (using
equations (1.2), (1.4)) for all states p of a standard classical system, so that all 
observables are absolutely compatible in this case. The existence of incompatible 
observables is thus a characteristic feature of standard quantum systems, modelled 
(through condition (1.19)) by the non-classical features of quantum probability.
Pulmanovä [1980] considered the connections between compatibility/
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incompatibility and quantum logic, and found [Theorem 6; see also Hardegree, 
1977, Theorem 7] another link between relative compatibility and quantum 
probability: propositions A,B are compatible relative to state W if and only if
J(A,B,W) := pw (AAB) + Pw(A 'aB) + pw (AAB') + pw (A'AB') = 1 . (1.20)
That in general 0 < J(A,B,W) < 1 for standard quantum systems follows from the 
modified contradictory inference of the previous section (using equations (1.7), 
(1.13a), (1.14)), while for standard classical systems the upper bound is invariably 
attained (using equations (1.4), (1.6)).
Incompatibility and a New ’Incompatibility" Principle
It was in fact the modified contradictory inference [as presented by Hall, 1989, 
§2.5], coupled with the "entropic" generalisation of the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle for discrete observables by Deutsch and others [Deutsch, 1983; Partovi, 
1983; Kraus, 1987], that prompted T.S. Santhanam [private discussion] to suggest 
the possible existence of a generalisation of the uncertainty principle based on the 
properties of quantum probability. The generalisation that I found [Hall and 
Santhanam, 1989; reproduced in Appendix I of this thesis] makes use of the 
properties of J(A,B,W) defined in equation (1.20) above.
In particular, a measure of incompatibility, I(M,N,W) , of observables M,N 
relative to state W is proposed, with
I(M,N,W) := sup[ 1 -  J(Mx ,Ny ,W) | X,Y e B(!R)} . (1.21)
Equation (1.21) in fact generalises the definition of Hall and Santhanam [Appendix 
I, equation (7)], where the latter was for discrete observables only (i.e., where the 
eigenvalues of M,N form discrete sets in flR). The agreement of the two 
definitions follows from the relation J(A,B,W) > J(A,BAC,W) . The equivalence of 
equations (1.17), (1.20) implies that I(M,N,W) = 0 if and only if M and N are
16
compatible relative to state W . For standard classical systems, quantities 
J(A,B,p) , I(M,N,p) may be analogously defined, with the valuations 
J(A,B,p) = 1 , I(M,N,p) = 0 .
A further property of the measure of incompatibility I(M,N,W) is the 
generalised "uncertainty" principle [Appendix I, equation (13)]:
I(M,N,W) > — l — (1.22)
n +
for observables of an n-level quantum system which are "complementary" in the 
sense of Kraus [1987]. It follows that such observables are absolutely incompatible, 
i.e., they may not be simultaneously measured on any state W , analogous to the 
implications of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (AxAp > ^ fi) for conjugate 
position and momentum observables. A large class of pairs of absolutely 
incompatible observables is determined in Appendix I (equation (11)).
Finally, it may be possible to recover from the definition (1.21) of I(M,N,W) 
something very similar to the form of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in the 
case where M and N represent conjugate position and momentum observables. 
For example, one could perhaps demonstrate in this case that I(MX,MY,W) > (i 
only if the Borel subsets X,Y satisfy
IXI - IYI <f w M h ,  (1.23)
where |X | , |Y | are the "lengths" of X and Y in suitable units, and h is 
Planck's constant given in these units. The number p. might be interpreted as a 
probability related to properties of standard deviations. At present, however, this is 
purely speculation.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
I have argued elsewhere [Hall, 1989, §2] that proponents of completeness of 
the Copenhagen interpretation of standard quantum mechanics, in accepting the
17
principle of complementarity, have quantum probability more or less forced upon 
them. Here my goal has been somewhat different: to investigate the role of
quantum probability in modelling the "complementarity" behaviour exhibited by 
quantum systems. It has been demonstrated that (i) complementary properties are 
incorporated into quantum probability via the modified contradictory inference, 
based on the static formulation of conditional probability (§1.3); and that 
(ii) incompatible observables can be completely characterised by a quantitative 
measure of incompatibility, based on non-classical features of quantum probability 
(§1.4). I should emphasise that these results are not intended to support either the 
principle of complementarity or quantum probability as "explanations" of quantum 
phenomena, but rather to indicate the close connections between them as 
"interpretations" of such phenomena.
It would not be proper to conclude this chapter without examining the question 
"If classical probability is independent of standard classical systems, then should 
not quantum probability be independent of standard quantum systems?" There are 
two lines of investigation suggested by this question. The first is to supply an 
axiomatic basis for quantum probability. The simplest method is to replace the first 
axiom of Kolmogorov [1950] with the specification that the class of events is 
represented by a set, C , of closed subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, which is 
closed under intersection and (ortho-)complementation. Then for a probability 
function P on C satisfying the remainder of Kolmogorov's axioms (disjoint <—♦ 
orthogonal), joint probabilities may be defined by
P(SaT) = P(SnT)
for S,T s C , and conditional probabilities P(S|T) through
P(SAT) = P(S|T) P(T),
leading to the result
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P(S IT) + P(S' IT) < 1 .
These equations may be compared with (1.3), (1.13a), (1.14), and demonstrate the 
existence of an axiomatic basis for quantum probability, independent of standard 
quantum systems. However, this basis is not very instructive for the interpretation 
of quantum phenomena; a different approach will be taken in Chapter 4, not based 
on the Hilbert space formalism of standard quantum mechanics.
The second line of investigation involves denying the premise that classical 
probability and classical systems are independent, and arguing that the former is an 
empirically based generalisation from observation of the latter. The implication is 
that probability (and logical) structures are objective features of the physical world, 
open to study [see e.g. Finkelstein, 1969a; Accardi, 1984]. This latter viewpoint 
proves quite productive, as subsequent chapters will show.
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CHAPTER TWO
PROBABILITY AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE 
OF STATISTICAL THEORIES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the probability structures inherent to standard classical 
and quantum systems were reviewed, and their properties compared. These were 
shown to have some conceptual value in delineating the non-classical features of 
quantum mechanics. The discussion will be generalised here by introducing the 
concept of statistical theories, characterised roughly as those theories which make 
probabilistic predictions for the behaviour of physical systems. An inherent 
probability and logical structure is then defined for such theories, and the relation of 
this structure to classical probability theory examined.
The work presented in this chapter, and in Chapters 3 and 4, is based on the 
contents of a recent paper [Hall, 1988]. There, the concept of statistical theories 
was introduced and applied to: (i) the definition of an inherent probability and
logical structure for these theories (considered in this chapter); (ii) the derivation of 
the Bell inequalities and their significance (considered in Chapter 3); and (iii) a 
new approach to axiomatic quantum mechanics (considered in Chapter 4). The 
relevance of this paper to the thesis is such that it is reproduced in Appendix II, and 
referred to often in what follows.
In §2.2, the characterisation of general statistical theories [§2 of Appendix II] 
is expounded, with expanded discussion on its conceptual foundations.
The inherent probability and logical structure of such theories is outlined 
briefly in §2.3, essentially following §§3.2, 3.3 of Appendix II. The structure is
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formulated via a series of definitions and theorems, with the intention of clarifying 
the technical basis; the interpretation of this structure is then discussed.
Those statistical theories with a "classical" probability and logical structure are 
characterised in §2.4, by three rather simple conditions. The notion of covering 
theories, by which a statistical theory may be "embedded in" or "covered by" a 
second statistical theory, is discussed in relation to the possibility of "replacing" 
those statistical theories with a non-classical structure by "classical" statistical 
theories. This section draws on elements of §§3.4, 4 of Appendix n.
Conclusions are presented in §2.5.
2.2 STATISTICAL THEORIES
Briefly, a statistical theory [Appendix n, §2] contains a set of experimental 
propositions, P ; a set of states, S ; and a mapping, p , from PxS to the 
interval [0,1] ; such that the quantity p(A,X) is predicted by the theory as the 
probability that proposition A is verified if tested on state X . A deterministic 
theory is a special case of a statistical theory, with p(A,A.) 6 {0,1} for all A e P , 
X e S . Elements of this characterisation are examined below.
Propositions
Experimental propositions essentially correspond to yes/no experiments which 
may be performed on members of the class of systems described by the theory. 
The two possible results of testing proposition A e P may be labelled by 1 and 
0 , corresponding respectively to verification (a "yes" result) and falsification (a 
"no" result). It is not necessary that P contains all possible propositions (i.e., 
yes/no experiments) for the class of systems under consideration (this would 
amount to a "completeness" condition for the theory).
Two experimental propositions A,B of a statistical theory are defined to be
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equivalent with respect to the theory if the predictions of the theory do not 
distinguish between them, i.e., if p(A,X) = p(B,A.) for all states \  . Equivalence is 
denoted by A = B . It follows that propositions may be represented up to 
equivalence by mappings, from the set of states to the interval [0,1] , where for 
A e P the mapping A is defined by
A(k) := p(A,A.) (2.1)
for all X e S . These mappings will be called the abstract propositions of the 
theory, and the set of such propositions denoted by 7 . Note that this improves on 
the notation of Hall [1988], where the distinction between P and 7 is made by 
context. The relations A = B , A = B are equivalent. In general a statistical theory 
will be denoted by (S,P,p) , although the incomplete representation (S,7) may 
also be used in what follows.
States
States are sometimes regarded as descriptions of ensembles (e.g., in the 
"statistical interpretation" of quantum mechanics [Ballentine, 1970]). However, in 
what follows I wish to regard states as descriptions of individual systems. The 
connection between the two types of state is the notion of a preparation procedure. 
An ensemble state may be identified with the preparation procedure which 
generates a "random" member of that ensemble, while a system state may be 
identified with the preparation procedure which generates a system in that state. 
The equivalence of ensemble and system state descriptions lies in the fact that only 
so-called "random" members of the former are used in physical predictions. The 
main conceptual advantage of single system state descriptions lies in the fact that 
experiments are not in general performed on ensembles, but on individual systems. 
A second advantage is that discussion of the word "random" may be avoided.
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Probability
The definition of statistical theories above inherits a weakness from standard 
probability theory, in that the meaning of the word "probability" in connection with 
the quantity p(A,X) is not defined empirically, but taken as a primitive concept. 
This should somehow be resolved in a physical context to make predictions of the 
theory testable. In §2 of Appendix II I consider a sequence of results r(A .A^ ) , 
r(A2,^2),...a’(AN,A^ f) (where r(A,A) ) is 1 or 0 if A is respectively verified or 
falsified on X ), and propose that a statistical theory predicts the behaviour
^theoretical ^
N as N -.<*>, (2.2a)
where
Nyes
N
:= X  r(A i )  
i=l
(2.2b)
is the total number of verifications, and
^theoretical
yes
N
:= X  p (A A .)  .
i= l
(2.2c)
In the case p(A.,A.) = p for each value of i , equations (2.2) imply N = pN i i yes
for sufficiently large N , justifying the interpretation of p(A,A) as a probability. 
However, the question "how large is sufficiently large?" remains (this question also 
applies in particular to standard quantum mechanics — e.g., how many photons 
determine an interference pattem?).
Graham [1973], in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, and more generally Finkelstein [1972] note that statistical predictions 
for single-system measurements may be transformed into deterministic predictions 
for ensemble measurements. In particular, if a proposition is tested on each 
member of an ensemble, then the probability that the relative frequency of 
verifications has a particular value is either 0 or 1 . Thus statistical predictions 
involving individual systems become deterministic predictions about ensembles.
23
However, this is unsatisfactory for assigning an empirical meaning to probabilities, 
as in practice the "ensemble limit" N — can not be realised. At best only finite 
subensembles are available for experimentation, the behaviour of which is not 
deterministic in general.
Before leaving (unresolved) the question of how probabilities are to be 
physically interpreted, I shall mention briefly the interpretation of de Finetti [1974; 
see especially §§3, 5, 7] based on the idea that probability is subjective. 
Probabilities are taken to reflect a degree of belief of the occurrence of an event, 
and vary according to the individual and available information. This information 
may include observed frequencies, and the connection of subjective probabilities 
with relative frequencies is provided by a suitable inteipretation of the law of large 
numbers [de Finetti, 1974; §7.5.6]. I shall not attempt to provide here an adequate 
discussion of de Finetti’s viewpoint. However, I feel that the notion of purely 
subjective probability cannot provide a compelling explanation for the existence of 
(successful) statistical theories such as quantum mechanics, which organise a wide 
range of physical phenomena into an objective structure. To interpret statistical 
theories as merely generating "probabilities", which may or may not agree with an 
individual's own subjective calculations, appears to ignore this organisational 
structure (unless perhaps this structure is interpreted as reflecting the common 
thought structure of "subjective" individuals!).
One further point must still be made about the characterisation of statistical 
theories given at the beginning of this section. In particular, a probability is 
assigned to an individual event (measurement of A on X ) rather than to "many" 
events. This is justified by equations (2.2): while the probabilistic nature of the 
event is evident only within the context of a large number of events, the 
contribution p(A.,A.) appears as an independent term in the expression for 
Nyes°retlCal ’ re^ ect n^§ individual nature of the contribution.
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2.3 PROBABILITY AMD LOGICAL STRUCTURE
The probability and logical structure inherent to statistical theories is given 
below as a series of definitions and theorems, summarising §§3.2, 3.3 of Appendix 
II. The interpretation of this structure is then briefly discussed.
Formulation
Consider a statistical theory (S,P,p) , with a set of abstract propositions 7 as 
defined in §2.2. In the following, D denotes a definition, and T denotes a 
theorem (proofs may be found in Appendix II).
Dl. The set of potential abstract propositions, 77 , is the set of all mappings
from S to the interval [0,1] (hence 7 c 77).
D2. The natural partial ordering, =4 , on 77 is defined by
A=> B IFF A(X) < B(X) V7.eS,  (2.3)
for all AB e 77 .
D3. The complement, A' e 77 , of A e 77 is the mapping
A'(X):=1-A(X)  VA.eS. (2.4)
D4. The mappings 0 ,1  e 77 are defined by
0(X) := 0 , 1(A) := 1 VA e S . (2.5)
D5. For AB e 77 the meet, AaB e 7 7 , and the join A'JB e 77, are given by
(AaB)(X) := sup{T(X)|/e 7>u {0} , X = i A , X = * B }  (2.6a)
(AVB)(X) := inf{X(X)\A e 7 v  {1} , A=> A , B => A] (2.6b)
T l. For AB,C € 77 one has
(i) A=$A (2.7 a)
(ii) If A=> B , B =4 C , then A=$ C (2.7b)
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(hi) If A = * B , B  =f A, then = (2.7c)
(iv) U ' Y  = A (2.7d)
(v) If A = $  B then B' => A' (2.7e)
(vi) 0 =3 A =i> 1 . (2.7f)
T2. For AB ,C  e TP , J  e 7  one has
(i) Aa B = Ba A , AvB  = BvA (2.8a)
(ii) (Aa B)aC = Aa (BaC) , (A vB )vC  = Av(BvC) (2.8b)
(iii) Aa B =$ A =$ Aa/B (2.8c)
(iv) J=> Aa B if f  x = * A ,  X = > B (2.8d)
(v) A v B = > X  IFF A = >  J ,  B = >  J . (2.8e)
T3. For A e  P  one has
(i) Sr O II o s? II (2.9a)
(ii) Aa A = AAl = A = AvO = AVA. (2.9b)
T4. Definition D5 may be consistently extended (D6 below) to define the 
meet and join of the members of an arbitrary sequence [ A  | i e 1} in TP (where 
I is an arbitrary index set, possibly uncountably infinite).
D6. The meet and join of the sequence in T4 are given by
(A A)(K) :=sup{J(?t) I J e  7>u {0} , X => n A) (2.10a)
iel 1 iel 1
(V A)(k) := inf{ J(X) I J e  ? \ j  {1} , u A = *  J} (2.10a)
iel 1 iel 1
where the mappings n A , u A e TP are given by
iel 1 iel 1
( n  A)(k) := infU(X) | i e 1} V \ e S  
iel 1 1
(2.11a)
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(u  A)(X) := sup{A(X) I i € 1} VX e S . (2.11b)
i€l 1 1
T5. If 7 is closed under complementation (i.e. f  e 7 VT e 7 ) , then
V l  = ( A i O ' (2.12)
iSl 1 iS I 1
for all sequences {A | i 6 1} in 77 .
Interpretation
The defmition of the set of potential abstract propositions TP in D1 is a 
technical device which not only allows the partial ordering =)> and the
complementation ' to be defined in a natural manner independently of 7 , but 
enables consideration of propositions 0 , 1 ,  X  , AaB , X B  even if they do not 
belong to 7 .
The partial ordering => , defined in D2 has the properties required of logical 
implication (Tl), and is in fact called implication in Appendix II. In particular, if 
p(A,^) = 1 (i.e., A is "true" for state X ), and A => B , then p(B,^) = 1 (i.e., B 
is "true" for state X ). Further, the operation ' defined in D3 is called 
complementation. If for A e P the abstract proposition Ä is defined as being 
verified when A is falsified, and vice versa, then it is consistent with the 
interpretation of p(A,Ä.) (see §2.2) to assume A -  X  , thus providing a simple 
interpretation for X  in this case.
The representative logic of (S,P,p) is defined to be the partially complemented 
poset (7,=>/) . The basic properties of this logic are given in T l, T2.
The potential abstract propositions 0 ,  1 defined in definition D4 may be 
interpreted as corresponding to trivially absurd and trivially true propositions 
respectively. In §3.2 of Appendix II it is assumed that 0,1 6 7 ; however, this 
assumption is avoided here by the forms of D5, D6. Part (vi) of theorem Tl show
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that 0 and 1 are the theoretical lower and upper bounds respectively for the 
representative logic (?,=*,') .
The main function of definition D5 is to assign a joint probability (MB)(X) 
for propositions A,B € P on state X e S . In general MB need not be an abstract 
proposition of (S,P,p) , i.e., it might not have a corresponding yes/no experiment 
which is described by predictions of the theory. Hence the joint probability 
(MB)(X) must in general just be interpreted as a number in [0,1] ; however, it is a 
number with some very special properties! (T2-T5).
Definition D5 also assigns a joint (potential) abstract proposition M B  to 
abstract propositions MB e 7 . This is connected with the representative logic 
(?,=*,') of (S,P,p) by theorems T2, T3. In particular, part (iv) of T2 implies that 
the greatest lower bound of MB e 7 with respect to the implication relation exists 
if and only if MB e 7 , and is given by MB in this case. A similar connection 
exists between MB and the least upper bound of MB e 7 , via part (v) of T2.
Theorems T2, T3 establish that desirable "logical" properties of the meet and 
join of abstract propositions are satisfied. Theorem T4 and definition D6 extend the 
definition of meet and join to arbitrary sets of propositions, and finally, theorem T5 
demonstrates a relation between joins, meets, and complementation (de Morgan's 
law) in the case where the representative logic is fully complemented.
While theorems T1-T5 appear to be of a logical nature, they in fact arise from 
definitions D1-D5, which are cast purely in terms of probabilities via equation 
(2.1). Thus both the logical and the probability structure are defined simultaneously 
for (S,P,p). This contrasts somewhat with the quantum logic approach mentioned 
in §1.1, where there is a definite conceptual order: logic first, probability second 
(see also §4.3).
The connections of the above-defined structure with axiomatic quantum 
mechanics will be examined in Chapter 4. The connections with classical
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probability theory will be considered in the remaining sections of this chapter, and 
applied to the discussion of local causality and the Bell inequalities in Chapter 3. 
Examples 3.1, 3.2 in §3.4 of Appendix II derive the probability and logical structure 
for generic classical and quantum mechanical systems respectively.
2.4 CLASSICAL STATISTICAL THEORIES AND
CLASSICAL COVERING THEORIES
In general, the representative logic of a statistical theory (S,P,p) will not be 
Boolean; nor will the probability structure obey the classical laws of probability. 
For example, if (S,P,p) represents a standard quantum system (§1.2), i.e., S is the 
set of density operators of a complex, separable Hilbert space H , P is the set of 
projections on H , and p(Ä,W) = tr[W A] , then one obtains (Example 3.2 of 
Appendix II) the joint probability structure of quantum probability discussed in 
Chapter 1, which is certainly not classical.
The utility of non-classical probability and logical structures has been noted in 
Chapter 1 for the case of standard quantum systems. One may interpret the 
existence of such structures for statistical theories in general as implying that the 
classical rules for manipulating propositions and probabilities are not physically 
absolute (cf. §1.5). Alternatively, it may be argued that these classical rules are 
indeed absolute, and hence that only those statistical theories with a "classical" 
structure are of fundamental interest. This latter viewpoint motivates the 
examination of theories which have such a structure, and their relation to other 
statistical theories.
Classical Statistical Theories
A statistical theory (S,P,p) is defined to be classical if and only if (i) the 
representative logic (?,=?/) is Boolean, and (ii) the probability structure satisfies 
the rules of classical probability. It is shown in §3.4 of Appendix II that (S,P,p) is
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a classical statistical theory if and only if the following conditions are satisfied
1 € ? (2.13a)
A' f\B e ? (2.13b)
(XB)(X) + (X  A B))X) = B(X) (2.13c)
for all A,B e ? ,  Xe S . These are equivalent to equations (15a)-(15c) of Appendix 
II, with the difference here that (2.13a) was implicitly assumed for the latter (note 
that B= 1 in (2.13b) gives X  e ? , etc.). It is remarkable that classical 
statistical theories are characterised by just three straightforward conditions. A 
canonical example of such a theory is given in Example 3.1, §3.4, of Appendix II.
Classical Covering Theories
If one adopts the viewpoint that the classical rules of probability and logic are 
physically absolute, then the non-classical probablity and logical structure obtained 
in the case of standard quantum systems (see above) suggests that standard quantum 
mechanics is an inadequate description of the physical world. This in turn suggests 
that a classical statistical theory be sought which describes all the phenomena 
explained by standard quantum mechanics. In the terminology of §4 of Appendix 
II, such a statistical theory is called a classical covering theory.
In general, a statistical theory (S,P,p) is defined to be a covering theory for a 
statistical theory (S,P,p) if and only if there exists a proposition mapping 0:P —♦ P 
and a state mapping <j):S —+ S such that
(i) A and 0(A) correspond to the same yes/no experiment; (2.14a)
(ii) X and < j ) ( X )  correspond to the same preparation procedure; (2.14b)
(iii) p(A,X) = p(0(A), <|>(A.)) for all A e P , X eS  (2.14c)
(cf. equations (18) of Appendix II). Thus a covering theory reproduces all the
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predictions of the theory which it "covers" and in general may yield further 
predictions also. However, (S,P,p) and (S,P,p) may have inequivalent probability 
and logical structures (§4 of Appendix II).
A covering theory may be considered for some physical (not necessarily 
statistical) theory for various reasons. These reasons can be physically based (e.g., 
to incorporate further physical phenomena, as in the replacement of Kepler's laws 
of planetary motion by Newton's law of universal gravitation); or technically based 
(e.g., the use of rigged Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics to cope with Dirac 
delta functions/position eigenstates); or interpretationally based (e.g., the use of 
statistical mechanics to "explain" phenomenological thermodynamics); and in 
general will overlap these three categories.
The replacement of a non-classical statistical theory by a classical covering 
theory has been motivated here on interpretational grounds: the assumption that a 
classical logical and probablity structure is a priori preferable. Further, such a 
program of replacement is technically feasible: Example 4.4 in §4 of Appendix II 
demonstrates the existence of a classical covering theory for each statistical theory. 
However, it will be demonstrated in the case of standard quantum mechanics that 
such a covering theory must violate the principle of local causality (Chapter 3).
Further discussion and examples of covering theories may be found in §4 of 
Appendix LI.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
The characterisation of a statistical theory as a triple, (S,P,p) , (§2.2) leads to 
an associated probability and logical structure for such theories (§2.3). In general 
this structure will be non-classical (e.g., standard quantum systems).
Those statistical theories which do have a "classical" structure are completely 
characterised by conditions (2.13). The relative simplicity of these conditions is
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due in part to the simultaneous enmeshment of the probability/logic components of 
the associated structure. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that those statistical theories 
with a "quantum" structure are also simply characterised.
In §2.4 it was noted that any statistical theory with a non-classical structure 
may be replaced by one with a classical structure, via the notion of covering 
theories. This supports the viewpoint that only classical structures are of 
fundamental interest (implying that standard quantum mechanics should be replaced 
by a classical covering theory). However, the results of the next chapter 
demonstrate that the alternative viewpoint, namely that non-classical structures may 
be required to satisfactorily model the physical world, deserves strong 
consideration.
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CHAPTER THREE
STATISTICAL THEORIES, LOCAL CAUSALITY, 
AND THE BELL INEQUALITIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
While it may be desirable from some viewpoints to replace "non-classical" 
statistical theories by classical covering theories (see previous chapter), this may 
possibly conflict with other desirable constraining principles for statistical theories. 
One can not always have one's cake, and eat it too! Indeed, sacrifice is called for in 
the case of standard quantum mechanics — it will be shown here that a classical 
covering theory must in this case make predictions which violate local causality.
In §3.2, local causality is formulated as a general principle for arbitrary 
spacetimes via the concept of joint experiments, and applied to define the class of 
local statistical theories. An important property of the inherent probability and 
logical structure of local, classical statistical theories is derived (equation (3.4)). 
This property provides the key to a necessary condition for a statistical theory to 
admit a local, classical covering theory, taking the form of the "physical" Bell 
inequalities (§3.3). This result is used to clarify earlier work by Clauser and Home 
[1974] and Fine [1982], and demonstrates the usefulness of the statistical theory 
framework as characterised in §2.2.
Conclusions are presented in §3.4, which discuss the significance of the Bell 
inequalities for standard quantum mechanics, and link the existence of these 
inequalities to the importance of studying non-classical probability and logical 
stmctures in physics.
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3.2 LOCAL STATISTICAL THEORIES
In this section, "coincidence" or "joint" experiments are defined within the 
context of statistical theories and applied to the discussion of local causality in 
arbitrary spacetimes, to obtain a definition of local statistical theories. Further, a 
connection between local causality and joint probability is established for local, 
classical statistical theories. This section may be viewed as a generalisation of 
§§5.2, 5.3 of Appendix II, to arbitrary spacetimes.
Joint Experiments
It is convenient to let [A] denote the yes/no experiment corresponding to 
experimental proposition A of a statistical theory (S,P,p) . Suppose for a system 
described by state X € S the procedures for both [A] and [B] have been carried 
out for some A,B e P . This joint experiment will be labelled by [A,B] , and 
yields results in the set {(yes,yes), (no,yes), (yes,no), (no,no)} .
The propositions A • B , A ' • B , A • B ' , and A ' • B ' are defined as being 
verified if the result of [A,B] is (yes,yes), (no,yes), (yes,no), and (no,no) 
respectively; and falsified otherwise. In the case where these propositions are 
elements of P , i.e., probabilities of their verification are predicted by the theory 
for each state X € S , [A,B] is called a joint experiment of the theory. An
example is given in §5.2 of Appendix II showing that even if the joint experiment 
[A,B] exists for some A,B e P , it need not be a joint experiment of the theory.
It is important to note that although [A,B] is a physical combination of [A] 
and [BJ , the three experiments correspond to three physically distinct situations. 
Hence the predictions for [A],[B] performed singly on separate systems described 
by states X need not be trivially related to the predictions for [A,B] . For 
example, suppose A and B refer to deflections of a compass needle in two 
different neighbourhoods of a conductor. If these neighbourhoods are sufficiently
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close then the magnetic fields of the needles may interact appreciably on 
performance of [A,B] , whereas such "interference" is absent in the performance 
of either [A] or [B] alone.
For local statistical theories, to be defined later in this section, a special class 
of joint experiments is identified for which predictions pertaining to [A],[B] , and 
[A,B] are in fact simply related. The identification rests on the causal properties of 
spacetime, and therefore attention will now be turned to spacetime structures.
Spacetime Descriptions
The description of state preparation procedures, and of the yes/no experiments 
corresponding to propositions (§2.2), is generally formulated within the language of 
some spacetime. I shall model a spacetime here as an ordered set, (M,—>) , where 
M is a set of events (spacetime points), and the ordering relation —♦ on M 
represents the "causal" direction of time, from "past" to "future" events. In 
particular, for a,ß € M the relation a —> ß is read " a precedes ß ", and is 
assumed here to be transitive (i.e., a —> ß , ß —> y  implies a —r j )  and 
irreflexive (i.e., a ^ a  for all a € M ). Thus "causal loops" of the form a —> ß , 
ß —» a are disallowed: an event cannot precede itself.
Spacetimes characterised in a manner similar to the above have been studied in 
various contexts by (for example) Reichenbach [1956, §11], Zeeman [1964], 
Finkelstein [1969b], Malament [1977], and Bombelli et al. [1987]. However, the 
properties of the ordering relation vary between authors according to context and 
convenience. For example, Finkelstein [1969b] examines the case where —♦ is 
transitive (defined above) and antisymmetric (i.e., a  —► ß , ß —> a  implies 
a  = ß ); while Zeeman [1964] and Bombelli et al. [1987] assume that —1 is a 
partial ordering (i.e., transitive, antisymmetric, and reflexive (a —♦ a ) ). My 
assumptions of transitivity and irreflexivity above provide a simple point of contact
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between the two types of ordering just mentioned: if =* is any transitive,
antisymmetric ordering on M , then a transitive, irreflexive ordering is obtained by 
defining a  —» ß if and only if a  =» ß and a  p ß ; conversely, from any 
transitive, irreflexive ordering —» on M a partial ordering => is obtained by 
defining a  ß if and only if a  —> ß or a  = ß (these assertions are
straightforward to check). The assumptions of transitivity and irreflexivity 
correspond (I feel) more closely to the desired reading " a  precedes ß " than do 
the other possible assumptions mentioned, and are adopted for this reason.
For Newtonian spacetime, M is a four-dimensional Euclidean space and 
a  —> ß whenever the time co-ordinate of a  is strictly less than that of ß . For 
Einsteinian spacetime, M is a four-dimensional Riemannian manifold with metric 
signature (+,+,+,-) , and a  —> ß whenever a  * ß and a  lies in the (solid)
backward lightcone of ß . The ordering relation is invariant under Galilean and
(local) Lorentz transformations for Newtonian and Einsteinian spacetimes 
respectively.
A region of the spacetime (M,—>) is a subset of M . Associated with region 
R c M  are two regions R~,R+ c M , called respectively the past and future of R , 
and defined by
R~ := {a € M | a  —* ß for some ß e R} , (3.1a)
R+ := {a € M | ß —> a  for some ß e R} . (3.1b)
These past and future regions are illustrated for Newtonian and Einsteinian 
spacetimes in Figure 3.1 below, where the "striped" zones indicate the past of 
region R , and the "dotted" zones indicate the future of region R (the "dashed" 
lines are not contained in whichever of the past or future regions of R that they 
bound).
Two regions R15R2 c M  are defined to be causally separated if neither 
a  —> ß nor ß —> a  for all a  e R1 , ß € R^ . Equations (3.1) imply that R1 and
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Newtonian spacetime Einsteinian spacetime
FIGURE 3.1
R0 are causally separated if and only if R1 n R” = R~ n R2 = <J> , i.e., when neither 
region intersects the past of the other. Examples of causally separated regions are 
depicted in Figure 3.2 below for Newtonian and Einsteinian spacetime (the dashed 
lines indicate the boundaries of R~ R~ )•
R»
—  r
Newtonian spacetime Einsteinian spacetime
FIGURE 3.2
The spacetime notions above will now be used to discuss "local measurements"
and "local causality" for statistical theories.
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Local Measurements
The measurement of a physical quantity for some system involves a correlation 
between two consecutive spacetime configurations of a "measuring apparatus"; 
namely, between some initial configuration and one of a set of possible final 
configurations. For an experimental proposition (§2.2) the latter configurations will 
correspond to "yes" or "no" results (the ordering initial/final is determined by the 
ordering on the spacetime (M,—>) ).
A local measurement is defined to be one which takes place within a definite 
region R of spacetime, i.e., where the initial configuration is dependent on 
manipulation of "variables" within R , and where the final configuration was 
determined within R . Here, "dependent on manipulation" is meant to imply that 
the experimenter has control over the initial configuration.
Local Causality
Let [A,B] be a joint experiment of some statistical theory (S,P,p) , where 
experiments [A],[B] correspond to local measurements in regions RA,Rß 
respectively of spacetime. Predictions of the theory may be compared for N 
systems described by state X in two cases: (i) [A,B] is performed for each
system; and (ii) [B] is performed for each system. In case (i), the relative 
frequency of verifications in Rß for sufficiently large N is predicted to be 
(A-B)(X)  + (A' • B)(X) (using equations (2.1), (2.2)), while for case (ii) the 
corresponding quantity is BQt) . An example is provided in §5.3 of Appendix II for 
which these two quantities are not equal, suggesting that an experimenter in RA 
could signal to region Rß by either performing or not performing experiment [A] 
for the N systems. In that example, RA lies in the past of Rß (i.e. RA c Rß ), 
so that any such signal would be in a past —♦ future direction.
The principle of local causality is roughly that signals may only be sent from
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the past to the future. In particular, signalling to region R from R via the 
above mechanism is disallowed if R^ does not overlap the past of Rß . A local 
statistical theory (or more accurately, a local causal statistical theory) is now 
defined to be one which satisfies the principle of local causality, i.e., if [A,B] is a 
joint experiment of the theory such that [A],[B] are local measurements in 
spacetime regions RA,Rß respectively, and RA does not overlap the past of Rß 
(Ra n R~ = <)>) , then
(A-B)(X) + (A' • B)(X) = B(X) (3.2a)
+ U '- D W  = B'(k) (3.2b)
for all states X e S . Equations (3.2) preclude the sending of a signal from RA to
Rd via the mechanism discussed above. a
In the case where RA and Rß are causally separated, it follows that both 
equations (3.2) and the equations
(,A-B)(X) + (A-B')(X) = A(X) (3.3a)
(A'-B)(X) + (A' -B')(X) = A\X)  (3.3b)
must hold for all states X e S of a local statistical theory (S,P,p) .
Local Classical Statistical Theories
It may be seen from equations (3.2), (3.3) that the predictions of local 
statistical theories for certain joint experiments [A,B] are connected with the 
predictions for the component experiments [A],[B] . For the case of local, 
classical statistical theories, this connection leads to a relation between local 
causality and joint probability (equation (3.4) below).
In particular, let [A,B] be a joint experiment of a local, classical statistical 
theory such that [A] and [B] are performed in causally separated regions.
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Equations (2.3) (2.8d), (3.2), (3.3) then imply
A-B =» AaB , A ' -B=*A ' aB,  A-B'=>AaB ' ,  X  • Br =* XKB’ .
This together with equations (2.3), (2.13c), (3.2), (3.3) leads to the result
A-B=AaB, A ' -B= A ' aB,  A-B' =AaB' , A'-B'=A' f \B'  . (3.4)
(For example, from (2.3) (T- B)(X) = (AS)(X) -  m^ , (A' • 5)(X) = (A'aB)(X) -  n^
with m^,n^ > 0 ; equations (2.13c), (3.2) then yield
(AaB)(X) + ( X aB)(X) = = (^A5)(X) -  m^ + (A'AB)(X) -  nx  ,
so that = n^ = 0 ).
This result, that the joint probability distribution of propositions A,B tested in 
causally separated regions is physically measurable via the joint experiment 
[A,B] , is a property intuitively desirable for joint probabilities. The formalisation 
of joint probablities (Chapter 2) and of local causality (this chapter) thus 
successfully captures this intuitive idea for the case of classical statistical theories. 
However, for non-classical and/or non-local statistical theories the connection 
between the "formal" joint abstract proposition AAB, and the "physical" joint 
abstract proposition A- B in equation (3.4) need not hold. Hence these abstract 
propositions must in general be distinguished; this distinction will play an 
important role in the subsequent discussion of the significance of the Bell 
inequalities (§§3.3, 3.4).
The main idea behind the derivation of equation (3.4) is presented in §3.4 of 
Hall [1989], where it is formulated in terms of quantities p^(A&B) , p^(A-B) 
analogous to (AaB)(X) , (A-B)(X) respectively. In §5.3 of Hall [1988, equation 
(20); see Appendix II] the result is given for the first time within the context of 
statistical theories. It is in fact proved there for a wider class of statistical theories 
(local, "regular" statistical theories), examined in Chapter 4.
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3.3 THE BELL INEQUALITIES
In §2.4 it was shown that each statistical theory admits a classical covering 
theory, implying that in some sense all physical phenomena may be understood in 
terms of classical probability and logical structures. The main result of this section 
is the demonstration that some statistical theories, and in particular standard 
quantum mechanics, do not admit a local classical covering theory. It follows that 
an attempt to understand quantum phenomena in such "classical" terms as above 
must conflict with the principle of local causality (assuming the physical validity of 
certain predictions of standard quantum mechanics).
The demonstration relies on the derivation of a suitable form of the Bell 
inequalities, and is based on results in §§5.4, 5.5 of Appendix II; these in turn were 
motivated by some earlier work [Hall, 1989, §§3.5, 3.6] which lacked the 
conceptual basis of statistical theories. Advantages of the statistical theory 
framework over other derivations [e.g., Clauser and Home, 1974; Fine, 1982] are 
that (i) the roles of joint probability and local causality become clearly identifiable; 
and (ii) a weaker "locality" condition than the "factorisability" condition of Clauser 
and Home [1974] is used.
The Formal Bell Inequalities
For a classical statistical theory (S,P,p) it may be shown (Appendix E of 
Appendix II) that
-1 < (A^AJCK) + (^AB2m  + (B^B2)(X)
-(^A ^X X ) -  ^(X) -  B2(K) < 0 (3.5)
for all abstract propositions e ? and all states X € S . I shall call these
the formal Bell inequalities [cf. §5.4 of Appendix II], as they are a consequence of 
the probability and logical structure of classical statistical theories. In particular, 
they connect abstract propositions of the form AaB,XB , which are only formally
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related, via the definition (2.6a):
AaB(X) = s u p U f l . )  I Xs ? ,  T = > 4 , £ ]  .
These inequalities were first derived by Fine [1982], as a property of classical 
distributions. It will be seen below that by themselves they have no direct physical 
interpretation; a further assumption, such as local causality, must be made.
The Physical Bell Inequalities
Suppose now that (S,P,p) is a local classical statistical theory (defined 
through equations (2.13), (3.2), (3.3)), and that [A ^A J , [Ar B2] , [B^A^ ,
[B1?B0] are joint experiments of the theory such that the individual components of 
each are performed in causally separated regions. Hence equation (3.4) holds, 
which together with the formal Bell inequalities (3.5) immediately implies
-1  < ( ^  • A^iX) + ( ^  • B2)(X) + (B{ ■ B2)(k)
-  (B^^CX) -  ^ (k ) - B2(k) <  0 (3.6)
for all states X e S . I call these the physical Bell inequalities [cf. §5.4 of 
Appendix II], since they connect predictions of the theory for physically related 
abstract propositions of the form A,B,A- B .
The physical Bell inequalities were essentially first derived by Clauser and 
Home [1974], but as a property of "objective local theories", based on the earlier 
inequality due to Bell [1964]. Clauser and Home do not distinguish between 
"formal" and "physical" inequalities, however they make clear in their paper they 
are considering joint experiments (and hence A• B rather than A\B ). I shall now 
discuss the derivation of Clauser and Home, and relate the class of "objective local 
theories" (introduced by them) to the class of local statistical theories considered 
above.
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Objective Local Theories
Clauser and Home [1974, §11] consider a particular type of joint experiment, 
with two localised measuring apparatuses 1 and 2 which have adjustable parameters 
a,b respectively. It is assumed that this experiment is to be performed on each 
member of an ensemble of systems, described by a distribution p(X) of states. 
Defining p (X,a) , p0(^,b) to be the probabilities that apparatus 1, apparatus 2 
respectively are triggered by a system in state X ; and p (a) , p2(b) to be the 
probabilities that a member of the ensemble described by p(A.) triggers apparatus 
1, apparatus 2 respectively; Clauser and Home [1974, equation (2)] write
Pt(a) = f^ d X  p(A,) Pj(X,a) , (3.7a)
p2(a) = 6X p(A.) p2(A.,a) , (3.7b)
where T denotes the space of states X . Further, Clauser and Home denote the 
probability that both apparatuses are triggered by a system in state X by 
p 2(A.,a,b) , and the corresponding "ensemble" probability by p12(a,b) , with
p12(a,b) dX p(X) p12(X,a,b) . (3.7c)
Finally, they define an objective local theory to be one which further satisfies
p 12(X.,a,b) = p ^ a )  p2(k,b) , (3.8)
for each state h T  [cf. Clauser and Home, 1974, equation (2')].
To transpose the definitions of Clauser and Home to the language of statistical 
theories, consider a statistical theory (S,P,p) with an associated covering theory 
(S,P,p) (§2.4), where P = P denote the propositions which may be tested on the 
class of systems considered by Clauser and Home; S = T ; S is the set of 
probability distributions {p } on T ; and p,p are related by
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p(A,p) =
i
(3.9)
for each A e P , p e S [cf. Example 4.2 of Appendix II]. Equation (3.9) 
embodies equations (3.7a,b) above, where propositions verified by the triggering of 
apparatuses 1,2 may be denoted for example by A^,A2 respectively (so that 
p ^ a )  = p(A1?^ ) , p^a) = p(Ar p ) , etc.). Further, the proposition that both 
apparatuses are triggered is then tested by a joint experiment of the form [A^AJ , 
so that p 12(X,a,b) , p12(a,b) of equation (3.7c) correspond to p ^ - A ^ X ) ,
fKA^A^p) respectively. Finally, equation (3.8) may be written in either of the 
forms
for each state X e S .
Thus an objective local theory corresponds to an associated pair of statistical 
theories (S,P,p) , (S,P,p) satisfying equations (3.9), (3.10) above. Using the
method of Clauser and Home [1974, Appendix A], the physical Bell inequalities, 
equation (3.6), may be derived for (S,P,p) using equation (3.10b) (or equivalently 
using equation (3.8)). They then immediately follow also for (S,P,p) , via 
equation (3.9) (or equivalently via equations (3.7)). Thus the physical Bell 
inequalities hold for both objective local theories, and for local classical theories. 
The question to be answered now is how the former theories are related to the 
latter.
The connection between the two classes of theories lies in the interpretation of 
the "factorisability" condition, equation (3.8), of Clauser and Home [1974, §11]. 
This condition is motivated by them as expressing the statistical independence of 
measurement results for the two apparatuses. This is a concept of classical 
probability theory, and in the framework of statistical theories relies on the
P(A1-A2,X) = p(A1A ) p(A2,X) (3.10a)
x,o.) (3.10b)
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equivalence of A^A,  and A^AA^ ; i.e., the quantity p 0(A.,a,b) of equation (3.8) 
must be a classical joint probability. Further, the terminology "objective local 
theory" implies that Clauser and Home interpret equation (3.8) as a locality 
condition. Indeed, if the measurements of the two apparatuses refer to causally 
separated regions, then the equivalent condition, equation (3.10b), together with the 
similarly motivated conditions
(A' • B)(X) = A'{X) B(Xf (A-B')(X) = A(X) B'(X), (A' -B')(X) = A'(X) B'(X)
imply that equations (3.2), (3.3) are satisfied, and hence that the factorisability 
condition is consistent with local causality.
In summary, the interpretation of equation (3.8) by Clauser and Home may be 
incorporated within the statistical theory framework by assuming that (S,P,p) (and 
hence (S,P,p)) is a local classical theory. But then the physical Bell inequalities, 
(3.6), follow immediately, as derived above, independently of the factored form of 
equation (3.8). Further, the equivalence of A-B , AaB may be proved via equation 
(3.4). I conclude that the derivation of the physical Bell inequalities by Clauser and 
Home is in essence restricted to a subset of local classical statistical theories, which 
could be termed "factorisable" local, classical statistical theories.
Local, Classical Covering Theories and the 
Physical Bell Inequalities
It will now be shown (following §5.5 of Appendix II) that the physical Bell 
inequalities provide a necessary condition for a statistical theory to admit a local, 
classical covering theory. That is, a statistical theory (S,P,p) can only be 
embedded in a theory with a classical probability and logical structure, in a manner 
consistent with local causality, if it satisfies the physical Bell inequalities (3.6). 
Since as is well known [e.g., Clauser and Home, 1974; Clauser and Shimony, 
1978] standard quantum mechanics makes some predictions which violate these
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inequalities, it follows in particular that there are no local, classical covering 
theories for standard quantum mechanics.
To demonstrate the above statements, consider a covering theory (S,P,p) for 
some statistical theory (S,P,p) , with proposition and state mappings 9 and <J> 
satisfying equations (2.14). If [A,B] is a joint experiment of (S,P,p) then it 
follows from equation (2.14a) that [A,B] and [0(A),0(B )] denote the same joint 
experiment. Hence, by the definition of the proposition A B  (§3.2), one has
0(A-B) = 0(A)-0(B) . (3.11)
Equations (2.14c) and (3.11) immediately imply that
p(A-B,X) = p(0(A)- 0(B), <$>(X)) (3.12)
for each X e S . Now suppose that (S,P,p) is a local, classical statistical theory. 
Hence the physical Bell inequalities (3.6) hold for (S,P,p) ; from (3.12) they must 
therefore hold for (S,P,p) , and the remarks of the above paragraph are validated.
It is important to note that the formal Bell inequalities, (3.5), have no similar 
significance. It is possible for the latter inequalities to hold for (S,P,p) but not for 
(S,P,p) , as in general the two theories will have different probability/logic 
structures (§2.4). The derivation of the formal Bell inequalities by Fine [1982] is 
thus not directly related to the discussion of allowable covering theories for 
quantum mechanics. Some further assumption such as local causality is required to 
obtain the physical Bell inequalities, and thus contribute to this discussion (any 
assumption leading to equation (3.4) will suffice). Claims such as that of 
de Muynck [1986], that the Bell inequalities may be obtained independently of such 
assumptions, are thus based on inadequate attention to the physical significance of 
the various inequalities that may be derived. The framework of statistical theories 
clarifies this point by distinguishing unambiguously the formal and the physical 
Bell inequalities and their respective significance.
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS
The characterisation of statistical theories in this thesis (§2.2) has permitted 
conceptually independent formulations of (i) inherent joint probability and logical 
structures (§2.3); (ii) covering theories (§2.4); and (iii) local statistical theories 
(§3.2). The separation of these concepts clarifies their role in the derivation and 
significance of the Bell inequalities (§3.3). First, thz formal Bell inequalities, (3.5), 
hold for those statistical theories with a classical probability/logical structure. 
Second, the physical Bell inequalities, (3.6), hold for those statistical theories which 
further satisfy the principle of local causality. Third, the latter inequalities are a 
necessary condition for any statistical theory to admit a covering theory which is 
both classical and local.
It is the above clarification of the ingredients to, and the distinction between, 
the formal and physical Bell inequalities that is the main result of this chapter. The 
result may be regarded as a demonstration of the value of the statistical theory 
framework.
That there are no local, classical covering theories for standard quantum 
mechanics is a matter of some interpretational significance for physics. It would 
appear that to understand quantum phenomena in terms of classical structures (via 
the replacement of standard quantum mechanics by a classical covering theory), the 
principle of local causality must be abandoned. This result encourages the serious 
consideration of non-classical structures as physically fundamental, so as to 
maintain local causality. The study of non-classical probability and logical 
structures in this thesis (Chapters 1, 2, 4) is thus justified not only by (i) an analogy 
between classical and quantum formalisms (Chapter 1); and (ii) such structures 
being characteristic properties of statistical theories (Chapter 2); but also (iii) as 
pertinent to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Finally , two points should be made in regard to experimental tests for
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violation of the physical Bell inequalities. The first point is that the definition of 
causally separated regions (§3.2) is dependent on the spacetime model (M,—>) 
used for physical spacetime. The successes of special and general relativity theory 
suggest that Einsteinian spacetime is a suitable model, and hence that spacelike 
separated regions are causally separated (Figure 3.2). However, a violation of the 
physical Bell inequalities via measurements in spacelike separated regions could be 
construed as evidence that such regions are not causally separated. This argument, 
questioning the (macroscopic) validity of our present spacetime models is perhaps 
rather more difficult to accept than, say, non-classical probability structures!
The second point is that those predictions of standard quantum mechanics 
which violate the physical Bell inequalities could be physically wrong, in which 
case the signficicance of the inequalities for interpreting physical phenomena, in 
local classical terms, becomes null. In fact, no experiment has been performed to 
date which directly tests such predictions, due to the low efficiencies of existing 
detection apparata [see, e.g., Clauser and Shimony, 1978; Aspect and Grangier, 
1984; Ferrero and Santos, 1986]. Hence direct experimental confirmation of these 
inequalities by standard quantum systems is still required to fully assess their 
significance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE STATISTICAL THEORY APPROACH TO 
AXIOMATIC QUANTUM MECHANICS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The results of Chapter 3 demonstrate that the framework of statistical theories 
is well-suited to the discussion of some of the conceptual elements of quantum 
mechanics, and further that non-classical probability and logical structures are 
relevant to this discussion. In this chapter, I explore the possibility of adjoining 
some further requirements to the statistical theory concept (as characterised in 
§2.2), in order to obtain a class of statistical theories with "quantum-like" 
structures. This provides a step towards a new axiomatic formulation of quantum 
mechanics, which I call the "statistical theory approach".
In §4.2 the class of regular statistical theories is defined, and shown to arise as 
the consequence of four physically based axioms for the description of physical 
systems. These axioms underly the statistical theory approach to axiomatic 
quantum mechanics.
In §4.3 this approach is compared with the quantum logic approach (mentioned 
in §1.1). In particular, the links between "quantum logics" and the representative 
logics of regular statistical theories, and between "probability measures" and the 
states of regular statistical theories, are examined in some detail. Conceptual and 
technical advantages of the statistical theory approach are stressed.
In §4.4 the statistical theory approach is further developed and some results 
from Chapters 1 and 3 are generalised.
Conclusions are presented in §4.5.
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4.2 REGULAR STATISTICAL THEORIES AND
THE STATISTICAL THEORY APPROACH
A statistical theory (S,P,p) is defined to be regular if the following conditions 
hold for all X e S , A,B e ? :
1 e ? (4.1a)
If A ^ B  then A 'AB e ? (4.1b)
If A=$ B then (A A B )(X ) +  ( A 'A B ) ( \ )  =  B (X ) . (4.1c)
This is equivalent to the definition in §3.4 of Appendix II (equations (17)), noting 
that (4.1a) is implicitly assumed in the latter definition (§3.2 of Appendix II), and 
that A' e 7 follows from equations (2.7f), (2.9b), (4.1a), (4.1b) of the thesis. 
Comparison of equations (2.13), (4.1) shows that the class of classical statistical 
theories is contained within the class of regular statistical theories. Further, 
Example 3.2 of Appendix II shows that the Hilbert space description of a standard 
quantum system yields a regular statistical theory.
The class of regular statistical theories provides the basis for a "statistical 
theory approach" to axiomatic quantum mechanics, briefly discussed in Hall [1988; 
see Appendix II]. The aim of such an approach is to derive the characteristic 
"quantum" features of standard quantum mechanics from a small number of 
(physically motivated) axioms. A further aim is to derive the Hilbert space 
formalism of standard quantum mechanics, which I shall not address here. I will 
now discuss the basic assumptions of the statistical theory approach, and in the next 
section make comparisons with the quantum logic approach.
The Statistical Theory Approach
While regular statistical theories are the key to the statistical theory approach 
to axiomatic quantum mechanics, the defining conditions (4.1a), (4.1b), (4.1c) do 
not directly admit a simple physical interpretation and are therefore not suitable as 
axioms for a physical theory. In the following I shall show that some other,
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physically motivated axioms can be found from which conditions (4.1) can be 
derived as theorems.
First, motivated by the probabilistic nature of quantum phenomena:
Axiom 1. A physical system is described by a statistical theory as 
characterised in §2.2. In particular, there are a set of states, S ; a set of 
experimental propositions, P , which may be tested on these states; and a 
mapping p:PxS —♦ [0,1] , where p(A,A,) is the probability that proposition A is 
verified on state X .
The remaining axioms are motivated by consideration of simultaneously 
measurable propositions. Consider an experiment E which may be performed on 
the class of systems described by a statistical theory (S,P,p) . Denote the possible 
results of this experiment by elements of a result set . For any physical 
experiment will be finite. There is then an associated set of propositions tested 
by experiment E , of the form "The result of E is contained in a subset, X , of 
R£ Denote the experimental proposition corresponding to X c R^ by Ax , and 
the set of such propositions by P£ . Thus Ax is verified by a result x e X , and 
falsified otherwise. E is defined to be an experiment of (S,P,p) if P_ c P . Now 
if a proposition A € P has zero probability of being verified on any state
Ä C j
X € S , i.e., p(Ax ,X.) = 0 VA. e S , then a result x e X is exceptional, and may be 
discarded (without changing any probabilities). It follows that R„ may beb
replaced by the set R_\X without loss of generality. I shall therefore assume thatb
R_ is minimal, in the sense thatb
\  = 0 IFF X = <j> , (4.2)
where denotes the abstract proposition corresponding to Ax e P£ .
The following lemma gives some technical properties of the abstract 
propositions in 7 , corresponding to an experiment, E , of (S,P,p) .b
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Lemma 4.1. If E is an experiment of the statistical theory (SJP,p) , then
(i) 4 ^ = 1 ;  , (4.3a)
(ii) A L  = A , where Xc := RC\X ; (4.3b)
^  Xc E
(iii) A x n j X )  + i  ( X )  = A ( X ) ; (4.3c)
xcnY Y
for all X,Y c R^ . , X s S .
Proof. The proof of properties (4.3) uses the fact that E simultaneously tests all 
propositions in P£ . Consider an ensemble of N systems described by state X  , 
and suppose that experiment E is performed on each member of this ensemble. 
For each system define the quantity r(Ax ,^) to be 1 if experimental proposition 
Ax is verified, and 0 otherwise. Since, by definition, the result of E is in , 
and since the result is in some Y c R g  if and only if it is in exactly one of 
X n Y , Xc n Y ,  then
r(AR ,X = 1 ;
t(A ,X )  + r(A ,X )  = t(A X )  ; xnY xcny y
(4.4a)
(4.4b)
for every U S  , X,Y c . Further, if (• )  denotes an ensemble average, in the 
limit N —> oo , then equations (2.1), (2.2) imply
(r(Ax ,^)) = A^X)  (4.4c)
for all X q R_ , X  e S . Part (i) of the lemma now follows from definition (2.5)
h
and equations (4.4a), (4.4c); part (ii) follows from definition (2.4) and equations 
(4.4a), (4.4b), (4.4c) (choosing Y = R^ ); and part (iii) follows from equations 
(4.4b), (4.4c). □
The second axiom of the statistical theory approach is motivated by the 
interpretation of the proposition A ^ ,^  e P£ for an experiment E of (S,P,p) . In 
particular, since x e X n Y  if and only if x e X ,  x e Y , it follows that AxnY
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is verified if and only if both Ax and A y are verified. Intuitively, the probability 
of this simultaneous verification on state X is just the "joint probability" of Ax 
and Ay verified on state X . To incorporate this as a property of the probability 
structure of (SJ?,p) I formulate:
Axiom 2. If E is an experiment of (S,P,p) then
for all X,Y c .
(4.5)
This axiom ensures that the probability structure of (S,P,p) conforms at least 
partly to an intuitive concept of joint probability. To motivate the next axiom, a 
consequence of Axiom 2 is first derived.
Consider now propositions Ax ,Ay e P£ for some experiment E of (SJ?,p) ,
and suppose that X c Y .  Then from Axiom 2 A^hAy = A ^ y  = so l^at
Ax => Ay (equation (2.8c)). Conversely, suppose that A  ^ => Ay . Then equations
(2.8c), (2.8d) give A^hAy = Ax  , and hence A ^ y = Ax  by Axiom 2. Hence, part
(iii) of Lemma 4.1 above implies that A = 0 . Therefore XnYc = § (equation
xnYc
(4.2)), and so X c Y .  The above results show that
Ax =^Ay IFF X c Y  (4.6)
for all X,Y c , where E is an experiment of (S,P,p) .
Equation (4.6) relates implication on (S,P,p) to the intuitively natural 
property of set inclusion for those abstract propositions which may be tested 
simultaneously. The third axiom of the statistical theory approach ensures that this 
relation always obtains.
Axiom 3. If A =4 B for some A,B 6 ? , then there exists an experiment E of 
(S,P,p) with A,B e ?E •
In Axiom 3, denotes the set of abstract propositions tested by experiment 
E . If A =4 B , then the axiom implies that A -  Ax  , B = ,ly for some
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X,Y c Rg , and thus X c Y from equation (4.6), i.e. B is verified {by experiment 
E ) only if A is verified. Axiom 3 may thus be interpreted as incorporating an 
intuitive concept of implication into the logical structure of (S,P,p) .
The final axiom to be given here is primarily of a technical nature:
Axiom 4. There exists an experiment, E , of (S,P,p) .
The technical reason for this axiom is to ensure that 1 e ? (following from 
part (i) of Lemma 4.1). Axioms 3 and 4 and the relation A=$ 1 further ensure 
there is an experiment of (S,P,p) for each abstract proposition. Thus Axiom 4 
may be regarded in some sense as a completeness condition.
The following theorem is a structure theorem for physical theories which 
satisfy the above four axioms.
Theorem 4.1. A theory satisfying Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 above is a regular statistical 
theory.
Proof. It must be shown that conditions (4.1a), (4.1b), (4.1c) follow from Axioms 
2, 3, 4. But condition (4.1a) follows from Axiom 4 and part (i) of Lemma 4.1. 
Further if A=$ B for some A>B e 7 , then A = Ax  , B = 
where E is an experiment of (S,P,p) (Axiom 3). Therefore
Ay for some X,Y c R£ ,
A '  A B -  AfhA^ -  A A Ay, -  A € 7L c 'P
* T xc T xcnY E
using part (ii) of Lemma (4.1) and Axiom 2, i.e., condition (4.1b) is satisfied. 
Condition (4.1c) then follows using part (iii) of Lemma 4.1 and Axiom 2. □
It is of interest to note that if Axiom 3 is replaced by the postulate that an 
experiment E of (S,P,p) exists for each A,B e ? such that AfB e , then
conditions (2.13) may be proved by a method similar to the above theorem; i.e., if 
any two propositional qualities may be tested simultaneously then Axioms 1, 2, 4
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imply that (S,P,p) is a classical statistical theory.
The study of regular statistical theories in axiomatic quantum mechanics is 
thus motivated by Axioms 1-4 above, where these may be interpreted in a 
physically intuitive manner. In particular, Axiom 1 provides a natural probability 
and logical structure for physical systems; Axioms 2 and 3 restrict this structure to 
conform with usual notions of joint probability and implication; and Axiom 4 is 
included for technical convenience. Some properties of regular statistical theories 
are examined in §4.4; first some comparisons will be made in §4.3 between the 
statistical theory approach to axiomatic quantum mechanics, and the quantum logic 
approach mentioned in Chapter 1.
4.3 COMPARISON WITH THE QUANTUM LOGIC APPROACH
The historical development of the quantum logic approach to axiomatic 
quantum mechanics is reviewed by Jammer [1974]; recent expositions of the 
approach may be found in, for example, Gudder [1979], Beltrametti and Cassinelli 
[1981], Primas [1981], and Varadarajan [1985]. I shall be concerned here with two 
fundamental concepts of this approach: quantum logics, and probability measures 
on such logics. There is a strong link between these concepts and regular statistical 
theories.
Some definitions are required to discuss the above concepts. A poset is a pair 
(£<) , where < is a partial ordering on the set £ .  The greatest lower bound and 
least upper bound of a,b e £ with respect to < are denoted by aAb , aVb 
respectively, and are unique if they exist. An orthocomplemented poset is a triple 
(£,</) , such that (£,<) is a poset with an element l e £ satisfying a < 1 for all 
a e £ , and the operation a —> a ' (called orthocomplementation) satisfies: a" = a ; 
if a < b then b ' < a ' ; and aVa' = 1 , for all a,b e £ . An orthocomplemented 
poset is orthocomplete if a < b ' implies aVb e £ , and is ,
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G-orthocomplete if for all countable sequences a^a^a^,... in £ ,  a. < aj Vi ^ j 
implies Va. e £ . An orthocomplemented poset is orthomodular if a < b implies 
b = aV(bAa') . A quantum logic is a G-orthocomplete orthomodular poset. A 
probability measure on a quantum logic is a mapping, m:C—>[0,1], which 
satisfies m(l) = 1 , and m(Va.) = I  m(a.) for all countable sequences a^a^a^,... 
in £ such that a. < a ' for each i * j . The above definitions are taken from 
Gudder [1979, §§3.1, 3.2].
The quantum logic approach typically [e.g., Varadarajan, 1985] begins with a 
quantum logic (£,<,') , where the elements of £ are interpreted as propositions, 
and defines states to be probability measures on £ . If M denotes the set of 
states, and p:£xM —♦ [0,1] is defined by p(a,m) := m(a) , then this approach leads 
directly to a statistical theory (£,M,p) . Further, if M is order-determining on £ , 
i.e., a < b if and only if m(a) < m(b) for all m e M , then it may be shown that 
the representative logic of (£,M,p) (§2.3) is just (£,</) .
In contrast, the statistical theory approach (§4.2) begins with the assumption of 
a statistical theory (Axiom 1), which has an inherent probability and logical 
structure (§2.3). Three further assumptions (either Axioms 2-4 or conditions (4.1)) 
lead to the class Of regular statistical theories. It is shown in Appendix C of 
Appendix II that the representative logic of a regular statistical theory (S,P,p) is 
an orthocomplete, orthomodular poset. Further, it is shown that the mappings 
m^.7? —* [O’l] defined by m^(A) = A(X) for each X € S , A eT P ,  satisfy 
(i) m^(l) = 1 , and (ii) m^(V.T) = I  m^(,4) for all countable sequences 
A^,Ay J y . . .  in ? such that /  =* A'. .  Comparing these properties with the earlier 
definitions of quantum logics and probability measures, it is seen that the two 
approaches are very closely related.
The main technical differences are that (i) quantum logics are required to be 
G-orthocomplete, whereas the representative logics of regular statistical theories
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need only be orthocomplete, and (ii) quantum logics need not admit any states [e.g., 
Greechie, 1971], whereas the states of regular statistical theories are indeed 
guaranteed sufficiently numerous to be order-determining, through definition (2.3).
It is an advantage of this approach that the meet and join of propositions are 
always defined (equations (2.6), (2.10)), whereas in the quantum logic approach 
they can only be defined as greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds 
respectively, which need not exist in general. Thus in the former approach one has 
m^(VX) = I. m^(T) for Ä =* A'. , i * j , even though for countably infinite 
sequences {T} , VÄ need not be an element of ? .  This property, that m^ 
"behaves like" a probability measure on a a-orthocomplete poset even though 
(?,=>,') is only orthocomplete in general, avoids the need to motivate a-ortho- 
completeness (which would be impossible on physical grounds as it involves an 
infinite sequence of propositions).
I conclude that the statistical theory approach is better physically motivated 
than the quantum logic approach. First, logical structures appear naturally in the 
former approach (via Axiom 1), as an inherent feature of the nature of the 
predictions made by statistical theories (Chapter 2); whereas in the latter approach 
(quantum) logics are introduced elements. Second, the probability and logical 
structures of the former approach have a common conceptual root (statistical 
theories, as characterised in Chapter 2); whereas the quantum logics and 
probability measures of the latter approach are conceptually distinct. Third, the 
axioms of the statistical theory approach are given in terms of physical experiments, 
whereas the appearance of G-orthocompleteness and probability measures in the 
quantum logic approach involves the technically convenient, but unphysical,
JL
consideration of infinite sequences of propositions.!
f This last point applies also to any variations on the basic quantum logic 
approach in which a-orthocomplete posets are obtained as derived features 
[e.g., Marlow, 1978; Gudder, 1979, §3.2].
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The quantum logic approach has been developed extensively since its 
inception, and many of the results apply directly to the statistical theory approach, 
via the relationship between quantum logics and regular statistical theories. 
Conversely, the statistical theory approach provides a set of simple, physically 
motivated axioms for the study of probability measures on orthocomplete, 
orthomodular posets in the quantum logic approach. These connections between 
the two approaches invite future mutual exploitation.
4.4 SOME PROPERTIES OF REGULAR STATISTICAL THEORIES
In this section some technical and interpretational properties of regular 
statistical theories are briefly stated.
Conditional Probabilities
Consider a regular statistical theory (S,P,p) for which the representative logic, 
(?,=>,')> is a lattice, i.e. AaB , AslB e 7 for all AB e 7 .  Since AaB => B 
(equation (2.8c)), it follows from Axiom 3 (§4.2) of the statistical theory approach 
that AaB, B may be simultaneously tested by some experiment E of (S,P,p) . 
This permits the physically based definition of a generalised conditional probability, 
(T| #)(V) , for each AB e 7 , Xe S , as the probability that both AAB and B are 
verified if tested simultaneously on state X , given that B is verified. This 
definition is consistent with the "static formulation" of conditional probability 
discussed in §1.3 for classical and quantum systems. A derivation similar to that of 
equations (1.13) of §1.3, shows
Wl = (4.7)
From equations (2.8b), (4.7) it then follows that
O \S |0(X ) = U\BhO(k) x (ß |Q (?i), (4.8)
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i.e., the conjunctive inference, or Bayes rule, of classical probability theory (§1.3) is 
satisfied by these generalised conditional probabilities. Further, the implication 
relation for (S,P,p) may be characterised in terms of conditional probabilities by
A = >  B IFF ( B \A ) ( X )  =1 for all X e  S  . (4.9)
The Modified Contradictory Inference
In Appendix D of Appendix II it is shown (equation (Dl)) that if (?,=},') is a 
lattice, for the regular statistical theory (SJP,p) , then
(Aa B)(X)  + ( A '  AB)(X)  < B(X)  (4.10a)
for each A,B € 7  , X  e S . Hence from equation (4.7) one has
( A \ B ) ( X )  + ( A '  \B)(X)  < l  (4.10b)
for such theories. Equation (4.10b) generalises the modified contradictory inference 
discussed in §1.3 (equation (1.14)) for quantum systems, and may similarly be 
interpreted in terms of complementarity properties. For c l a s s i c a l  statistical theories, 
equality strictly holds in equations (4.10) (from equations (2.13c), (4.7)).
Simultaneously Measurable Propositions
If abstract propositions A,B of (S,P,p) may be simultaneously tested by an 
experiment E of (S,P,p) , so that A = A x , B  = A y  for some X,Y q  , then 
equality holds in equations (4.10) from equations (4.3c), (4.7) and Axiom 2 of the 
statistical theory approach; i.e., the contradictory inference of classical probability 
theory,
(4|5)(A.) + U '|5 )a )=  1 ,
holds for simultaneously measurable propositions of (S,P,p) .
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Local Regular Statistical Theories
Again for the case where the representative logic of (S,P,p) is a lattice, it is 
shown in Appendix D of Appendix II that if (S,P,p) is a local regular statistical 
theory then
AaB=A-B , A ' t ä = A ' - B ,  AaB'=A-B'  , A ' M ' = A ' - B '  , (4.11)
for a joint experiment [A,B] of the theory such that [A],[B] are performed in 
causally separated regions (§3.2). This generalises equation (3.4) for local classical 
statistical theories. For a standard quantum system (§1.2), equation (4.11) implies 
that if propositions A,B are tested in causally separated regions and [A,B] is a 
joint experiment of the theory, then the corresponding propositions A,B must 
commute (§5.3 of Appendix II).
Generalised Probability Measures and Decompositions
A generalised probability measure of a statistical theory (S,P,p) is defined 
[Appendix II, §3.4, equation (15)] to be a mapping, m , from T? to the interval 
[0,1] which satisfies
m(l) = 1 ; (4.12a)
if AVA,... e 7 satisfy A, =* X. , i * j , then m(V^t) = I  m(4) . (4.12b)i  z  1 J 1 1
Conditions (4.12) generalise the definition of a probability measure on a 
quantum logic (§4.3). Here a characterisation of the set of generalised probability 
measures will be given for the case of regular statistical theories (Theorem 4.2 
below).
Define a decomposition of the statistical theory (S,P,p) to be a countable 
subset, D , of 7 such that
I  A(k) = 1 for all Xe S . (4.13)
M  D
The term "decomposition" is suggested by the Hilbert space formalism for the
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description of a standard quantum system (§1.2); in this case D corresponds to a 
decomposition of the Hilbert space H into a direct sum of mutually orthogonal 
closed subspaces of H . The following lemma characterises the decompositions of 
a regular statistical theory in terms of the representative logic of the theory.
Lemma 4.2. A countable subset D= {XX.,...) c ? is a decomposition of the 
regular statistical theory (S,P,p) if and only if
(i) X=> B' for each A * B  in D , and (4.14a)
(ii) VA = 1 . (4.14b)
AeD
Proof. First, suppose that D = c ?  is a decomposition of (S,P,p) .
Hence for X,X e D , i * j ,
A ( X )  = A \ ( X )  + I A ( X )
1 k*ij K
for all X e S  (using equations (2.4), (4.13)), and therefore A =4 Aj from 
definition (2.3). But this is just condition (4.14a) of the lemma. Further, using the 
result from Appendix C of Appendix II that the mapping m^:TP—♦ [0,1] defined 
by
m^(A) := A(X) for each X e S, A e T ?  (4.15)
is a generalised probability measure, it follows from equations (4.12b), (4.13) that
(VX)(A.) = m^(VX) = I  m^(^) = 2 ApC) = 1
for each Xe S , and hence that VA = 1 , i.e., condition (4.14b) is satisfied. 
Conversely, suppose now that conditions (4.14a), (4.14b) of the lemma are satisfied 
for some countable subset D c 7 . It must be shown that D is a decomposition of 
(S,P,p) . But since the mapping m^ defined in (4.15) is a generalised probability 
measure for each X e S (Appendix C of Appendix II), it follows using equations
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(4.12) , (4.14) that
X AX) = X my (J) = m* ( V A) = (1) = 1 ,
AeD AeD A A AeD A
and the lemma is proved. □
Lemma 4.1 will be used in the proof of the following theorem, which 
characterises the set, M , of generalised probability measures of a regular 
statistical theory (S,P,p) in terms of the decompositions of (S,P,p) .
Theorem 4.2. A mapping m:77—♦ [0,1] is a generalised probability measure of 
the regular statistical theory (SJP,p) if and only if
X m U ) = l  (4.16)
for each decomposition D of (S,P,p) .
Proof. Suppose first that m 6 M , i.e., m is a mapping satisfying conditions
(4.12) . Then for a decomposition D of (S,P,p) , Lemma 4.2 above together with
conditions (4.12) imply that
X m(i) = m( V A) = m(l) = 1 ,
TgD ^6D
i.e., equation (4.16) holds. Conversely, suppose that (4.16) holds for all 
decompositions D of (S,P,p). But {1} q 7 (condition (4.1a)) is a decomposition 
of (SJP,p) from Lemma 4.2, and hence equation (4.12a) follows from (4.16). 
Further, suppose that A^A^,... e 7 satisfies X =4 A'. , i * j  . If {AyA^,— } is 
finite, the orthocompleteness property of (?,=$,') (Appendix C of Appendix II) 
implies that MX e 7 . Also, the relation vA =4 1 and condition (4.1b) gives 
B = (V l)' e 7 . Thus, since A => VX = B' for each i , B =4 B , and 5V(VÄ) = 
B\/B' = 1 (Appendix C of Appendix II), it follows from Lemma 4.2 that the sets
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D1 = {BiAyAy—} , D9 = {B,B'} are decompositions of (S,P,p) . Hence, using 
equation (4.16),
m(VA) = m(F') = 1 -  m(B) = X m(^) -  m(5) = I m ( i )
1 j £ D x
i.e., condition (4.12b) holds. Finally, if is infinite, define
:= m(v"_1 M) . Then the limit of the sequence {T^} as n —» °o exists from 
definition (2.10b). But the result just proved above shows that Tn = Z? m(^.) for 
all finite values of n , and hence equality must hold in the limit, i.e., m(V<”_1 A) = 
l ”_1 mOf) . Thus condition (4.12b) holds, and the theorem is proved. □
Regular Statistical Theories and Decompositions
Finally, decompositions as defmed by condition (4.13) lead not only to a 
characterisation of the probability measures of a regular statistical theory (Theorem 
4.2) but to a characterisation of regular statistical theories themselves. This is the 
content of the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3. A statistical theory (S,P,p) is regular if and only if
(i) {1} is a decomposition of (S,P,p) , and
(ii) {A,A' AB,B'} is a decomposition of (SJP,p) for all A,B e ? satisfying 
A ^ B .
Proof. By inspection, condition (i) is equivalent to condition (4.1a), and condition 
(ii) is equivalent to conditions (4.1b), (4.1c). □
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 together indicate that decompositions are a useful 
concept in the statistical theory approach to axiomatic quantum mechanics, and 
suggest the possibility of alternative axioms to Axioms 2, 3, 4 of §4.2, based on a 
physical interpretation of decompositions.
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The symmetry of equations (4.13), (4.16) for regular statistical theories may be 
exploited to show that (S,P,p) is a covering theory (§2.4) for (S,P,p) , where 
S = M is the set of generalised probability measures on (S,P,p) , and
p:PxS —* [0,1] is defined by p(A,m) := m(i) . Moreover, it follows that (i) the 
decompositions of either theory are equivalent, so that by Theorem 4.3 they have 
isomorphic representative logics; and (ii) 5 = S . Hence (S,P,p) may be regarded 
in some sense as a "completion" of (S,P,p) . Further properties of (S,P,p) provide 
an avenue for future work; I note here only that S c S  , where S is the 
convex-state set defined in Example 4.2 of Appendix II.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
While the statistical theory approach is technically very closely related to the 
quantum logic approach (both concern probability measures on orthocomplete, 
orthomodular posets; see §§4.3, 4.4), it has a conceptually stronger foundation. 
The main reason for this is that once Axiom 1 is accepted (§4.2), i.e., that a 
physical system is described by a statistical theory, there is immediately a basis for 
discussing probability and logical structures, and the possible properties of these 
structures (§2.3). Axiom 2 then provides physical interpretations of joint 
probability and logical implication for simultaneously measurable propositions 
(equations (4.5), (4.6)), and Axiom 3 allows a physical characterisation of 
implication, via set inclusion. These axioms alone establish much of the structure 
of regular statistical theories (in particular, conditions (4.1a), (4.1b)). The 
consequence of Axiom 4, that there is an experiment described by the theory 
(P c P ) for each abstract proposition of theory (§4.2), may be interpreted as a 
completeness condition.
To make full contact with the Hilbert space formalism of standard quantum 
mechanics further development is needed. This can partly be achieved by "riding 
on the back" of the quantum logic approach (§4.3), and perhaps partly by some
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"special" characteristics of regular statistical theories (e.g., the order-determining 
property equation (2.3), and the "decomposition" properties noted in Theorems 4.2, 
4.3 (§4.4)).
Finally, going in the opposite direction, one might hope to find more 
fundamental axioms for the statistical theory approach, so that Axiom 1 becomes a 
theorem. There are at least two reasons for pursuing such a program. First, the 
characterisation of statistical theories in §2.2 distinguishes strongly between 
propositions and states, even though the preparation of states and registration of 
results are experimentally similar procedures. It may be possible to define these 
two concepts in a simple manner via a single underlying concept (e.g., 
"procedures"). Second, the characterisation of statistical theories accepts 
probability as a primitive physical feature, even though the connection between 
probability and physical measurements is not well defined (§2.2). In particular, 
individual systems in the statistical theory approach exhibit properties amenable to 
prediction only within an ensemble context (equations (2.2)). It is thus desirable to 
better understand the necessity/origin of probability in quantum mechanics (and 
other statistical theories); perhaps this may be achieved by examining in detail the 
concept of an individual physical system.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ON NON-INTERACTING SYSTEMS IN 
QUANTUM MECHANICS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is to a large extent independent of the earlier chapters. The 
apparatus of statistical theories and non-classical probability/logical structures is put 
aside, to discuss the description of non-interacting systems in quantum mechanics 
from the viewpoint of a recent thought experiment due to Datta et al. [1987, 1988].
The essential elements of this thought experiment are expounded in §5.2. 
Whereas Datta et al. [1987, 1988] conclude that a violation of (Einsteinian) local 
causality is suggested by the thought experiment, it is shown that rather it is the 
consistency of the description of non-interacting systems which is challenged. 
Possible interpretations of the thought experiment are categorised in terms of the 
model of measurement proposed by Datta et al.
In §§5.3, 5.4, 5.5, discussions of the thought experiment in the literature [in
chronological order of appearance: Hall, 1987; Lindblad, 1987; Squires and
Siegwart, 1987; Finkelstein and Stapp, 1987; Clifton and Redhead, 1988; Ghirardi 
et al., 1988; Squires, 1988; and Corbett, 1988] are similarly categorised, and
examined critically to clarify the interpretational import of the experiment. A
generalisation of the first contribution to the discussion [Hall, 1987] (following the 
initial paper of Datta et al. [1987]), is given in §5.4.
Conclusions are presented in §5.6.
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5.2 THE DATTA-HO M E-RAYCHAUDHURI THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
A  Controversial Result
Datta et al. [1987, 1988] consider a pair o f correlated neutral pseudo-scalar
0 - o PC
mesons (M  ,M  ) originating from the decay o f a J =1  vector meson, with
in itia l state given by
|V(0)> := ( I 1 l ^ 0 ) l lM °>2) ’ (5-D
where subscripts 1 and 2 denote the two subsystems formed by the left-moving 
and right-moving components o f the meson pair. The particle/antiparticle states 
|M °) , |M °) decay via a weak CP-violating interaction [Lee and Wolfenstein, 
1965] into decay products represented by states |<J>S) , |<})L ) where CP- 
noninvariance is indicated by ( ^ l ^ )  * 0 .  It is the non-orthogonality o f the 
decay states |<(>s) , |<j) ) which forms the crux o f the thought experiment.
A t time t '  > 0 the state of the combined system (evolving from j\|/(0)) ) can 
be represented in the form
|V (t ')> = U (t',0 )  |v (0)) = C1|a1(t ' ) ) 1 |<t>s>2 + C2 |a2(t ')> 1 ]<f>L>2
+ 03133(1'))! |M ° )2 + C4 |a4( t ' ) ) j  |M ° )2 , (5.2a)
where IJ(t1,t2) (= U ^ t^ L )  ( S U ^ t ^ ) )  is the evolution operator for the combined 
system; the first two terms in the superposition correspond to the decayed 
components o f subsystem 2; and the last two terms correspond to the undecayed 
components. It should be noted that the states |M °) , |M °) are orthogonal both 
to each other and to the states |9S) » |<1>L ) . Equation (5.2a) corresponds to
equations (5) and (2) o f Datta et al. [1987] and [1988] respectively (where some 
terms have been dropped for convenience in the latter two equations). It is useful 
to write equation (5.2a) in (i) the density operator form
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W (t') = |v(t')>  (v ( t ') l  = Ü (t\0) |¥ (0)> <\|/(0)| Ü V ,0 )  ; (5.2b)
and (ii) the simplified form
|\|/(t')> = C J ^ )  +C 2 |\|f2> + C '|x >  ; (5.2c)
where the normalised states
I V “ la1(t')>1 l*S>2* I V “ |a2(t/)>l I V 2 ’
|X > -C 3 |a3(t')>, |M°>2 + C4 |a4(t')>1 |M°>2 (5.3)
satisfy ( v j x )  = ( v 2IX> = ° -
Datta et al. compare for some time t > t ' the probability of detection of a M® 
meson by a measurement on subsystem 1 in two cases:
(a) no measurement is made on subsystem 2 prior to time t ;
(b) a measurement of the decay products |<J>S) , |<|> > is made on subsystem 2 
at time t '  .
In case (a) this probability may be calculated in the usual manner as
p(a)(M°) = tr[W(t) IM°> j j<M° I] , (5.4)
where W(t) is given by equation (5.2b), with t '  replaced by t . Case (b) is less 
straightforward, as it involves the measurement of non-commuting projections, 
I$5) (0S I »|0L) (§L \ > for subsystem 2. Datta et al. treat this case via an 
approximate model of measurement in their first paper [1987], and via an exact 
model in their second paper [1988]. As both lead to the same qualitative result 
(equation (5.7) below), I shall only give details of the latter model here. In this 
model it is assumed that for the measurement on subsystem 2 at time t ' , the state 
W (t') (equation (5.2b)) collapses to a mixture represented by the density operator
w ' ( t ' )  = P j l V  < V  + P2I V  < V  +P3IV3) ( v 3l +P4 lv4> < V  . (5.5)
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where 1 ^ )  , |\|/?) are given in equation (5.3), |\i/3> = N“1(C11 ^ )  + C2 1y0>) 
(where N is a normalisation factor), |\y4) = |%) (equation (5.3)), and 
P4 = |C ' I . Equation (5.5) corresponds to equation (5) of Datta et al. [1988]. The 
probabilities Py Py P3 are not uniquely defined by Datta et al., but are constrained 
to sum to l-p 4 , so that probability conservation is observed (i.e., tr[W '(t')] = 1 ). 
The probability of detection of a M° meson for subsystem 1 at time t > t' is 
then given for case (b) by
P ^ W )  = tr[W'(t) |M ° ) 1 j<M °|] , (5.6)
where W '(t) = Ü(t,t') W '(t') Ü+(t,t') and W '(t') is given by equation (5.5).
The main result of the analysis of the thought experiment by Datta et al., 
outlined above, is that the quantities in equations (5.4), (5.6) are not equal, i.e.,
p(a)(M°) * p ^ M 0) . (5.7)
This corresponds to equation (9) of Datta et al. [1988], where the difference 
p^ (M °) -  p ^ M 0) is calculated explicitly. A similar result was suggested by their 
earlier paper [Datta et al., 1987, equation (9)], which however was dependent on an 
approximate model for the collapse |W (t')) —♦ |W '(t'))  .
The above result, indicating that an appropriate measurement on subsystem 2 
for each member of an ensemble of systems described by initial state 1^ (0)) , at 
time t ' , could influence the distribution of results of a measurement on subsystem 
1 at time t > t' , even with t -  t' arbitrarily small, led Datta et al. [1987] to 
suggest "the intriguing possibility of incompatibility between quantum mechanics ... 
and Einstein's locality condition at the statistical level". However, their question of 
"whether the pecularity of the example discussed ... is indicative of a genuine 
non-local effect predicted by quantum mechanics" [Datta et al., 1988] may be 
immediately answered in the negative. Since a non-relativistic model of 
measurement is used for the thought experiment, the speed of light in vacuo (and
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hence arbitrarily small time differences) is irrelevant to the discussion. The 
"peculiarity" of equadon (5.7) lies not in the possibility of superluminal influences 
propagating from one spacetime region to another, but rather in the possibility of 
any influences propagating between the supposedly non-interacting subsystems 1 
and 2 . This point has been made especially clearly by Lindblad [1987], though it 
has apparently not been noted in several discussions of the thought experiment [e.g., 
Squires and Siegwart, 1987; Clifton and Redhead, 1988].
Interpretations of the Thought Experiment
The controversial result of the thought experiment, characterised by equation 
(5.7), is thus the suggestion that a measurement of a physical quantity for some 
system could influence the observable properties of a second, (supposedly) 
non-interacting system. Having discarded the suggestion that Einsteinian locality is 
violated, there are at least three possible conclusions that might be drawn from this 
result. The first, motivated by the somewhat ad hoc nature of the collapse 
W (t') —♦ W '( t ')  proposed by Datta et al., is that:
(I) The measurement models used by Datta et al. [1987, 1988] are inconsistent 
with quantum mechanics.
The second possible conclusion from equation (5.7) is not that subsystems 1 and 2 
interact, but that the measuring apparatus used to carry out the measurement on 
subsystem 2 interacts also with subsystem 1, i.e.:
(II) The measurement models are inappropriate in that the measuring apparatus 
interacts with both subsystems.
The third conclusion is rather less acceptable than the first two:
(III) "Non-interacting" systems actually interact (!).
The latter conclusion implies that the representation of non-interacting
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systems in quantum mechanics (in this case by a factorisable evolution operator 
U = Uj ®U9 on the tensor product of the respective Hilbert spaces) is inherently 
inconsistent, and is certainly well worth avoiding. It is therefore desirable to find 
arguments supporting either of the first two above conclusions. In §§5.3, 5.4 I 
categorise two classes of existing arguments in the literature as type I and type II, 
according as to whether the respective conclusions (I) or (II) above are supported. 
In §5.5 I place two remaining contributions to the discussion, which seek to 
generalise the model of measurement used by Datta et al., but which do not lead to 
any significant resolution of the interpretation of equation (5.7).
5.3 TYPE I ARGUMENTS
Type I arguments in the literature may be divided into two kinds. The first 
[Lindblad, 1987] argues that the approximate model of measurement in the first 
paper of Datta et al. [1987] does not conserve probability. However, as this 
criticism is not applicable to the exact model of the second paper (§5.2), it will not 
be further discussed here.
In the second kind of type I argument [Squires and Siegwart, 1987; Finkel- 
stein and Stapp, 1987; Clifton and Redhead, 1988] it is maintained that the 
measurement models proposed by Datta et al. are not consistent with the projection 
postulate. In particular, this postulate [e.g., von Neumann, 1955, §V.l] implies that 
after measurement of some physical quantity on an ensemble of systems described 
by density operator W , the state collapses to a mixture, W ' , of mutually 
orthogonal states, of the form
w ' - I p - W . , (5.8)
where pk = tr[W Ä^] , Wk = A^ W A^trfW A^\ for some complete mutually 
orthogonal set of projections {A^J (i.e., 2^ = 1 , Äk Aj = 5kl Ak ). Since the
collapse W (t') —* W '( t ')  (equations (5.2b), (5.5)) does not have this form (e.g.,
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(\|/1 1 \|/2) * 0  from (5.3) and CP-noninvariance), the model of measurement used 
by Datta et al. is inconsistent with the projection postulate, and therefore, claim the 
proponents of this argument, it is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. Conclusion 
(I) of §5.2 is thus reached.
However, the projection postulate applies only to the class of so-called "ideal" 
or "moral" measurements [e.g., d'Espagnat, 1971, §§3, 14.1; Bell, 1987, §3]. Thus 
the argument merely points out that the model of measurement used by Datta et al. 
involves a measurement not belonging to this class. However, the proponents of 
this argument argue that all physical measurements do belong to this class: "a
measurement (again according to orthodox quantum theory) always projects the 
wavefunction onto an eigenstate of some Hermitian operator" [Squires and 
Siegwart, 1987]; "It is, of course, a basic precept of quantum theory that a 
measurement never collapses a state onto a mixture of non-orthogonal states" 
[Finkelstein and Stapp, 1987]; "In actuality the system after measurement projects 
into a member of a subset of mutually orthogonal states" [Clifton and Redhead, 
1988].
To dispel this notion that only moral measurements are of interest, it is useful 
to consider a simple counterexample. Accordingly, let Hermitian operators A2 
represent physical quantities of two two-level quantum systems S., S0 
respectively, with (mutually orthogonal) eigenstates denoted by { | p j  , | P p  and 
{ I p 2 , 11)2) respectively. Further, define
HV-^lth+UV-
It follows that A1 may be measured by preparing S2 in the initial state 11)2 ; 
correlating the two systems via an evolution operator, Ü , satisfying
ü | t ) , ® I T ) 2 = IT>j  ® l t > 2 . ü | i ) 1 ® | t > 2 = I— >!  ® | 1 > 2
(one may check that such a unitary operator exists); and measuring A2 . Then if
72
S1 has initial state | f ) j ,  the eigenvalue of A? corresponding to state | | ) 0 will 
be obtained with certainty; similarly, for initial state 11> of S1 , the eigenvalue 
corresponding to 11)2 is guaranteed by this procedure. This manner of measuring 
a physical quantity by correlating the states of two systems is well known and 
accepted in quantum theory [e.g., von Neumann, 1955, §VT.2J. However, applying 
the projection postulate to the above measurement of , where the initial state of 
Sj is given by
a I T >1 +  b l l > 1 .
the final state of S1 will be described by the mixture
w ' - | a | 2 |T>11< T M b | 2 | - > 11< - |
of non-orthogonal states. Thus moral measurements, combined with the notion of 
correlated properties, leads in a natural manner to collapse into non-orthogonal 
states.
The second kind of type I argument is seen to be based on an unreasonable 
restriction for models of measurement, namely that all measurements are moral. 
That it is possible to show that the description of non-interacting systems is 
consistent subject to this restriction [e.g., Bohm, 1951, §22.17; Bussey, 1982, 1987; 
Squires and Siegwart, 1987; Finkelstein and Stapp, 1987; Clifton and Redhead, 
1988] is of some interest, but is unfortunately of small consequence for the 
interpretation of the Datta-Home- Raychaudhuri thought experiment.
In summary, the above analysis demonstrates that type I arguments are 
inconclusive with regard to the results of Datta et al. [1987, 1988] (equation (5.7)). 
This has been pointed out by myself [Hall, 1987, §2], Datta et al. [1988], and 
Ghirardi et al. [1988]. The case of type II arguments will now be considered.
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5.4 TYPE n  ARGUMENTS
, Type II arguments endeavour to reach conclusion (II) of §5.2. They proceed 
by constructing a model of measurement which incorporates that of Datta et al. 
[1988] as a special case, and which is sufficiently detailed to discuss the interaction 
of the measuring apparatus with either subsystem. It is then proved that the 
"controversial result", equation (5.7), holds only if the measuring apparatus interacts 
with both (mutually noninteracting) subsystems. Note that conclusion (I), and 
hence any type I argument, is automatically refuted by this procedure, as the model 
of measurement used by Datta et al. becomes part of a (consistent) extension of 
quantum mechanics.
There are two subclasses of type II arguments identifiable in the literature, 
characterised by the general model of measurement used. The first [Ghirardi et al., 
1980] applies to the Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri thought experiment retrospectively, 
and is based on a quantum mechanical description of measuring apparatuses. The 
second [Hall, 1987; Ghirardi et al., 1988; and in retrospect Kraus, 1983, §4] is 
based on the operation-effect formulation of measurement theory [Davies, 1976; 
Ludwig, 1985; for an excellent exposition see Kraus, 1983]. Both subclasses of 
argument are reviewed briefly below; the second subclass is presented in a form 
more complete than has hitherto been given.
Quantum Mechanical Description of Measuring Apparatuses
Treatment of the measuring apparatus as a quantum system dates back to early 
quantum theory [e.g., von Neumann, 1955]. The type II argument due to Ghirardi 
et al. [1980] based on this treatment is couched partly in terms of superluminal 
signalling between spacetime regions. However, this is inappropriate, as the model 
of measurement in fact makes no relativistic assumptions. Hence the essential 
elements of the argument are recalled here purely in terms of non-interacting
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systems, where these are characterised by factorisable evolution operators.
Let Sj, S2 denote two non-interacting systems, and M denote a measuring 
apparatus. If the density operator W(0) represents the state of S1 + S9 at time 
0 , consider the probability of obtaining a result X = x^  at time t for some 
physical quantity X of S1 in two cases:
(a) No measurement has been made in the time interval (0,t) ;
(b) The measuring apparatus has been used to make some measurement on S0 
in the time interval (0,t) .
These cases generalise the thought experiment of Datta et al. (§5.2).
In the case (a), this probability has the form
pw (X = x.) = tr[U (5.9a)
where X. denotes the projection onto the subspace spanned by eigenstates of X
with eigenvalue x. , and where for non-interacting systems the evolution operator
LL on H 0 H  has the factored form 
b l +b2
% .+S = ^ S  , ® i2>(i 1 ®ÜS> (5.9b)
( i i denote the identity operators on LL , H respectively). In case (b), the 
1 2  ^  b2
probability is given by
PWCX = Xj) = tr[Üs W(0) ®WM(0) 9 %  X ] , (5.10a)
where W (0) denotes the initial state of the measuring apparatus, and where for 
non-interacting systems Sr  S9 the evolution operator Us +s +M on Hs ®HS
0 R , has the factored form M
^Sj+S^M  = U Sj+M U S2+M ’
(5.10b)
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( ü s +M , Üs +M denote evolution operators on Hs <s> HM , Hs ® HM 
1 2  1 2
respectively). The trace operation is over the Hilbert space H ® H in equation
bl b2
(5.9a), and over H <S>H ®H in equation (5.10a).
bl M
Using the unitarity of Us and +M , the cyclic property of the trace 
operation, and the relations
(following since X represents a physical quantity of ), it may be shown from 
equations (5.9), (5.10) that
p(a)(X = x.) = tr[Ü„ W(0) Üt X.] , (5.1 la)
J ^ i  J
p ^ X  = X) = tr[Ü +M W(0) ® W (0) Ü* +M X ] . (5.1 lb)
J 1 1 J
Hence, if Us +M = Us <8>UM , i.e., if the measuring apparatus does not interact 
with S1 , then it follows that
p(a)(X = x.) = p(b)(X = xj) .  (5.12)
Comparing equations (5.7), (5.12) it follows that the result of Datta et al. [1987, 
1988] may be interpreted as per conclusion (II) of §5.2.
Actually, it remains to be shown that the thought experiment of Datta et al. 
(§5.2) is indeed incorporated within the above model. This may be done by 
modelling the collapse W (t ')—♦W '(t')  (equations (5.2b), 5.5)) in the form 
(5.10a). Now, one may verify the existence of a unitary operator Us +s +M which
satisfies
S j+S^+M IOj)Sl+S2 ® l ° > M =  IV:>c .c ® |0Sl+S2 i = 1,2,3,4 (5.13)
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where {1^)$ +s ) » { |i ) M) ^  sets orthonormal vectors on Hs ®HS , HM 
1 2 1 2
respectively (i = 1,2,3,4) ; |0 )M is an initial apparatus state, and the |\j/.)s +s 
are given as per equation (5.5). Further, the basis set { |<|>.)_ _ } may be always
1 l
2
chosen such that |(\|/(t, )| fy) | = Pj for arbitrary probabilities pJ5 pr  p^, p4 
which sum to unity, where |\|/(t')) is chosen as per equation (5.2a). Tracing over 
the apparatus states then yields the transition W (t') —♦ W '( t ')  as desired.
"Operational" Description of Measuring Apparata
The second subclass of type II arguments models the interaction of a quantum 
system, S , with a measuring apparatus, M , by a completely positive linear 
mapping <j) from the set of density operators on Hs to the bounded positive
trace-class operators on H [Kraus, 1983, §2] . The mapping <j>M is called an
operation, and the states of the system W , W ' before and after the measurement 
process respectively are related by
W ' = <bu < W /m MW )]  . (5.14)
The general nature of operations has been exploited to discuss imprecise
measurements [e.g., Busch, 1986; Caves and Milbum, 1987]; measurements
distributed over time [e.g., Barchielli et al., 1984; Caves, 1987]; and the 
measurement problem in quantum mechanics [e.g., Ghirardi et ai, 1986; Benatti et 
a l , 1988].
The First Representation Theorem [Kraus, 1983, §3] states that an arbitrary 
operation, <|> , may be written in the form
<I>M(W) = £Ä k W Ä* . (5.15a)
k
where summation is over a countable index set and converges in the trace norm 
topology. For a non-selective operation (tr[<j>M(W)] = 1), one has
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I Ä ^ Ä k = i  (5.15b)
k
where 1 denotes the identity operator on Hs . Equations (5.15) generalise both 
the projection postulate (equation (5.8); (j>M(W) = W = Ä* = ,
L^ . = i ) and unitary evolution (<f>M(W) = Ü W Ü , Ü+Ü = 1 ). Further, by the
Second Representation Theorem [Kraus, 1983, §5], the first model of measurement 
discussed in this section is also formally incorporated, and hence also the model of 
Datta et al. [1988].
As in the above case of the quantum mechanical description of measuring 
apparata, let S0 denote two non-interacting systems, W(0) the initial state of 
S1 + S0 , End consider the probability of obtaining a result X = x. at time t for 
some physical quantity X of Sj in the two cases:
(a) No measurement has been made in the interval (0,t) ;
(b) The measuring apparatus M has been used to make some measurement on 
S0 in the time interval (0,t) .
In cases (a) and (b) this probability has the respective forms
p(a)(X = x.) = t r [ ^ > ( W ( 0 ) )  X.] ,
p(b)(X = x.) = tr[4> ^(W (0)) X.] ,
1 2
(5.16a)
(5.16b)
where , < j)^c are non-selective operations on H„ 0FL and X. is the
5 1 JSl+S2 5 Sl +S2
projection onto the subspace spanned by the eigenstates of X with eigenvalue x. . 
Recalling that in the Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri thought experiment (§5.2) 
these two quantities are not equal (equation (5.7)), it remains to be shown that such 
a result can obtain only if the measuring apparatus interacts with both subsystems 
Sj, S2 , thus obtaining conclusion (II) of §5.2.
First, non-interacting subsystems must be defined in this formalism. This can
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be done in an interpretationally straightforward manner: S1 and S0 are defined to 
be non-interacting if and only if uncorrelated states remain uncorrelated under 
evolution (i.e., W 1 ® W9 —■+ WJ ®W ' ) [cf. Kraus, 1983, §5]. Thus in equations 
(5.16), it follows that
(Wj ®W2) = «,<»>(*,) , (5.17a)
e c » ,  ® w 2) = ^ ( w , )  ®<t)W(w2) , (5.17b)
for all states W , W0 on H , FL respectively, where <}>£a\  (j>^ ((j>ia\  <{>~bb 
L z  U b2 b2
are non-selective operations on H (FL ).
bl 2
Using the First Representation Theorem (equations (5.15)) it follows from
equations (5.17) that
*sais  = 4 a ) ° 4 a ) -51 2  bl ä2
(5.18a)
= ^ b)° 4 b ) . 
1 2  1 2
(5.18b)
where (j)„ and (t)„ denote the natural extensions of operations 
bl b2
H , FL respectively to FL ® FL ; thus if 
b2 - U b2
<j>Q , on
1 2
-  f  V w ,  K■ <  < *2> f w 2 b * , (5.19a)
then
4 a)(W) = I ( \ ® i 2) w(Äk®i2) , 4 ^ (W ) = w ( i j ® ^ ) , (5.1%)
where 12 denote the identity operators on Hs , Hs respectively. To prove 
(5.18a), note that equations (5.17a), (5.19a) give
trtCWj ® W2) ( s  c ;  Y Cm -  I  (A£ ® B+) Y(Ak ® B^)) ] = 0 
m  k ,  l
for all uncorrelated states W1 ®W2 and all bounded operators Y on Hs <8>HS ,
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where the First Representation Theorem (equations (5.15)) has been used to write
<4ak (w)=ic„wc:j  1 j  ^  m m1 2  m
for all states W on H ® H . It follows that the term in curly brackets above is 
zero (cf. the proof of equation (4.4) in Kraus [1983, §4]), and hence that
.(a)<i>Si+S2J
, (a) „ , (a) 
1 2
where (j)* denotes the (unique) adjoint of <j) [Kraus, 1983, §§2, 3]. Equation 
(5.18a) follows, and (5.18b) in a similar manner.
Equations (5.18) have the straightforward interpretation that an operation 
describing the evolution of two non-interacting systems can be decomposed into 
two operations, describing the independent evolution of each system. Substituting 
equations (5.18a), (5.19) into equation (5.16a), and using the relation [X., B^ ] =0 
(following from the fact that X is a physical quantity of S1 ), the result
p(a)(X = x.) = tr <4a)(W (0))X . .
JJ
(5.20a)
is obtained. Similarly from equations (5.16b), (5.18b), one has
P® (X  = X.) = tr 4 b)(W (0))X . . 
S1 JJ
(5.20b)
Comparing equations (5.20a), (5.20b), it is seen that the two probabilities are
unequal only if * <{>^  , i.e., only if the measurement on system S9 directly 
b l 2
influences the evolution of system S1 . Thus within this model of measurement, 
conclusion (II) of §5.2 is reached for the result (equation (5.7)) of Datta et al. 
[1987, 1988].
The proof outlined above of the consistent description of measurement for 
non-interacting systems within this model is implicit in the work of Kraus [1983,
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§4], and is merely given an explicit form here. A partial form of this proof is given 
by Hall [1987] and Ghirardi et al. [1986] in the immediate context of the Datta- 
Home-Raychaudhuri thought experiment. The latter two references essentially 
prove the equality of p ^ (X  = x^ ) , p ^ (X  = x.) from the simplifying assumptions
1 (^e  identity operation), and <J>^C = <j>  ^ , implying that
1 2  b l +b2 b2
<j)£a  ^= (j)^ = 1 , <{)  ^= 1 inequations (5.18). The assumption <j)^ = (j)^
H H H H H H H
was recognised in both references to be equivalent to the non-interaction of the 
measuring apparatus with subsystem S1 [Hall, 1987, §3; Ghirardi et al., 1988, 
following equation (17)].
In conclusion, the two classes of type II arguments existing in the literature 
strongly support rejection of the controversial conclusion (III) of §5.2. Indeed, 
conclusion (III) could only be reached by a model of measurement which is 
inconsistent with both of the (rather general) models of measurement analysed 
above. Thus, in view of §5.3, conclusion (II) appears to be the most satisfactory 
interpretation of the Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri thought experiment.
5.5 OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
Two contributions to the discussion of the Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri thought 
experiment remain to be examined. They essentially concern proposals for new 
models of measurement to incorporate the model of Datta et al. [1988], but are 
insufficiently developed to yield significant insight into the interpretation of the 
thought experiment.
The first proposal [Squires, 1988] suggests that the collapse W (t') —♦ W '( t')  
(equations (5.2b), (5.5)) is to a mixture of eigenstates of a non-Hermitian operator. 
However, since the states |\|/ ), |\j/0), |\j/_) appearing in equation (5.5) are 
linearly dependent, they must share the same eigenvalue of any such operator. It is 
thus difficult to see how an experimenter could distinguish between these states by
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the measurement of such an operator. There are further technical and 
interpretational difficulties with such a scheme, including the lack of a spectral 
theorem for non-Hermitian operators, and complex expectation values. These 
objections taken together imply that this model cannot profitably be further 
discussed here.
The second proposal [Corbett, 1988] is more detailed, with the aim also of 
modelling the collapse W (t') —♦ W '( t ')  of §5.2. To review Corbett's scheme, let 
|\|/*), |\|f^) be two fixed states of a Hilbert space Hs , and consider an "initial 
state" of the form
| V s > = C i  | V g > +C2 l ^ > - (5.21)
Corbett [1988, Corollary 1] proposes a measurement process which maps the initial
density operator \ \ A to the mixture W(\{/ ) , given by
W(Yj) := q 1 T|Vg> <Vgl + |c 1|2(MÖ|¥g> <Vgl + lc2i2(1-'Y)l¥ )^ (VgI , (5.22)
where q = 1 + (y-1) 2 Re X CjC, ; X = (Vc 1 Vg) * 0 ; and Y is a parameter of the 
measuring apparatus satisfying 0 < y < 1 . Comparing equations (5.21), (5.22) with 
equations (5.2c), (5.5), one finds that Corbett's model is related to the collapse 
proposed by Datta et al. [1988], in the special case C' = p4 = 0 (where states 
Ixj/ j), |y 2) ’ I¥3) are identified with states IVs) respectively).
I give here a straightforward generalisation of equations (5.21), (5.22) which 
incorporates the collapse model of Datta et al. more fully. In particular, any state 
I \|/s ) on Hs has a unique expansion of the form
l¥s> =a|Vs>+ b IXs > . (5.21')
where |\|/g) has the form given in (5.21), jx<-) is a unit vector orthogonal to 
1 9  9 9|\|/s ), |\|/s > , and I a | + |b | = 1 . A collapse from the initial state | \\f^) (\|/s |
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to the mixture W(\jf^) may then be defined by
W(YS) := i a 12 W(\j/®) + |b |2 |x s > <XSI • (5.22')
Equations (5.21'), (5.22') clearly generalise equations (5.21), (5.22). Moreover, 
identifying |y s ) = |y(t')>  . |Vj> = IVj> . IVj) = |V2> > Iv” ) = IV3> -
|ZS) = !%) = |V4) . Cj = |a |~1 Cj , c2 = | a | - 1 C2 , b = C ' , then equation
(5.21') becomes equivalent to equation (5.2c), and equation (5.22') has the explicit 
form
W (vs) = q-’(1-Y) | C j | 2 |V l > <V l | + q-1(l-Y) |C2 |2 |y 2> <y2 |
+ q_1 |a |2Y |V3> <V3I + IC' 12 |v 4> (v4| • (5.23)
Comparing equations (5.5), (5.23), it is seen that the collapse W (t')) —♦ |W' ( t ' )  
of Datta et al. (§5.2) may be identified with the collapse | \|/ ) (\\r \ —+ W(\|/^) , 
where
p ^ q -'d -Y ) |Cj |2, p2 = q-1(l-Y) |C2 |2, p3 = q '1 | a 12Y, P4 = | C' | 2 . (5.24)
However, Corbett [1988, Theorem 3] attempts a different generalisation to 
equations (5.21')» (5.22'), and a significant error is made in the process. In 
particular, the final state of the system is not normalised [Corbett, 1988, equations 
(25), (29)]. This is not only incompatible with his Corollary 1 (corresponding to 
equations (5.21), (5.22) above), but inconsistent if used to calculate probabilities, 
such as in equation (5.6). Although Corbett claims that Datta et al. [1988] "only 
need the unnormalised [state] ... in their work", the latter [Datta et al., 1988, 
equation (7)] explicitly invoke probability conservation to ensure that the final state 
is normalised. This is necessary for the calculation of the probability p^(M °) in 
equation (5.6). Corbett's calculation [1988, equation (33)], involving this 
probability, but using an unnormalised state (pL) , is thus physically meaningless.
It follows from the above that Corbett’s criticism [1988, preceding Corollary 3]
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that my own contribution to the discussion [Hall, 1987] is applicable only in the 
case that probability is conserved, is invalid. However, Corbett is correct in his 
assertion that "the impossibility proof of Hall [1987] is not applicable" to his basic 
measurement model. Neither the restricted model of measurement (5.21), (5.22) 
(corresponding to Corollary 1 of Corbett), nor the "correct" generalisation (given 
here in equations (5.21'), (5.22')) of this model can be incorporated into the 
operation-effect formalism discussed in §5.4 (in fact, it is not consistent with the 
latter formalism; similarly, it is not consistent with a quantum mechanical 
description of measuring apparata (§5.4), nor with the projection postulate (§5.3)).
To prove the above remark, it suffices to consider the transition |\|/^) (\|/®| 
—> W(\j/[!) of equations (5.21), (5.22), and show that this transition cannot be 
extended to a linear mapping on the density operators of Hs , i.e., to a mapping 
W —+ W ' satisfying
qW1 + (1-JI)W2 -»  qWj + (l-q)W ' (5.25)
for all W , W? on Hs . In contrast, equation (5.25) holds as a fundamental 
property of non-selective operations (equations (5.14), (5.15)). To demonstrate 
equation (5.25) is inconsistent with Corbett's model, define P to be the projection
onto the subspace of H<, spanned by |\j/*), |y^ ) and let J|\|/*), |\^> ) ,
{ IVo), IVc)} be orthonormal bases for this subspace. It follows that
j  u
\ IVs> <Vsl +\ IVs> <^ s! = 5^ = 2 l^> <^l +12 l^> <^l -
are density operators on Hs . Hence, a necessary condition for the transition |y^) 
(\j/^ j —4 W(\jA to admit an extension satisfying (5.25) above is that
J  i j
W(y*) + W(\|/‘) = W (v“) + W(\f/^). (5.36)
Equation (5.26) may be checked using equations (5.21), (5.22) (noting that |\|/*>, 
|\|/^> are linear combinations of |\|/*>, l¥g) )» a straightforward calculation
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shows that it does not hold, and thus Corbett's model is inconsistent with the 
operation effect formalism. This may be regarded as a serious objection to 
Corbett's model, as it implies that an ensemble described by the density operator 
jiW1 + (l-q)W 0 cannot be constructed in general by "mixing" fractions |_ L , 1—p i  of 
ensembles W0 respectively. This is contrary to the usual interpretation of 
mixed states.
In summary, there are strong objections to the models of measurement 
proposed by Squires [1988] and Corbett [1988]. The former especially is fraught 
with technical and interpretational difficulties. Moreover, incompatibility of the 
latter with linearity (equation (5.25)) poses an interpretational problem. Given that 
the latter model may be suitably generalised (equations (5.21'), (5.22')) to 
incorporate the model of Datta et al. [1988], it would be of interest to determine 
whether a type II argument (§5.4) can be pursued in this case. However, the 
motivation for doing so is weakened by the existence of two standard models of 
measurement which already provide a satisfactory interpretation of the thought 
experiment (§5.4).
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
The Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri thought experiment is worth analysing for a 
number of reasons:
(i) it provides a reasonably simple problem, and yet is related to fundamental 
concepts of measurement and consistency in quantum mechanics;
(ii) it has led to a clarification of the role of models of measurement in regard to 
the consistent description of non-interacting systems in quantum mechanics, 
and provides an obvious example of the need to go beyond the projection 
postulate in understanding measurement.
The analysis of the thought experiment (§5.2) demonstrates that it is the
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consistent description of non-interacting systems, rather than Einsteinian locality, 
that is at stake. Type I arguments in the literature (§5.3), suggesting that the 
measurement model of Datta et al. is internally inconsistent, have been examined 
critically, and rejected. Type II arguments have also been reviewed (§5.4), and 
show that the model of measurement proposed by Datta et al. may be satisfactorily 
interpreted as involving a measuring apparatus which interacts with both 
components of the system under consideration. Finally, the models of measurement 
reviewed in §5.5 do little to clarify the import of the Datta-Home-Raychaudhuri 
thought experiment, due to problems with interpretational consistency and lack of 
detail.
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ABSTRACT
The genera lised  H eisenberg  in eq u a lity  and  the  entrop ic  u n ce rta in ty  
re la tio n  of D eutsch  provide m easures of jo in t uncertainty ra th e r  th an  
incompatibility for d iscrete observables. We clarify th is  d istinction  and 
propose a m easu re  of incom patib ility  applicable to bo th  classical and 
quan tum  system s, based on respective p roperties of jo in t probabilities for 
such system s.
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1. Introduction
A discrete observable is defined for both classical and quantum systems 
to be a measurable quantity, A, which takes values in some discrete set, 
Va = tel, 02» <2 3 , •••). If Va  = {0,1} then A is called a proposition. In general 
a measurement of the discrete observable A is equivalent to a 
measurement of the associated propositions A i , A 2 , A 3 , ..., where the 
result A = ay (A * aß corresponds to the result Ay = 1 (Ay = 0), for j  = 1,2,3, 
... . In the case of quantum systems the Ay are represented by a complete
set of mutually orthogonal projections, {Ay}, onto subspaces, [Aj{H)J, of a
If p<£ (Ay) denotes the probability that a measurement of the discrete 
observable A on a random member of an ensemble £  will give the result A 
= ay (i.e. Ay = 1), then the variance [1], (A-eAJ2, and the entropy [2], S(A,(E), 
of A on £  are given respectively by
These quantities each provide a measure of the uncertainty in A for the 
ensemble. In particular, both achieve their absolute minima, (A^A)2 -  
S(A,%) = 0, if and only if the result of measuring A on a member of £ 
chosen at random can be predicted with complete certainty, i.e., when 
p^A ß  = Sjk PzfAk) for some k.
For classical systems, the values of any two discrete observables A, B 
can be specified prior to measurement; hence there is always an 
ensemble, £a s > for which A and B each have zero uncertainty, i.e. 
SCA^ab) and S(B, Bab) are both zero. For quantum systems, however, it
Hilbert space H, and A is represented by the operator Ä = £y ay Ay on H.
(1 )
s (a , ö  .■=- y  p^fAj>ln • (2)
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has been d em o n stra ted  by D eutsch  [2] and  o thers [3,4] th a t  th e re  are 
discrete observables A, B for which
S(A,'E)+ S(B,t) > 0 V<E . (3)
The ex istence  of such observables is th u s  a d is tin g u ish in g  fea tu re  of 
quan tum  system s, and conversely the  non-existence of such observables is 
a characteristic  p roperty  of classical system s.
However, the  quan tity  S(A,%) + S(B',<E) appearing in  equation (3) does not 
characterise  the  com patibility  property  of classical system s, which is th a t 
the  indiv idual m em bers of any  ensem ble £  can be consistently  assigned a 
priori values of two discrete observables A and B  (which will in  general 
v a ry  over th e  ensem ble). A sim ila r rem a rk  applies to th e  q u an tity  
(A<zA)(A<zB) appearing  in  the  generalised H eisenberg inequa lity [l]. The 
aim  of th is  le t te r  is to in troduce a q u an tity  which does characterise  th is 
property  for bo th  classical and  quan tum  system s.
2. A measure of incompatibility
An appropria te  m easure of the incom patibility  of two discrete observables 
A and B , for an  ensem ble £, is th en  some q u a n tity  I(A,B ,%) which
satisfies the  m inim al requ irem en ts
(i) I(A,B,*E) > 0; and
(ii) KAyBy'L) = 0 for all ensem bles of classical system s.
Also, n o tin g  th a t  th e  m ea su re m e n t of any  d isc re te  observab le  A 
produces a se t of self-consistent values for the  m em bers of £, th en  A 
m ust be com patible w ith  itself, i.e.
(iii) 7(A,A,'E>) = 0 for all d iscrete observables A.
A final desirab le  req u irem en t comes from  considering N-level quan tum  
system s for the  case w here A and B  are  com plem entary  [4,5], i.e. where 
the  projections Ay , Bk correspond to one-dim ensional subspaces A/H),
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Bk(H) of an  N-dim ensional H ilbert space H  such th a t  I (ej, fk) I 2=N-1 for
basis  vectors e jeA j(H ) , f k e B k ( H )  (j,k = 1, 2, N). C om plem entary
observables generalise  the notion of (non-discrete) conjugate observables
[4], w here th e  incom patibility  of the  la t te r  is characterised  by the  well-
know n H eisenberg  inequa lity  (A^x)(A^p) > 77 fi . T hus i t  is fu r th e r
desirable th a t  the m easure satisfy an  inequality
(iv) I(A ,B ,t) > 0 for com plem entary (quantum ) observables A,B.
To see th a t  the m easure 764,5, m u st depend on £, consider the case
w here  A  and  B  a re  the  a n g u la r  m om entum  com ponents L x and L y
respectively. In  general these will be incom patible; e.g., if  the m em bers of
£  have to ta l  a n g u la r  m om entum  L 2 = 6 fl 2 an d  az im u th a l a n g u la r
m om entum  L z = 0, th en  no values in  Va  ~ v b  = {0, ± fi , ±2 fi , ... } can be
2 2 2assigned to Lx and Ly satisfying L2 = L x + L y +  L z . Thus, I(A ,B ,£) > 0.
However, if  £  is chosen such th a t L 2 = 0 for each m em ber of £, then  Lx
and  Ly m ay be assigned th e  (com patible) values L x = L y -  0 for each
system , so th a t  I(A ,5 ,£ )  = 0 in  th is  case. A quan tity  K AyB,^)  satisfying
requ irem en ts (i) — (iv) above will now be constructed, using  the properties
of “q uan tum ” jo in t probabilities.
For two propositions E, F  define the jo in t proposition E  / \F  hy
P ie(EaF) = 1 IFF P<L(E)= PlfF) = 1 (4)
In  th e  case  of c lassica l sy s tem s, E  a  F  is  th u s  th e  p roposition  
corresponding to a jo in t m easu rem en t of E  and  F, and  p<z {E a F) is a 
c lassical jo in t probability . In  the  case of q u an tu m  system s, E  a  F  is 
rep resen ted  by the projection E  a  F  onto the subspace E(H) c\F(H) of H  
[6,7], and p ^ E  aF) is by analogy a “quan tum ” jo in t probability. However,
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for q u an tu m  system s, p^(E aF) does not obey all of the classical laws of 
probability [7,8], as will be seen below.
Now, for a  proposition E , let E ' denote the  proposition w hich takes the 
value E ' = 1 (E'=  0) if  E  takes the value E  = 0 (E = 1). T h u s,p £  (E0 = 1 - p E 
(E) for all ensem bles £  and for quan tum  system s, E '=  1 — E . Consider 
then  the quan tity  J(E,F,£) defined by
J(E,F,%): = p / £ aFJ + p ^ E aF ) + p JE 'aF) + p ^CE'aFO . (5)
F or classical system s, J(E,F,T,) = 1 by the  classical law s of probability. 
However, for a quan tum  ensem ble, £, described by the  density  operator W£ 
on H , equation (5) has the form J(E,F,(e) -  tr[W £ G ] , where G is the  sum 
of the  m u tua lly  orthogonal projections E a F, E a F ', E ' a F, E ' a  F ' , and is 
hence itse lf  a  projection. I t  follows th a t in  general
0 <J(E,F,t) <1 . (6)
The upper bound in  equation (6) is obtained for all classical system s, while 
the  lower bound m ay be achieved, for exam ple, w hen £  is an  ensem ble of 
two-level q u a n tu m  system s, and  E  and F  correspond to d istinc t, non- 
orthogonal, one-dim ensional subspaces of H.
The behav iou r of th e  q u a n tity  JCEyFyT.) leads to the  defin ition  of an 
ap p ro p ria te  m ea su re , KAyBy'E), of the  incom patib ility  of two discrete 
observables A  and  B for an  ensem ble £:
KAyByT.) := sup 1^ -  J(Af  Bk> £ jj . (7)
From  the above parag rap h , th is  quan tity  clearly satisfies requ irem ents (i) 
and  (ii) lis ted  a t the  beginning of th is section. F u rth e r, since E a F  = E F
A  A
for com m uting  projections E, F  it follows th a t J(Aj, Ak,'E) = 1, for j,k  = 
1 ,2 ,3 ,..., and hence th a t  I(A,A,rE)= 0, th u s satisfying requ irem en t (iii).
SI
Finally, suppose A and B  are com plem entary, as defined earlier. It
A A A A A  A A
th en  follows (see next section) th a t  A j a  Bk = A j a  £& = A}- a  = 0 for =
1,2,3,...,N, and  hence equation (7) m ay be rew ritten  as
I(A,B,-E) = sup  { trP Ü jÄ . v B k)]^ , (8)
A A A
w here W<e is the density  operator corresponding to £, and  A j v Bk is the
A A A
projection onto the  linear span of {ej> fk). Now, t r  [W<£ (Aj v Bk)] is g reater
A A A
th a n  both tr[W^A/] and t r [W>zBk], and  so is bounded below by the average 
of the  la t te r  two quan tities. F u rth e r, since X/ P ifA j)  = 1, i t  follows th a t
-A
sup{tr[W<£Ay]} > iV-1 for any discrete observable A of aniV -level quan tum  
system . T hus equation (8) im plies for com plem entary observables A and 
B  th a t
I(A,B,T) > N l > 0 , (9)
and hence I(A ,B ,%) satisfies requ irem ent (iv) as desired.
3. Further properties o f I(AJB, t)
Since I(A,B,T,) is triv ially  zero for classical system s (as per requirem ent 
(ii)), only th e  case of quan tum  system s will be considered in  th is section. 
In  p articu lar, it  will be shown th a t
I(A,B,T) = 0 IF F  [ 0 Vj,k (10)
th u s  ch arac te ris in g  com patib ility  for q u an tu m  observables (see [9] for 
fu r th e r  discussion of th is condition). Also, the  in eq u a lity  appearing  in 
eq u a tio n  (9) for com plem en tary  observab les w ill be im proved, and  
generalized to the relation
I(A,B,<L) > % ----------- \ -------- r ,
^  1 + sup I I
(ID
w here A ,B  are  non-degenerate observables of an  N-level quan tum  system  
for w hich [A/, Bk] * Ö V j ,k  = 1 ,2 ,..., N, and  ej, fk are  basis vectors for
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Aj(H), Bk(H) respectively. This resu lt m ay be com pared w ith  equations 
(13), (5), and  (24) of references [2], [3] and [4] respectively.
To prove equation  (10), it  is sufficient to show th a t J (E ,F ,rE) = 1 if  and only 
i f  [E , F] W <£ = 0. Now, defin ing th e  projection G as the  sum  of the 
m utually  orthogonal projections E  a  F, E  a F '  E '  a F, E  a F ', it  follows for a 
density  o p e ra to r on H  w ith  diagonal form W = Si Wi I \|/j > < \|/j I
(Wi>0Vi)y th a t  equation (5) m ay be rew ritten  as
J(E,F,t) =  wi <yi I d y .>  .
i
T hus if  J(E,F,'E) = 1 th en  <\|/; I G \ji> = 1 for each i, i.e., I \|/j> = G I \|/j>, 
and  so W<z = G W<e . B ut F F G  = F  aF= FEG , and hence [E,F  ] W<£ = [F, F  
]GW<e = 0. Conversely, suppose [E ,F  ] W ^ = 0. Hence, [E , F  ] I\j/;> =0 for 
each i, i.e., F F I \j/;> = F F  I and  so F F  I \|/> e E(H) rF (H )  = (E a F)(H). 
Thus, using (E a  F) E  = E  a  F  and (F  a F )F ' -  0 , one has
(£a i) I y/> = (ixfutf I y/.> + a  -  if) I ¥,>]
= vp + a-if) 11// >
= I Vi> + d/i) if' I y.>
= I y> .
Finally, since [F, F] = -  [F,F(| = -  [ F ' F] = [F 'F 1  , it follows th a t
d l\)/i> = (^ + i / / I y. > = I y. > ,
and hence th a t  J(E , F, T.) = 1 as required.
To prove equation  (11), note th a t since the Aj(H), Bk (H) are d istinct one­
dim ensional subspaces of H  in  th is case, th e ir  in tersection  m u st be zero­
dim ensional, i.e., A j a  B k  = 0 . Also, AjH ) n  B ^ H )  can a t m ost be one-
/  A
dim ensional, in  which case one m ust have Aj(H) £  B k (H), i.e. A j  and 
Bk m ust be orthogonal and so commute. B ut [Äj, Bk] * Ö by supposition,
A A  ^ A A  ^ A A ^
and  hence (Aj a  B  )(H) is zero-dim ensional, i.e. A j a  B  =0. Sim ilarly, A .
R, rZ J
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aB k  = Ö, an d  th u s , as in  th e  (less genera l) case of com plem entary  
observables, equation (8) holds for A and B . Now, if  A j  v Bk  projects the 
vector \jf e H  onto the un it direction \\rjk e (Aj (H), then
(y,ÄjV) = (yrA.vBky) \(ef  y/jf) 12 ;
(y .£kv> =  Ufk,v jk) i 2 ;
and  no ting  th a t  e j , fk, \f/jk lie in  the  sam e plane, (Aj vBk) (H) , it follows 
also th a t
\(ef ¥ j k ) | 2 + \(fk, Vjk) + .
S u b stitu tio n  of the above into equation (8), w ith  W w ritten  in  diagonal 
form, yields
trrJ + tr
KA.B.'E) > s u p ---- — —  ------  . (12)
j.k 1 + 1  Q I
F inally , no ting  sup {tr[W^Äj]f t r [W ^Bk]}  ^ N - 1 > equation  (11) m ay be 
obtained  from equation (12). For the  p articu la r case w here A and B  are
com plem entary, equation (11) becomes
I(A,B,-e) > -----, (13)
2V + / N
th u s  im proving the lower bound of equation (9).
4. An example - two spin-172 particles
We consider here the  well know n EPR-Bohm  though t experim ent for an 
ensem ble of paired spin-1/2 particles described by the singlet s ta te  [10,11], 
and  calcu late  th e  m easu re  of incom patib ility  be tw een  m em bers of a 
general class of observables for th is system.
For (un it) d irections m i ,  m 2 le t S ( m i ,m 2 )  be the  proposition which is 
verified if  and  only if  partic les 1 and 2 are  m easured  to have spin “up” in 
d irec tions m i ,  m 2 respectively. Thus S ( m i , m 2 )  is rep resen ted  by the 
projection
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S ( m v m 2) : = ( m ^ m .
w here I m i ,m2) = I m i)  ® I m2), and Im) denotes the s ta te  of a spin-1/2 
particle  w ith  spin  “u p ” in  direction m  . The discrete observables A, B  are 
defined as th e  propositions £(01,02), £(61,62) respectively, for a rb itra ry
directions a \, (12, 61, 62 .
In  the  special cases 61 = ± a \ ,  62 = ± ci2 > one has [A,B] = 0, and  hence 
I(A,B, £) = 0 from  equation (10). In  all o ther cases, A  a  B = A  'a  B = A  a  B'  
= 0, so th a t
KA,Bt T) = 1 -J{A,B,<Z) = tr[W £ (A v £ ) ]  . (14)
H ere, is tak en  to be the  singlet s ta te  i y/s)(Ys I > where
1%) = ^ • [ lo 1.- a 1> -  ' - “ i»0 !)) G5)
/V A
to w ith in  an  a rb itra ry  phase factor, and  A w  B  is the projection onto the
tw o-dim ensional subspace spanned by lai,<22), ‘61,62). W riting
Ä w ß  -  l a 1,a2)(a1,a2 l + I u){u \ u) 1 (u I , (16a)
w here
\ u ) : =  I a i.,a 2) “  ^61,62 1 ^ 1,a2) I 6 ^ 6 ^  (16b)
and  satisfies (u 101,02) = 0, the m easure of incom patibility of A and  B  m ay
be evaluated by substitu tion  of (15), (16a), (16b) into equation (14). Several
pages of spinor a lgebra th en  yield
KA.B.'E) = | ( 1  +K/L) , (17a)
w here
K : = (1 + a r 62)(l + -  (1 + 1 + 6r 62) (17b)
L : = 4 -  (1 + a 1.61)(l + a 2.62) . (17c)
M axim um  incom patibility , I(A,B,T) = 1, is achieved by the case 61 = 02, 62 
= a i  ; conversely, I(A ,B ,(E) = 0 for the case a i  = a2, 61 = 62 . For th is la tte r  
case, A and B  m ay bo th  be assigned the  a priori value of 0, as for the 
singlet s ta te  both  partic les can never have spin “up” in  the sam e direction.
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F inally , for the  case a \ = 61, 02 * ± b2, one ob tains the  sim ple resu lt 
KA,B,<E) = 1/2.
5. Discussion
The proposed m easure of incom patibility (equation (7)) m ay be applied to 
bo th  c lassical and  q u an tu m  system s, and  sa tis fies  an  in eq u a lity  for 
co m p lem en ta ry  observab les (eq u a tio n s  (9), (13)) analogous to the  
H e isen b e rg  in e q u a lity  for con jugate  observab les. Also, a sim ple 
ch arac te risa tion  of compatible d iscrete observables for quan tum  system s 
has been given (equation (10)).
F u r th e r  work is in  progress concerning the  in te rp re ta tio n  of non-zero 
n u m e ric a l v a lu es  of / (A ,# ,^ :) .  For th e  case w here  A and B a re  
propositions, as in  the  example of §3, the quan tity  1/2 x 7(A,ß,*E) appears to 
be a m easure  of the  error w ith  which the  “quan tum ” jo in t d istribution  of A 
and  B m ay be modelled by a classical jo in t distribution.
The “non-classical” behaviour of qu an tu m  jo in t probabilities has been 
show n [7 ,8] to lead  to the  v iolation of ce rta in  in eq u a litie s  of classical 
probability, such as the well known Bell inequality  [9]. The resu lts of th is 
L e t te r  fu r th e r  d e m o n s tra te  th a t  th is  n o n -c la ssica l b eh av io u r, as 
exem plified by the  non-triv ial lower bound of equation  (6), leads to the 
existence of incom patible observables for quan tum  system s. 
Acknowledgement
We th an k  K ailash K um ar for critical com m ents on the  m anuscrip t.
96
References
1. E. Merzbacher, Quantum Mechanics, 2nd Edition (Wiley, New York, 
1970), Ch. 8.
2. D. Deutsch, Phys. Rev. Lett. 50 (1983) 631.
3. M.H. Partovi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 50 (1983) 1883.
4. K  Kraus, Phys. Rev. D. 35 (1987) 3070.
5. T.S. Santhanam, in: The uncertainty principle and foundations of 
quantum mechanics, eds. W. Price and S. Chissick (Wiley, Great 
Britain, 1977) p. 227.
6. G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, Ann. Math. 37 (1936) 823.
7. I. Pitowsky, J. Math. Phys. 27 (1986) 1556
8. E.Santos, Phys. Lett. A. 115 (1986) 363;
M.J.W. Hall, Quantum mechanics and the concept of joint probability, 
Found. Phys. (1988), to be published;
M.J.W. Hall, The probability and logical structure of statistical theories, 
Int. J. Theoret. Phys. (1988), to be published.
9. S. Pulmannovä, Found. Phys. 10 (1980) 641.
10. D. Bohm and Y. Aharonov, Phys. Rev. 108 (1957) 1070.
J.S. Bell, Physics (N.Y.) 1 (1965) 195.11 .
97
APPENDIX II
THE PROBABILITY AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE 
OF STATISTICAL THEORIES
Michael J.W. Hall
Published in International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 27,1285 (1988)
98
ABSTRACT
A charac terisa tion  of s ta tis tica l theories is given which incorporates 
both  classical and  quan tum  m echanics. I t  is show n th a t  each sta tis tica l 
theory  induces an  associated logic and jo in t probability struc tu re , and simple 
conditions are  given for the  s tru c tu re  to be of a classical or quan tum  type. 
T his f irs tly  provides an  a lte rn a tiv e  for the  q u an tu m  logic approach to 
ax iom atic  q u an tu m  m echanics. Secondly, the  Bell in eq u a litie s  m ay be 
derived for those sta tis tica l theories which have a classical s tru c tu re  and 
satisfy  a locality condition w eaker th a n  factorisability. The re la tion  of these 
inequalities to the  issue of h idden variable  theories for quan tum  m echanics 
is discussed and clarified.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A num ber of physical system s, such as two-sided coins, electrons, and 
v iral infections, behave in  a  statistical m anner. W hether an  electron will be 
detected in  a certa in  place, or a tossed coin land  w ith “heads” upw ards, or a 
m em ber of some popu lation  succum b to an  in fluenza  v iru s , canno t be 
correctly predicted in  m any circum stances. However, as is well known, the 
behav iour of m any  coins, many  electrons, and large population groups is 
often  am enable  to accu ra te  p redictions involving relative frequencies, or 
probabilities.
T his p ap er is p rim arily  concerned w ith  ch arac te ris in g  th e  class of 
th e o r ie s  w h ich  d escrib e  s ta t i s t ic a l  p h en o m en a , a n d  l in k in g  th is  
charac terisa tion  w ith  (i) the  quan tum  logic approach to axiom atic quan tum  
m echanics (originated by B irkhoff and  von N eum ann, 1936; see also Gudder, 
1979; B eltram etti and  Cassinelli, 1981; Prim as, 1981), and  (ii) the  derivation 
and  significance of the  Bell inequa litie s  (see the  review  by C lau ser and 
Shimony, 1978, for an  exposition and fu rth er references).
In  th e  n ex t section  n o ta tio n  su itab le  for describ ing  th eo re tica l 
p red ic tions is in troduced , allow ing a defin ition  of a statistical theory. 
S ta tis tica l theories include classical and  quan tum  m echanics as exam ples.
I t  is shown in  the th ird  section th a t each sta tis tica l theory  induces an 
associated probability  and logical struc tu re . Simple necessary  and sufficient 
conditions a re  given for th is  s tru c tu re  to be of e ith e r a “c lassical” or a 
“q uan tum ” type. This provides the basis for a “sta tistica l theory approach” to 
qu an tu m  m echanics, w hich is con trasted  w ith  the  quan tum  logic approach
m entioned above.
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The fou rth  section is concerned w ith  “hidden  v a riab les” w ith in  the 
contex t of s ta tis tic a l theories. The concept of covering theories, w hich 
inc ludes th e  notion  of h id d en -v a riab le  th eo ries , is defined, and  some 
exam ples are given. In  particu lar, it  is shown th a t there  is a covering theory 
w ith  a “classical” struc tu re  for each sta tistica l theory.
In  th e  fifth  section i t  is d em o n stra ted  th a t  th e  g en era lised  Bell 
in eq u a litie s , f irs t  derived by C lauser et al. (1969), hold for all “classical” 
sta tis tica l theories which satisfy a weak locality condition. This is based on, 
and  clarifies some earlier work (Hall, 1988). The derivation is con trasted  to 
th a t  of C lauser and Horne (1974), and  of F ine (1982), and  its  re la tion  to the 
existence of h idden variable theories for quan tum  m echanics discussed.
Finally , resu lts  are  sum m arised in  a conclusion. Technical proofs are 
k ep t to Appendices for easier reading.
2. STATISTICAL THEORIES
The usefulness of a theory is determ ined, a t least in  p art, by its  ability 
to m ake predictions. These predictions (which m ay be retrospective) refer to 
experim en ts or observations on some class of system s, and  in  p a rticu la r  
m ake sta tem en ts  about the  re su lts  of such experim ents. N otation  suitable 
for d iscu ss in g  p red ic tio n s  w ill now be developed, as a p re lu d e  to 
charac terising  those theories which m ake statistical predictions.
If  the  possible resu lts of some experim ent E are contained in  a se t RE, 
th en  there  is an  associated group of propositions, of the form “The resu lt of E 
is contained in  a subset, X, of RE”. These propositions are  verified/falsified by 
perform ance of experim ent E, an d  indeed fully characterise  the  outcome of 
th e  experim ent.
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I t  follows th a t  predictions of the  theory m ay be expressed in term s of 
re s u lts  of th e  yes/no experim en ts w hich correspond to te s tin g  various 
propositions. The set of all propositions involved in  predictions of the theory 
will be denoted by P. F u rth e r, the class of system s on which the  experim ents 
are  perform ed m ay be characterised  by a set of states, denoted by S, where 
each sta te  is a description of a m em ber of the  class of system s. The resu lt of 
tes tin g  proposition Ae tP on sta te  Xe S will be denoted by r(A,X), where r(A,A.): 
= 1 (0) if  A is verified (falsified).
Hence, i f  propositions Ax, A2, . . .» ANe P can be tested  respectively on
system s described by s ta te s  Xi, X2, ••• > ^ ng S, the  theory is expected to m ake
some prediction(s) abou t the re su lts  r(Ax, ^ x), r(A2, X2), ... , r(ANAN). For
exam ple, a  deterministic theory contains a m apping, d, from !Px S to the set
{0, 1}, such th a t  r(Aj, Xj) is predicted to be d(Aj, A.j) for each i.
In  co n trast, a statistical theory is defined here  as a  theory  which
contains a m apping, p, from P x  S to the in terval [0,1], such th a t the to tal
N
num ber of verifications for the above sequence, N : = ^  rfA^, A^ ), is
i=l
predicted to have the  behaviour
theoretical
N - N
yes -- -------^ 0  as N ~  , (la)
tliGorcticfll
w here Nyes is given by the  expression
N “  = (lb)
i=l
T hus determ in istic  theories are  special cases of sta tistica l theories, w ith 
p(AA) = d(AA).
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If  pCAj,^) = p for each value of i, then  equations (1) im ply th a t  Nyes = 
pN for large N. Thus, for As T, Xe S, the quan tity  p(A,>.) m ay be in te rp re ted  
as “the  probability  of verifying proposition A on sta te  X”.
Now, if  p(A,A.) and p(B,A.) are equal for all s ta tes k S ,  th en  the  theory 
does no t d istingu ish  betw een predictions involving the  propositions A or B. 
Hence, we m ay say th a t  A and B are equivalent w ith  respect to the  theory, 
and  w rite A = B. Of course, one m ight be able to refine the  sta te  descriptions 
so as to d iscrim inate  betw een two such propositions, however, th is  would 
en tail a new theory.
Thus, the  propositions of a sta tistical theory m ay in fact be represented  
(up to equivalence) as mappings from the set of sta tes, S, to the  in terval [0,1], 
w here for A e !P,Xe S, we define
MX): = p (A ,U  (2)
U sing the  symbol A to denote both a proposition and a m apping should not 
lead to confusion, as the  rem ainder of the paper is prim arily  concerned w ith 
p ro p erties  of th e  la t te r  rep resen ta tio n . T hus, for the  purposes of w hat 
follows, a sta tis tica l theory  will be denoted by (S, (P), w here S is the  set of 
sta tes, and  ^Fis the  set of m appings from S to [0,1], obtained via equation (2).
3. TH E PROBABILITY AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE 
OF STATISTICAL TH EO RIES 
3.1 Introduction
The definition of a sta tistica l theory in  the  previous section is of a very 
general n a tu re , yet i t  tu rn s  out th a t  verjr few conditions need to be fu rth er 
im posed to ob tain  in te res tin g  s tru c tu ra l p roperties. Indeed, w ithou t any 
e x tra  assum ptions, fo rm ulations of “jo in t p robab ilities”, “com plem entary  
propositions”, and  an  “im plication  re la tio n ” can be specified in  a n a tu ra l
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way, leading to an  associated probability struc tu re  and a rep resen ta tive  logic 
for each s ta tis tica l theory.
The existence of an  in h eren t struc tu re , in which “classical ” ru les for 
m an ipu la ting  probabilities and  propositions (e.g. p(a & b) + p(a& b') = p(a), 
and  a & a ' = 0) need not hold in general, is consistent w ith  the  conceptual 
view point th a t  such ru les are  not absolute. This has sim ilarities w ith  the 
idea th a t  the  ru les of E uclidean geom etry do not apply a priori to physical 
space-tim e, and  such an  analogy has been explored by Accardi (1984) and by 
P itow sky (1986). A lternatively, one m ay argue th a t  the  classical ru les are 
indeed absolute , and  hence th a t  only sta tis tica l theories w ith  a “classical” 
s tru c tu re  can be of fundam ental in te rest.
The f irs t view point supports the  quan tum  logic approach to axiom atic 
q u an tu m  m echanics, in  which propositions are  constrained  to satisfy  some, 
b u t no t all, of the  p roperties of Boolean logic (see, e.g. B e ltram e tti and 
C assinelli, 1981). The second view point, w hen confronted w ith  qu an tu m  
m echanics, leads to a conflict w ith notions of local causality , in  the  form of 
the  the  Bell inequalities (see p a rt 5 of th is paper).
In  the  following sections, the  probability and  logical s truc tu re  inheren t 
to s ta tis tica l theories is investigated , and  sim ple necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions are given for sta tistica l theories to exhibit classical- and  quan tum ­
like behaviour. The la tte r  case leads to a “sta tis tica l theo ry” approach to 
axiom atic qu an tu m  m echanics, which is con trasted  w ith  the  q u an tu m  logic 
approach m entioned above.
3J2 P oten tia l Propostions
Now, an  aim  of th is paper is to associate w ith  any two propositions A, 
B of a  sta tistica l theory (S,20 a quan tity  (AaBXX) for each Xe S, which m ay be
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in te rp re ted  as a “jo in t probability”. C learly then , a m apping AaB:S -»[0,1] 
m u st be specified. D esirable p roperties of such a m apping are discussed in 
§3.3; for now it  is no ted  th a t  one m ay not necessarily  have AaB s T. This 
m otivates the  definition of the se t PT of potential propositions of (S,20, as the 
set of m appings from S to [0,1], i.e.,
= {A I A:S-»[0,1]}. (3)
I t  im m ediately follows th a t  P s  PP.
Two special elem ents of PP, 0 and 1, are defined by
(XX): = 0, 1(W: = 1 VXe S , (4)
and  for each Ae PP, the  complement, A', of A is defined by
A'(X): = 1 -  A(W VXe S . (5)
For convenience i t  will be assum ed th a t 0, 1 e 5* for the  rem ainder of the 
paper. T hese propositions can be in te rp re ted  as corresponding to yes/no 
experim ents w hich alw ays give a  ‘no’ and ‘yes’ resu lt respectively.
In  som e cases, th e  com plem en ta ry  p roposition  A ' m ay also be 
in te rp re ted  physically  for Ae P. F irst, define the  experim ental proposition A 
such th a t A is tes ted  on sta te  Xe S by testing  A on X, and reversing the yes/no 
resu lts  (see §2). Thus, r(A,X)=l— r(A,X). From  equations (1) and  (2) it follows
th a t  if  Aie fP for each i, th en  for N  large ^  Ai(Xi) = ^  A ' ^ )  .
Hence i t  is consistent for propositions A and A' to be equivalent w ith respect 
to (S,2*), and  in  such a case the la tte r  proposition has a simple in terpretation . 
3.3. The Associated Probability Structure and Representative
Logic of a Statistical Theory.
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In  th is  section, the m appings AaB, AvBe fP5P, called the  jo in  and m eet 
of p ropositions A,Be 1P5P will be defined, as well as the  p a rtia l ordering  
re la tion  A=>B, called im plication. P roperties of these definitions are  sta ted , 
w ith  proofs given in  Appendix A.
To m otivate  these  defin itions, i t  is f irs t suggested  th a t  reasonab le  
properties to be satisfied  for the  q u an tity  (AaB) (>.) to behave like a “jo in t 
probability” include: AaB = BaA; Aa(BaC) = (AaB)aC; and (AaB)(X) < A(A) for 
each Xe S. The la tte r  p roperty  can be w ritten  more succintly as AaB =* A, 
w here is the  n a tu ra l pa rtia l ordering on !PP, given by
A=> B IFF A(X) < B(X) VXeS.  (6)
E quation  (6) m ay be considered as generalising equation (3c) of B irkhoff and 
von N eum ann (1936) to a definition of im plication for all s ta tistica l theories.
I t  follows from equation (6) th a t  the  im plication re la tion  satisfies the
following properties for all A, B, Ce fP5P.*
A=>A (reflexivity) (7a)
If  A=>B, B=>C then  A=>C (transitivity) (7b)
If  A=>B, B=>A then  A = B (7c)
IfA=>B then  B ' => A' (7d)
0 => A => 1. (7e)
The quan tities (AaB) X), (AvB)(X) are now defined for A, Be ‘F'P, Xe S, by 
(AaBXX): = sup [X(X) I Xe X =>A, X=*B}, (8a)
(AvB)(W: = in f {X(X) I Xe 5P, A=>X, B=>X}. (8b)
The existence of AaB and  AvB is assu red  by the  earlie r assum ptions
Oe % and 1 e T  respectively.
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It is shown in Appendix A that the reasonable properties suggested earlier
in this section for AaB are indeed satisfied by definition (8a) i.e.y for A,B,Ce
tP3? one has
AaB = BaA (9a)
Aa(BaC) = (AaB) aC (9b)
AaB => A. (9c)
It is also shown that AaB has similar properties to a greatest lower bound for
A and B, namely
(X=>AaB) IFF (X=>A, X=>B) VXe !P, (9d)
for all A, Be
The mapping AvB satisfies analogous properties, also proved in
Appendix A. Thus for A, B, C e one has
AvB = BvA (10a)
Av(BvC) = (AvB)vC (10b)
A => AvB (10c)
(AvB => X) IFF (X=»A, X=>B) VXe , (10d)
where (lOd) demonstrates th a t AvB behaves like a least upper bound for A 
and B. From equations (9) and (10) follow such properties as
Aa0 = 0, Av l  = 1, AaA = Aa 1 = A = AvO = AvA, VAe T. (11)
Equations (9), (10), and (11) indicate that definitions (8a) and (8b) give a 
reasonable, abstract formulation of a probability structure for statistical 
theories. The representative logic of the statistical theory is defined to 
be the partially-complemented poset (tP, =>,'). For elements A, B of the poset, 
the greatest lower bound of A and B exists only if AaBs fP, and is then given 
by AaB, from equation (9d). Similarly, from (lOd) the least upper bound
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exists only if  AvBe P, and is th en  given by AvB. The rep resen ta tive  logic is 
fully com plem ented if  A 'e P VAe P.
Finally, definitions (8a), (8b) m ay be extended consistently as follows, to 
give the  join and m eet of any countable sequence Ax, A2, A3, ... e PP.
(aAj) (X ) : = sup |X(A.) I Xe fF, X => o A.J ; (12a)
(yA.) (X : = in f  { X(X) I Xe fP, yA ; => xj ; (12b)
w here the  propositions o Ai? yA i e fF^ F are  defined by
(n  Aj) (X): = in f  { A.(X)} , (y  Aj) (X): = supj A^X)} . (13)
I t is shown in  Appendix A th a t
If  A 'e CP, VAe fF th en  vAt = (aA[)' , (14)
i i
i.e. de M organs Law holds for those s ta tis tic a l theo ries  in  w hich the  
rep resen ta tive  logic is fully complem ented.
3.4 C lassical a n d  R egular S ta tistica l Theories
In  th e  la s t section the probability  and  logical s tru c tu re  of sta tis tica l 
theories w as investigated , and  the  fundam enta l s tru c tu ra l p roperties noted 
(i.e. equations (7), (9), (10), and  (12)). In  th is  section, classical and  regu lar 
s ta tis tic a l theo ries will be defined and  discussed  and  exam ples of each 
provided.
F irs t, a s ta tis tica l theory  (S ,^) is defined to be classical w hen the  
following conditions are satisfied for all A,Be P, Xe S:
A 'e  P (15a)
AaB e P (15b)
(AaBXW + (A'aBXW = B (U (15c)
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Conditions (15a), (15b) im ply th a t  (P is closed under com plem entation and 
join of propositions, and hence, from equation (14), it is also closed under the 
m ee t of p ropositions , i.e. A vB e(P V A ,B e iP. C ondition (15c) m ay be 
recogn ised  as a fu n d a m e n ta l law  of c lassica l p ro b ab ility  (see, e.g. 
Kolmogorov, 1950), especially if  rew ritten  in  the form p(AaB,A.) + p(A'aB,A.) = 
p(B,A.), using equation (2).
To m otivate  the  term  “classical” for s ta tis tica l theories w hich satisfy  
conditions (15), i t  is firs t convenient to define genera l ised  p ro b a b i l i ty  
m e a s u r e s .  A genera lised  p robab ility  m easu re  on (S ,^) is a m apping, 
m:2*!P—>[0,1], such th a t
If A v  A2, A3. ... e fP satisfy Ai=> A j Vi* j, then  mfvA^) = XmfAp; (16a)
m (i) = 1. (16b)
E q u a tio n s  (16) g en era lise  th e  defin ition  of a p ro b ab ility  m ea su re  by 
B e ltram e tti and  C assinelli (1981). I f  the  rep re sen ta tiv e  logic of (S ttP) is 
B oolean  (see Appendix B), th en  the  re la tions A±=> A' an d  A^aA j= 0 are 
equivalent, and  equation (16a) th en  im plies th a t  m is additive for m utually  
exclusive propositions, which is the  basic ten e t of classical probability  theory 
(Kolmogorov, 1950). Note th a t  from 0 => O' and (16a) i t  follows th a t m(0) = 0, 
while equation (16b) is a norm alisation  condition.
I t  is shown in  Appendix B th a t  a sta tis tica l theory (S ,CP) is classical if 
and  only if: (i) the  rep resen ta tiv e  logic is Boolean; and  (ii) the  m appings 
m^.lRP—»[0,1], defined by m^(A): = A(X), are  generalised probability  m easures
on (S,lF) for all s ta tes Xe S. Thus, classical s ta tis tica l theories are  ju s t  those 
s ta tis tica l theories which have a “classical” probability  and logical struc tu re .
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The significance of the Bell inequalities for such statistical theories will be 
discussed in part 5 of this paper.
A regular statistical theory is defined to be one for which (S,CP) 
satisfies the conditions
A'eCP (17a)
If A => B then A'aBe P (17b)
IfA=>B then (AaB) (M + (A'aB) (M = B(W (17c)
for all A, Be P, Xe S. Comparison with equations (15) show that all classical 
statistical theories are contained in the set of regular statistical theories. It 
is demonstrated in Appendix C that a statistical theory (S,P) is regular if and 
only if: (i) the representative logic is orthocomplemented, orthocomplete, and 
orthomodular; and (ii) the m ,^ as defined above, are generalised probability
measures for all Xe S. These conditions are related to the quantum logic 
approach to axiomatic quantum mechanics, and indeed equations (17) 
provide a basis for an alternative “statistical theory” approach, outlined in 
§3.5.
To conclude this section, generic examples of classical and regular 
statistical theories are given.
EXAMPLE 3.1 Let S be the phase space of some system of classical dynamics, 
and P be the set of propositions corresponding to whether the state of the 
system is contained within some subset of S. Thus, for X s  S, the proposition 
Axe fP is defined by A i^X): = 1 (0) for Xe X (Xe X ). From equation (5) it follows 
that A£ = Axce CP, where Xc= S\X, while from equations (6) and (8) it follows 
that Ax => Ay is equivalent to X s Y, and hence that AxaAy = Ax^ye P. Thus 
(S,P) satisfies conditions (15a), (15b). Further, if XeX then either ^.eXnY or
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Xe X nY c; while if Xe X th en  Xe XnY and Xe XnYc. I t follows th a t AXnY(^) + 
AXnYc (^) = Ax(X) for all Xe S, and therefore condition (15c) is also satisfied. 
Hence (S,CP) is a classical sta tistica l theory.
EXAMPLE 3.2 Let S be the set of un it vectors of a separable H ilbert space, H, 
and  let P  be indexed by the set of closed subspaces of H, where if E denotes the 
projection onto subspace E, the AE(y): = (\y,E\j/) for all \\re S, AEe CP. Thus (S,fE9 
describes a quan tum -m echan ica l system . F rom  eq u atio n  (5) one has 
A 'e=Ae 1g CP, w here E1 is the  orthogonal com plem ent of E in  H. F u rth e r,
from equations (6) and (8) i t  follows th a t  the  relations AEl=> AE2 and Ex s  E 2 
are  equivalent and hence th a t AEl aAE2 = AEinE2s  CP. Thus conditions (17a), 
(17b) are satisfied by (S ,^ . Finally, if  E xs  E 2 then  E 2 m ay be expressed as the 
d irect sum  of subspaces E xn E 2 and E ^ n E 2, and so from the properties of the 
in n e r p roduct on H it  follows th a t  condition (17c) is also satisfied. Hence 
(S ,CP) is a regu lar sta tistica l theory. Note th a t (15c) is not satisfied (e.g. le t E x, 
E 2 be distinct, non-orthogonal, one-dim ensional subspaces of H, and choose 
Xe E x), and hence (S ,CP) is not a  classical sta tistica l theory.
3.5 Com parison w ith  Q uantum  Logic A pproach
The aim  of the  quan tum  logic approach is to derive the H ilbert space 
s tru c tu re  of q u an tu m  m echanics from  a sm all num ber of axiom s. The 
approach (see e.g. Gudder, 1979) begins w ith  a set of propostions, CP, which 
has a num ber of conditons im posed on it, including the  existence of a partia l 
o r d e r in g ,  a n  o r th o c o m p le m e n ta t io n ,  o r th o m o d u la r i ty ,  a n d  
orthocom pleteness, (see Appendix C for definitions). S ta tes are  then  defined
I l l
in d ep en d en tly , e ssen tia lly  as m app ings from  —> [0,1] w hich sa tisfy  
equations (16). T hus defining A(A.): = A.(A) for s ta te  X, it  is seen th a t the 
quan tum  logic approach leads to a sta tistica l theory (S,39.
In  contrast, the  “sta tis tica l theory” approach recognises th a t quan tum  
m echanics is a s ta tis tica l theory, and  begins from th is point, i.e. w ith  the 
existence of a sta tis tica l theory (S,£P). A n a tu ra l com plem entation (equation 
(5)) an d  a n a tu ra l  p a rtia l o rdering  (equation  (6)) a re  used  to obtain  a 
probability  and logical structure . In  th is sense equations (4) - (12) are “free”; 
they  arise  from the contem plation of sta tistica l theories in  general. To arrive 
a t  an  orthocom plem ented, orthom odular, orthocom plete poset w ith the sta tes 
corresponding to generalised  p robab ility  m easu res, only th ree  re la tive ly  
sim ple conditions (equations (17)) need  be sa tisfied . T hese a re  to be 
com pared w ith  the  seven conditions needed in  the  quan tum  logic approach 
(see Appendix C).
A fu rth e r  technical advan tage  of the  “sta tis tica l theo ry” approach is 
th a t  the  quan tities (AaB)(A.), (AvB)(X) are always well defined, and can hence 
be m an ipu lated , w hereas in  the  quan tum  logic approach they  can only be 
defined as g rea test lower bounds and least upper bounds respectively, which 
need not exist in  general.
F inally , in  the  quan tum  logic approach th e re  is in te re s t in  the  case 
w here  the  set of s ta te s  is order-de term in ing , i.e. w here  th e  re la tio n s  
A,(A)<A.(B) VA.eS and A=>B are equivalent. The order-determ ining property is 
guaran teed  in  the “sta tistical theory” approach th rough  equation (6).
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4. COVERING THEORIES
In  §3.4 it  was shown (Exam ple 3.2) th a t  the H ilbert space s truc tu re  of 
quan tum  m echanics leads to a non-classical sta tistica l theory. As discussed 
in  §3.1, such a resu lt m ay be in te rp re ted  as e ither (i) non-classical struc tu res 
a re  req u ired  in  general to describe the  physical world, or (ii) qu an tu m  
m echanics is an  inadequate  description of the  physical world.
In  the  la t te r  case one would be led to search for a classical s ta tis tica l 
th e o ry  w hich  describ es  a ll th e  p h en o m en a  ex p la in ed  by q u a n tu m  
m echanics. More generally, one m ay ask  w hether the predictions of a given 
s ta tis tica l theory  m ay all be reproduced by an o th er sta tis tica l theory, and 
w hat rela tions there  m ight be betw een the probability  and logical struc tu res 
of these theories.
Accordingly, a s ta tis tica l theory  (S, CP) is defined to be a covering  
theory for a sta tistica l theory (S ,^  if  and only if  there  exist m appings a:£P— 
ß: S —> S such th a t
A and A correspond to the  sam e yes/no experim ent; (18a)
A ( M = Ä d )  VA.eS, A<= CP (18b)
w here A:= cc(A), X: = ß(A). T hus, (S, CP) reproduces all the  p redictions of 
(S,fP), and  in  general m ay yield fu rth e r predictions also.
I t  follows from (6) and (18b) th a t  the  im plication rela tions A => B and 
A=>B are  no t equ ivalen t. In  p a rtic u la r, th e  form er re la tio n  m ay hold 
w ithou t the  la t te r  being satisfied . Thus, (S ,CP) and (S, CP) in  general have 
different probability  and logical s truc tu res. Also, the  re la tion  A = B does not 
im ply A = B in  general, he ., w hile A and  B m ay be te s ted  by the  sam e 
experim ent for (S, CP), they m ay correspond to d istinct experim ents for (S ,CP).
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Since the  propositions and sta tes of (S, P) are  obtained as m appings (a '1 and 
ß*1) of corresponding quantities of the covering theory, the la tte r  m ay in  some 
cases be though t of as form ing the  basis of or underlying the former, i.e., as 
a “h id d en  v a ria b le ” theory . H ow ever, such an  in te rp re ta tio n  will be 
appropria te  only for certain  types of m appings.
F ou r in te re s tin g  exam ples of covering theo ries a re  now given to 
conclude th is  section. The fourth  exam ple dem onstra tes the  existence of a 
classical covering theory for each sta tistica l theory.
EXAMPLE 4.1 Let S = {Xx, X2] and  <P= {0, A, A', 2}, where A{Xx) = 0,A(A,2) = 1/2. 
I t  follows th a t  AaA ' = A &  0, and  hence (S ,£P) does not have a classical 
struc tu re . However, if  S = {A1,A2,A.3} and (P = {0, A,A', 2}, w ith  A(Xi) = ACA )^, 
A(A.2) = A(A,2), and A(A.3) = 1, th en  (S ,P) is a covering theory for (S,29 and is in  
fact a classical sta tistica l theory.
EXAMPLE 4.2 For a given sta tistical theory (S,2/) define (Sc,2/) by
[0,«0 2 > ( w = i .XeS
and A(p):= ^Tp(A.)A(A.), for all Ae CP,pe SC.
XeS
A sta te  pe Sc can be in terp reted  as being obtained by choosing a m em ber of an 
ensem ble of system s described by the  d istribu tion  p(X). For Xe S, the  sta te  
px<=Sc defined by p^(V): = 5^ ^  sa tisfies A(p^) = A(A.) for all Ae P, XeS,  and
hence (SC,£P) is a covering theory for (S,lP). F u rth e r, if  p1?p2 e S c, then  ap x + 
( l - a ) p 2e S c for 0 < a < 1. Therefore (Sc,fP) m ay be called the  convex-state 
covering theory corresponding to (S,^). One m ay show th a t  the im plication 
re la tio n  A=>B is equivalent for bo th  (S,^P) and (SciPf)f and  hence th a t th e ir 
rep resen ta tiv e  logics are  identical. For the  case of exam ple 3.2 of §3.4, Sc 
corresponds to the set of density operators on the H ilbert space H, and a  sta te
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We Sc is interpreted as a mixture of states \\fe S. For the case of example 3.1 
of §3.4, Sc is the set of ensembles of classical systems, and includes the 
equilibrium ensembles of statistical mechanics.
EXAMPLE 4.3 For a given statistical theory (S,^, define (Sc,^) by
as in Example 4.2 above, and
p(p): = ^  p(A) A(p) for all jig pe S . Defining pAE by pA(B) = 5^B and 
Ae(P
P^ gSc as in the previous example, it follows that jiA(p )^ = A(X) VAe P^Ae S. 
Further, 2? and Sc are both convex sets, and hence (Sc, 2?) may be called the 
completely-convex covering theory corresponding to (S,fP). In general (S,fP) 
and (Sc,5 )^ have different representative logics. For the case of example 3.2 of 
§3.4, 2? corresponds to the set of effects encountered in the operation-effect 
formulation of quantum mechanics (Kraus, 1983).
EXAMPLE 4.4 Let (S,^ P) be a statistical theory and consider a set of 
propostions, the elements of which are indexed by the mappings from S to 
subsets of the interval [0,1), i.e
^ :  = {aP l F:S-»{M |M s  [0,1)}} .
The deterministic theory (S x [0,1), 2 )^ may then be defined by 
aF(X,x):=f l ,  x g F(X),
\ o ,  x g F A ) ,
for all aFe P d, XeS,  and x e [0,1).  Thus, the state (1 ,x )g S x[0 ,1) fully 
determines the outcome of testing any proposition ocf e It is not difficult to 
show that (S x [0,1), 2 )^ is classical . First, from equation (5) one may show 
that o^> = otpcE where FCA): = [0,1)\FA). Second, from equations (6) and (8)
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i t  follows th a t  the  re la tion  a F=> a G is equivalent to F(A.)s G(X) VXeS, and 
hence th a t  ccfa<Xqs ocFnGe 2**, w here (FnGXX): = F (l)n G (l) . Third, if  xs G(X) 
th e n  e ith e r xs (FnGXA.) or xe (FcnG )(^); while if  xe G(X) th en  xe (F nG)(X) 
an d  xe (F cnG)(X); and  hence (a FAaG)(l,x) + ( a 'FAaG)(k,x) = a G(X,x) for all 
Xe S,xe [0,1). Thus, conditions (15a), (15b), (15c) are satisfied by (S x [0,1), 2*1), 
so th a t  i t  is indeed a classical theory.
Suppose now th a t  an  ensem ble of sta tes is constructed from elem ents of S 
x [0,1), corresponding to some fixed Xe S and a d istribu tion  p(x) over [0,1). 
The probability  of a proposition ocFe 2^ being verified on a m em ber of th is 
ensem ble is then
l
aF(X.,p): = Jp(x) aF(X,x) = J p(x)dx .
° F(JD
This m otivates the  definition of the sta tistical theory (Sd,2**), where 
Sd; = S x [0,1 )C = S x {p:[0,l) -> [0,<») I ) p(x) dx = 1} ,
o
a n d  w ith  a F(X,p) as above. T hus (Sd, 2>d) h a s  a sim ple  ensem ble  
in te rp re ta tio n  in  term s of the underly ing  determ inistic  theory (S x [0,1), 2^). 
M oreover, the  im plication re la tio n s  for these  two theories are equ iva len t 
(consider the case p ( x'X = 5XjX0, and  it  follows th a t  conditions (15a), (15b),
and  (15c) a re  sa tisfied  by (Sd,2?d), i.e., the la t te r  is a classical statistical 
theory.
Finally, for proposition Ae 2?, define a proposition ocp^G 2*1 such th a t  
f dx = MX)
Fa(W
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for all A.e S e.g., let F A(X)\ = [0,A(A)). It follows that for the uniform 
distribution, pQ(x) s  1, one has
l
aF (k,pJ = a FA J A
O
= J dx = A(X) .
PAW
Hence, (Sd,2^) is a covering theory for (S,fP), where As CP, Xe S correspond to 
apAe 2^,(X,p0)e Sd respectively. In view of the above, (Sd,^ )  provides what
may be called the deterministic-picture classical covering theory for (S,CP).
It should be noted that there is a wide range of choice for the mapping 
A -» ocpA, however, this range may be narrowed by imposing certain physical
requirements. For example, suppose that a group of propositons A lt A2, A3, 
... s £Psatisfy £ A^ A,) = 1 for all Xs S, and correspond to the possible outcomesi
ri, r2, r3 ... of some experiment E (i.e., A* is verified if and only if r^  is 
obtained). If it is required that the corresponding propositions aFl, ap2, ccp3, 
... e ^  are also tested by experiment E, then it is physically plausible, and
d
consistent with equations (1), to postulate that Z <Xp.(A.,p) = 1 for all (A,p)e S .
The choice F^ A,) = [0, A^ A.)) does not satisfy this summation condition; 
however, a suitable choice does exist, given by 
F{(X): = [Z Aft.), i MX))  .j=i J j=i J
This latter choice generalises a hidden variable model for quantum 
mechanics due to Bell (1966). Bell’s criticism of his own model, namely that 
it is very artificial, also applies here -  in particular, the mapping A —» ocp^
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depends crucially on the ordering of the experim ental outcomes r x, r2, r 3, ... . 
I t m u st be em phasised th a t  th is  criticism  in  no way affects the  significance 
of th e  exam ple, i.e., th e re  ex ists a c lassical covering th eo ry  for each 
s ta tis tica l theory.
5. THE BELL INEQUALITIES 
5.1 Introduction
T he v iew po in t th a t  only c la ss ica l s ta t is t ic a l  th e o rie s  a re  of 
fundam enta l in te res t (see §3.1), is supported by Exam ple 4.4, since any non- 
classical s ta tis tica l theory  m ay be replaced by a classical covering theory  
w hich describes the  sam e physical phenom ena. However, i t  will now be 
shown in  the  case of quan tum  m echanics th a t no such covering theory can 
sa tis fy  a  c e rta in  locality  condition. The d em o n stra tio n  re lies upon  a 
derivation of the well known Bell inequalities (C lauser et al. , 1969; C lauser et 
al., 1974; C lauser et al., 1978; Fine, 1982), and  is significant in  th a t  the  
locality condition used is of a w eaker n a tu re  th an  the standard  factorisability 
condition.
C oincidence experim en ts a re  defined an d  d iscussed  in  the  nex t 
section, and  the  locality  condition is given in  §5.3. B oth  “form al” and  
“physical” versions of the Bell inequalities are th en  derived in  §5.4, following 
on from  and  clarify ing some e a rlie r  work (H all, 1988) w hich lacked the  
conceptual basis of sta tistical theories. Finally, the  relevance of these resu lts 
to quan tum  m echanics is discussed in  §§5.5, 5.6.
5J? Coincidence Experiments
The concept of a coincidence experim ent is form ulated here w ithin  the 
context of sta tistical theories.
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For the  sta tis tica l theory (S,^P) consider the case of a system  described 
by s ta te  Xe S, for which the procedures for two yes/no experim ents have been 
carried  out, corresponding to propositions A ,Be (P. For example, A m ay refer 
to a range of position values for a free particle a t some tim e while B refers to 
a range  of m om entum  values a t a la te r  tim e. A second exam ple is the 
sim ultaneous m easu rem en t of two propositions for a quantum -m echanical 
system  (example 3.2, §3.4), w here the  corresponding projections commute.
One m ay th en  consider th a t  a single jo in t experim ent, labelled  by 
[A,B], h a s  been perform ed, the  re su lt of w hich lies in  the  set {(yes,yes), 
(no,yes), (yes,no), (no,no)}. C learly [A,B] is not a yes/no experim ent, and  so 
can  n o t be d irec tly  d iscussed  w ith in  a s ta tis t ic a l  th eo ry  fram ew ork. 
However, one m ay define the propositions AJB, A'.B, AJ3', and  A'.B ' as being 
respectively  verified if  the  re su lt of [A,B] is (yes,yes), (no,yes), (yes,no), and 
(no,no), and  falsified otherw ise. If these propositions are elem ents of P, i.e. 
p robabilities of th e ir  verification are  predicted by the  theory  for each sta te  
Xe S, th en  [A,B] m ay be called a jo in t experim ent o f the theory.
In  general, even if  a jo in t experim ent [A,B] exists for A,Be P, it  need 
not be a jo in t experim ent of the  theory. For example, consider the case of the 
position /m om en tum  m easu rem en t m en tioned  above, w here  (S ,^) is the 
“quan tum -m echan ica l” s ta tis tica l theory  from §3.4 (Exam ple 3.2). I f  the  
experim en t [A,B] is su itab ly  chosen (essen tia lly  such th a t  the  projection 
postu la te  is applicable), th en  i t  follows for \j/eS th a t  (A.B)(\|/) = (\|/, ABA\j/), 
w here A  and B are projections onto the appropria te  ranges of position and 
m om entum  respectively. H ere, since the  operator A BA  is not a projection 
onto a subspace of H, th en  A .B e P, and  hence [A,B] is not a jo in t experim ent
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of (S,£P). I t m ay be noted, however, th a t ABA is an effect (K raus, 1983), and 
hence for the  completely-convex covering theory  (Sc, ^ )  (Exam ple 4.3, §4),
v
[A,B] is a jo in t experim ent of the theory. Explicitly, for sta te  W eS c, one has
(A.BXW) = t r  [WABA], (A'.BXW) = tr[W A'BA/], etc, 
w here A': = 1-A .
I t  is perhaps tem pting  to identify  A.B w ith  the  jo in t propositon AaB; 
however, th is  tu rn s  out to be incorrect in  general, as will be seen below. The 
locality condition given in  the  next section provides a sufficient criterion for 
such an  identification to be m ade in  the  case of a class of regular s ta tis tica l 
theo ries .
5.3 Local Statistical Theories
Let [A,B] be a jo in t experim ent of some sta tistica l theory (S ,^ ,  and  for 
a propostion  Xe T  le t [X] denote the  corresponding yes/no experim ent by 
w hich X m ay be tested. Then, the  experim ents [A], [B], [A,B] correspond to 
th re e  physica lly  dis t inc t  cases, even though  the  la t te r  is a physical 
com bination of the  first two. In  p articu la r, resu lts  of experim ents [A], [B] 
perform ed singly m ay not be sim ply rela ted  to the resu lt of [A,B].
C onsider now th e  s itu a tio n  w here ex p erim en ts  [A], [B] involve 
re sp ec tiv e ly  reg ions Rj, R n of space-tim e w hich a re  non-overlapping . 
Predictions of (S,^P) m ay th en  be compared for N system s described by sta te  X 
in  two cases: (i) [A,B] is perform ed for each system; and (ii) [B] is perform ed 
for each  system . In  each  case , consider th e  re la tiv e  frequency  of 
verifications in  region Rn for proposition B. For sufficiently large N, th is  is 
predicted  in  case (i) to be (A.B)(X) + (A'.BXW), and  in  case (ii) to be B(X). If 
th e se  q u a n titie s  a re  no t equal, th e n  an  experim en t in  region R n can
120
d isc rim ina te  betw een cases (i) and  (ii), i.e. , it  can be determ ined  w ith in  
region R jj w hether or not proposition A was tested  in  region Rj.
As an  exam ple, le t [A,B] be the  position/m om entum  m easu rem en t 
discussed in  the previous section, for the completely-convex theory (Sc,l^). It 
follows th a t  the  re la tive  frequencies for cases (i) and  (ii) above are given 
respectively by
(A.BXW) + (A'.BXW) = tr[WABA] + t r  [WA'BA'],
B(W) = tr[WB] .
Since A and B are  non-com m uting projections, these  re la tive  frequencies 
cannot in  general be equal. Thus, the sta tistical behaviour of the  m om entum  
m easu rem en t, [B], is influenced by the  existence/non-existence of an  earlie r 
position m easu rem en t, [A].
T he above exam ple dem o n stra tes  how the  p a s t m ay influence the 
fu tu re . In  particu lar, an  experim enter in  Rj could in  principle signal to the 
fu tu re  region R jj, by e ither perform ing or not perform ing experim ent [A] for 
a large num ber of system s.
The principle of local causa lity  is roughly th a t  signals m ay only be 
sen t from the p a s t to the  fu ture. Thus, for N ew tonian space-tim e it  im plies 
th a t  no signals can be sen t betw een spa tia lly  sep ara ted  regions w ith  the 
sam e tim e co-ordinate; while for E in ste in ian  space-tim e, no signals can be 
se n t betw een  space-like se p a ra ted  regions. The la t te r  has the  stronger 
experim en tal significance; as in  practice all m easu rem en ts extend over a 
period of time.
In  the  ligh t of the  above p a rag rap h s , a local s ta tis tica l theory  is 
defined to be one for which i f  [A,B] is a joint experiment o f the theory such
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that [A] and [B] are performed in space-like separated regions, Rj and Rn
respectively ,then
(A.BXM + (A'.BXW = B(X); (19a)
(A.BO(W + (A'.B'XX) = B'(W; (19b)
(A.BXX.) + (A.B'XA,) = A(W ; (19c)
(A/.B)(X)+ (A'.B')(^)= A U ) ; (19d)
for all states Xe S. Equations (19a), (19b) preclude the sending of a signal 
from Ri to Rn via the mechanism discussed above; while equations (19c), 
(19d) preclude the sending of such a signal from Rn to Rj.
It follows from equations (6), (9d) and (19) that A.B => AaB, A'.B =* 
A'aB, etc, for local statistical theories. One may then show (Appendix D) for 
local, regular statistical theories satisfying AaBg tP for all A,B e tP that
A.B = AaB, A'.B = A aB, A.B' = AaB', A'.B' = A'aB' , (20)
in the case where propositons A,B are to be tested in space-like separated 
regions.
If the “quantum-mechanical” statistical theory of §3.4 (Example 3.2) is 
constrained to be local, equations (19) and (20) then imply that:
■A-EinE2 + •^ ■E-LinE2 = e c^ *
for all \j/eH, where AEl, AE2 are to be tested in space-like separated regions. 
It follows from the relation Ae(\j/) = (\|/,E\j/) that [E1,E2] = 0; i.e. for quantum 
mechanics to be a local statistical theory, the projections corresponding to 
propositions tested in space-like separated regions must commute.
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5.4 Derivation of Bell Inequalities
L et (S,5F) be a classical sta tis tica l theory, i.e. conditions (15a), (15b), 
(15c) are satisfied. One m ay th en  show (Appendix E) for all AI? Bj, An, T 
and l e S  th a t
—1< (Aj/\Ajj) (A.) + (AjaB jj)(X.) + (BjaB jj)(A,) —(BjaA jj)(A,) — Aj(X) 
- B n(W < 0. (21)
F u rth e r , if  (S,1P) is a local classical s ta tis tica l theory, and [Aj,An], [A^Bn], 
[B jjA jj], [BjjBjj] a re  jo in t experim ents of (S,^P) such th a t  the  ind iv idual 
com ponents of each a re  perform ed in  space-like sep a ra ted  regions, th en  
equations (20) and (21) yield
-  1 < (AI.AII)(X.) + (ApBnXW + (BI.BII)(^) -  (B^An )(W
- A ! a ) - B na ) < o  , (22)
for all s ta tes Xe S.
E quation  (21) is equivalent to equation (8) of Fine, 1982 (replace Aj, Bj, 
An, B n by A, A', B, B ' respectively; (AjAAn)^.) by P(AB), etc), derived by him  
as a p roperty  of classical d istribu tion  functions. Note th a t  th is  equation 
connects predictions of the  theory for experim ents of the  type [Xa.Y], [X], [Y], 
w here the  form er is not necessarily  physically re la ted  to the  la tte r  two. In 
particu lar, equation (20) need not hold. This is a consequence of the fact th a t 
X aY is only form ally  connected  to p ropositions X,Yg T  in  general, via 
definition (8a). Hence, the contents of equation (21) m ay be referred to as the 
formal Bell inequalities. By contrast, the  contents of equation (22) m ay be 
called the  physical Bell inequalities, as th is equation  connects predictions 
for physically re la ted  experim ents, of the type [X,Y], [X], and  [Y].
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The physical Bell inequalities (equation (22)) m ay be compared w ith  the 
equation  im m ediate ly  preceding equation  (4) of C lauser and H orne 1974, 
(replace Aj, Bj, An, B^ by a, a ', b, b ' respectively , (Aj-AnXA.) by p12(X,a,b), 
Bj(X) by p1(X,a/), etc), or equivalently  w ith  equation  (3.18) of C lauser and 
Shim ony (1978). The C lauser-H om e resu lt was obtained as a consequence of 
certa in  factorisability  assum ptions, which in  the no tation  of th is  paper m ay 
be sta ted  as
(A .B )a) = A(MBtt,) ; (23a)
(A'.B)(M = AU)B(W  ; (23b)
(A.B0(X) = A (W B U ); (23c)
(A'.B'XW = A U )B U ); (23d)
for all s ta te s  Xe S, w here [A,B] is a jo in t experim ent of the theory  such th a t 
[A] and  [B] are  perform ed in  space-like separa ted  regions. E quations (23), 
reg a rd ed  as a locality  condition, express the  s ta tis tic a l independence of 
m easu rem en t resu lts  in  the  two regions, provided  the quan tities  (A.B)(X), 
(A.B'XA.), etc, are jo in t probabilities. This is a fu rth er assum ption, valid  only 
i f  eq u a tio n  (20) holds. In  th e  p re se n t de riva tion  of the  physical Bell 
inequa litie s, equation  (20) is d erived  w ith in  the  fram ew ork of sta tis tica l 
theories. F u rther, the  resu lt relies not on (23) b u t on (19), where the  la tte r  is 
im plied by b u t does not im ply (23) and is therefore a w eaker form ulation  of 
locality.
5.5 The B e ll In eq u a litie s  a n d  Q u a n tu m  M echanics
In  th is section i t  is shown th a t  the physical Bell inequalities (equation 
(22)) provide a necessary  condition for a s ta tis tica l theory  (S,(P) to adm it a 
local, c lassical covering th eo ry . S ince, as is well know n, q u a n tu m
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m ech an ics  m akes som e p red ic tio n s  w hich  v io la te  th e  physica l Bell 
inequalities, i t  follows in  particu la r th a t  there are no local, classical covering 
theories for quan tum  mechanics.
To validate  the rem arks of the above paragraph , suppose th a t  ( S ,^  is a 
covering theory for some sta tistica l theory (S ,^ . Hence for A,Be 2  there  exist 
propositions A, Be ^ s u c h  th a t experim ents [A], [B] are equivalent to [A], [B] 
respective ly  (equation  (18a)). In  p a rticu la r, if  [A] and  [B] m ay bo th  be 
perfo rm ed  for a system  described  by s ta te  Xe S, th en  [A] and  [B] m ay 
perform ed on the  sam e system  and hence the  jo in t experim ents [A,B], [A, B] 
a re  also equivalent. Thus, if  [A,B] is a jo in t experim ent o f the theory (S,2) 
(see §5.2), so th a t A.Be 2, th en  equations (18a), (18b) imply th a t
(A.BXX) = (Ä.B) d )  = ÄJB d )  (24)
for all s ta tes Xe S. E quation (24) im plies th a t if  the physical Bell inequalities 
hold for (S, 2), th en  they  m ust also hold for (S ,2), and  the s ta tem en ts of the  
above p a rag rap h  im m ediately  follow.
Note th a t  there  is no analagous resu lt to equation (24) which yields a 
sim ilar significance for the fo rm a l Bell inequalities (equation (21)). Indeed, 
Exam ple 4.1 of §4 dem onstrates th a t the quantities (AaB)( .^) and AaB (X) are 
n o t equal in  general. T hus the  possibility  rem ains of a classical covering 
theory  for quan tum  m echanics (although such a theory  m ust be non-local), 
and  in  fact Exam ple 4.4 of §4 realises th is possibility.
5.6 M odified  Sta tisticcd  Theories
I f  quan tum  m echanics can not be embedded w ith in  the fram ew ork of a 
local, c lassical s ta tis t ic a l  th eo ry , a question  a rise s  as to w h e th e r an
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acceptable m odification of s ta tis tica l theories exists such th a t  both “local” 
and  “classical” concepts can be re ta ined  for quan tum  m echanics.
P erhaps the sim plest such modification to the  definition of a sta tistical 
theory  (§2) is to suppose th a t propositions can not in  general be tested for all 
s ta te s  in  S. Thus, given a s ta te  Xe S, then  only some propositions (e.g., spin 
in  c e rta in  directions) m ay be tested . T his m ay be easily  in te rp re ted  as 
im plying th a t  the  experim en ter does no t have free will in  choosing which 
experim ent to conduct.
For such theories, the  physical Bell inequalities (equation (22)) hold 
only for those s ta te s  on w hich i t  is possible to perform  any of [Aj, An ], 
[Aj ,B ji], [Bj,An], [Bi ,B ji], [Ah], a n d [B J. However, there  m ay be no such 
sta tes! An explicit exam ple of “escaping” the  Bell inequalities in  th is  
m an n er has been given by Shimony, C lauser and Horne (1985).
6. SUM M ARY
The basic tool used in  th is  paper is the  concept of a statistical theory, 
as characterised  in  §2. The existence of an  associated probability and logical 
s tru c tu re  for each such theory (§3.3) then  provides a basis for the definitions 
of classical and regular s ta tis tica l theories (§3.4). The form er definition 
iden tifies the  class of theories which have classical probability  and logical 
s tru c tu re s , while the  la t te r  defin ition  d istingu ishes the  class of theories 
regu la ted  by those properties associated w ith the quan tum  logic approach to 
ax iom atic  q u an tu m  m echanics (§3.5). The class of reg u la r s ta tis tic a l 
theories contains the  class of classical theories.
The notion of a s ta tis tic a l theory  w hich “exp la ins” the  sam e se t of 
physical phenom ena as an o th e r theory  leads to the  concept of a covering 
theory  (§4). Logical properties are  not generally preserved in  the tran sition
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from a sta tis tica l theory to it's  covering theory, and in particu lar there exists 
a classical covering theory for each sta tistica l theory (Example 4.4).
W hereas c lassical and  reg u la r  theo ries are  defined in  a m an n e r 
designed to m ake th e ir  p robability  and  logical s tru c tu re  explicit, i.e. in  a 
form al m anner, th e  defin ition  of a loca l s ta tis tic a l theo ry  re s ts  on th e  
physical concept of coincidence experim en ts (§5.2). The la t te r  concept 
provides a se tting  for im posing restric tions on signalling betw een space-like 
sep ara ted  regions of space-tim e, leading to conditions for a sta tistica l theory 
to be local (§5.3).
The fo rm a l and  the  physical Bell inequalities are  shown to apply to 
c lass ica l and  to local, c lassical s ta tis t ic a l  th eo rie s  repectively  (§5.4). 
V iolation of the  la tte r  inequalities by quan tum  m echanics leads to the resu lt 
th a t  th e re  are  no local, classical covering theories for quan tum  m echanics 
(§5.5).
I conclude th a t  the  fram ew ork of s ta tis tica l theories is well su ited  for 
d iscussing  certa in  aspects of the  foundations of q u an tu m  m echanics. In  
particu la r, seem ingly d ispara te  fea tu res of the quan tum  logic approach are 
un ited  in  the a lternative  “sta tistica l theory approach”, and the role of locality 
in  the  derivation and significance of the Bell inequalities is elucidated by th is 
app roach .
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APPENDIX A
In this Appendix, equations (9), (10) and (14) of §3.3 are derived from 
definitions (8), (12) and (13) of the text. A lemma to be used in Appendices B 
and C is also proved.
Equations (9) are derived first. Equation (9a) follows immediately from 
the symmetry of definition (8a). Also, defining A nBe 2*P by (AnB)(X) = min 
(A(X), B(ÄJ} (see definition (13)), it follows from equation (6) that
(X => AnB) IFF (X => A, X =*> B) VXe FF . (A l)
Hence, (8a) may be written as
(AaBXW = sup (X(X) I Xs S’, X =>AnB)
^ sup (X(X) I Xs <P£, X => AnB)
= (AnB) f t) ,
and thus (AaB) => (AnB). Equations (Al) and (7b) then imply equation (9c), 
and further from (Al) it follows that if  X => AaB then X => A and X => B, for 
all Xe FF. But for Xe F such that X => A, X=> B, one has 
X(X)< sup (Y(X) I Y s S’, Y => A, Y => B),
= (AaBXX)
for all Xe S, and hence (9d) is proved. Finally, (9d) may be used to give 
((AaB)aCXX) = sup (x a )  I Xe S’, X =» AaB, X =» C)
= sup (X(X) IXs S’, X => A, X => B, X => C)
= sup CX(X) I Xs S’, X => A, X=> BaC)
= (Aa(BaC)X .^) ,
thus proving equation (9b). This last result also leads to the consistency of 
definitions (8a) and (12a).
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E quations (10) m ay be proved in  an  entirely  analogous m anner to the 
above, using  definition (8b).
E quation  (14) m ay be derived as follows. Suppose th a t  X'g IPVXg ^. 
Then, using equations (12), (13) and (7d), one has 
(aAJ)' (X) = 1 - ( aA10(W
i i
= 1 -  supfX a) IX s  f?X  => n  A,'}
i
= in f {1 - X(X) IX e  5>,X =>n a ')
= in f (XU) I X s T ,  X =» n  A,'}
i
=  in f (XU) I Xe fP, (n  A.')' => X'] .
i
But
(ry ^ U ) = 1 -  (nAj)(X)
= l - i n f { l - A ia)}
= sup (A^ A.)}
= u  A ß )  ,
i
i.e, (nA T ' = uA- . Also, if  Xg fP th en  X'g fP, and vice versa. Hence, 
i 1 i 1
(aA,')' (X) = in f  ( X U )  I X'e fP, uA- => XO
i 1 i
= inf{X(W IX efP.uA j => X}
i
= (vAj) (X) .
i
Finally , a  useful lem m a will be proved.
LEM M A
Suppose (S,50 satisfies the conditions 
(i) If  A => B' then  (A'aB')'g P,
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a n d  (ii) If A => B' then  (A'aB T  (X) = Aft.) + B(A.)
for all A,B€ 2, Xe S. Then for any countable sequence A lf A2, A3, ... e 2  such
th a t A ^  A '■ Vi* j, one has (aA*)' (X) = £ A(X)  VAe S .
J i i
Proof: F irs t note th a t for a sequence A1,A2g 2  such th a t  Ax =>A'2, the  resu lt
follows by condition (ii) of the  lem m a. Now consider a finite sequence A1?
' n-l ,
Ane fr, n  > 2, satisfying A^=> Ai Vi*j; and assum e th a t  ( a A-)'e fr, and
J i=1
( a  A^)'(X) = £ A^A.) . Then A^ => A- for i = 1, 2, n  - 1 ,  and  hence 
i=l i=l
An( \)  < m in (AjU), A^CX)}VXe S,
n-l , n-l '
i.e., An=> n  A^  , from equations (6) and (13), and  so A ^ ^  a  Ai from 
i=l i=l
equation  (12a). Hence from condition (i) of the  lemma,
( a  A')' = (A : a ("a  A ,'))'e <P,
i=l i=l
and  from condition (ii)
( a a y  cx ) = An a )  + ( a1 a [y (X)
i=l i=l
= £ Ana )  VA.eS .
i=l
T hus the  lem m a has been proved inductively for finite sequences.
Consider finally the case of a countably infinite sequence, and define
T (A,): = ( a  A^)' (A.). Then the  lim it of the sequence (Tn(A.)} as n  -» ©© exists 
i=l
from (12a). B ut i t  has been shown th a t Tn(A.) = £ Ai(A.) for all finite values of 
i=l
n, and  hence in  the lim it n  —»
o o  /  00
©o th is m ust also hold, i.e., ( a  Ai)/ (X) = £  Ai(A.)
i=l i=l
and the  lem m a is proved.
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APPENDIX B
I t  is proved in  th is Appendix th a t a sta tistica l theory is classical if and 
only if  (i) the  rep resen ta tive  logic is Boolean, and (ii) the m appings m^:
[0,1], given by m^(A): = A(X) are generalised probability m easures for all Xe S.
Now, for a p a rtia lly  com plem ented poset (£P,=>,0 to be a Boolean logic 
(G udder, 1979; B e ltram etti and Cassinelli, 1981), one requ ires VA,B, Cg & 
th a t
AaBg T., AvBg !P (Bl)
Aa(BvC) = (AaB)v(AaC) (B2)
Av(BaC) = (AvB)a(AvC) (B3)
A ' e V (B4)
If  A=> B then  B ' =» A' (B5)
AaA' = Of AvA' = 1 . (B6)
Conditions (B l), (B2) and (B3) ensure the  poset is a d istributive lattice, 
an d  conditions (B4) - (B6) ensu re  th a t  the  p a rtia l com plem entation  is an 
orthocom plem entation. F u rth e r, if  condition (ii) above is to be satisfied, then
from  equations (16), one has for each Xe S:
If  A ., A«, ... e^P  satisfy A^  => Ai' Vi*j, th en  (vAi)(>.) = S iAi(>.) , (B7)
J i
1 (X) = 1. (B8)
I t  w ill now be show n th a t  equations (B l) - (B8) a re  equ iva len t to 
conditions (15a), (15b) and (15c) of the text.
F irstly , suppose (B l) - (B8) are  satisfied. Then, (15a) and (15b) follow 
from (B4) and (B l) respectively. F u rth er, equations (9c) and (10c) im ply th a t 
AaB => A => AvB', i.e. AaB =»AvB' = (A'aB)', using (B4) and equation  (14). 
Then, using (B7), (B3), (B6), and  equation (11)
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(AaBXM + (A'aB)(/i) = (( AaB ) v ( A'aB )(X)
= ((AvA')aB)(X)
= (IaBXX)
= boo
for all Xe S, and hence (15c) is obtained.
It remains to be shown that equations (Bl) - (B8) follow from equations 
(15a), (15b), and (15c). But (B5) and (B8) hold automatically, from equations, 
(7d) and (4) respectively. Hence only equations (Bl), (B2), (B3), (B4) (B6), and 
(B7) must be checked.
Now, (B4) follows immediately from (15a), and then equations (14) and 
(15a) imply (Bl). Also, if B=A is substituted into (15c), then equation (11) 
implies tha t (AaA'XX) = 0 VXe S, and hence that AvA' = (AaA')'= 0 ' = 1, i.e., 
(B6) holds. Further, (15a) and (15b) imply (A'aB T e ^ fo r all A,Be T, and from 
(15c),
(A'aBOU) = 1 -  (A'aB'XX)
= 1 -  (BU) -  (AaB'XW 
= B(W +(AaB'XW .
Thus if A=> B', then AaB" = A, and so (A'aBOXW =A(W+ B(X). It follows that 
the lemma proved in Appendix A is applicable, i.e., if Ax, A2, ... e *2satisfy
A-=> A' Vi^j, then (aA^X^.) = E Ai(X.) VXe S. But (15a) and (14) imply that 
J i i
(a A[y(X) = vAi(X), and hence (B7) holds.
To prove (B2) and (B3), first note that repeated use of (15c) gives 
(A'aB'aC'XW = (A'aB'XW -  (A'aB'aC) (X)
= A'(W -  (A'aBXW -  (A'aCXW + (A'aBaCXW 
= l -  MX) -  B a ) + (Aabxx) - ca) + (Aacxw  + (Bacxw
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-  (AaBaCXW .
Then, (15a) and (14) yield
(AvBvCXM = AGO + B(a) + C(W -  (AaB)O.) -  (BaCXX.)
-  (CaAXW + (AaBaC X U  (B9)
Substituting C = 0 in (B9), one obtains (AvB)(A.) = A(Ä.)+B(X) — (AaBXÄ.). This 
result together with (B9) then gives
(Aa(BvC)XW = A(X) + (BvCXA.) -  (AvBvCXX.)
= A(W + B(W + C(W -  (BaCXM -  (AvBvCXX)
= (AaBXW + (AaCXX) -  (AaBaCXA.)
= ((AaB)v(AaC))(X) , 
thus proving (B2). Finally,
Av(BaC) = (A'a(BaC)')'
= (A'a(B'vC'))'
= ((A'aB')v(A'aC'))'
= (A'aB') a(A'aC')'
= (AvB)a(AvC),
and so (B3) also holds.
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A PPEN D IX  C
It is proved in th is Appendix th a t  a sta tistica l theory is reg u la r if  and 
only i f  (i) the  rep resen ta tive  logic is an  orthocom plem ented, orthocom plete 
and  o rthom odu lar poset, and  (ii) th e  m appings m^: —>[0,1 ], g iven by
m^(A): = A(X) are  generalised probability m easures for all Xe S.
Now, for the  partia lly  com plem ented poset (¥,=$,') to satisfy condition 
(i), i t  is required for all A, B, Cg ^ th a t
If  A => B then  A v B 'g 2 (Cl)
If  A => B then  A v (A 'aB ) = B (C2)
A ' e P (C3)
If  A => B then  B' =* A' (C4)
A a  A' = 0 , AvA' = 1 . (C5)
C onditions (C l) and  (C2) ensure  orthocom pleteness and  o rthom odularity  
respectively, while (C3) -  (C5) im ply th a t  the  p artia l com plem entation is an 
o rthocom plem entation  (G udder, 1979; B e ltram e tti and  C assinelli, 1981). 
F u rth e r , for condition (ii) above to be satisfied, then  from equations (16) it
follows th a t  for all Xe S one m ust have
If A1}A2, ... g fP satisfy A^=> Aj Vi^j, th en  (vA^XX) = EAj(^) (C6) 
1 00  = 1 (C7)
I t  w ill now be show n th a t  equations (C l) — (C7) a re  equ iva len t to 
conditions (17a), (17b), (17c) of the text.
F irstly , suppose (C l) -  (C7) are  satisfied by (S, T). Hence (17a) and 
(17b) follow from (C l), (C3), and equation (14). Also, if  A => B, then  AaB = A 
from (9d), and  (A'aB )U )  = (AvB'XM = MX)  + B U ) from (C6). Hence, (17c)
holds.
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It remains to be shown that (Cl) - (C7) follow from (17a),(17b) and (17c). 
Note that (C4) and (C7) hold automatically, from (7d) and (4) respectively, and 
hence only (Cl), (C2), (C3), (C5) and (C6) must be checked.
Now, (C3) follows immediately from (7a), and (Cl) is implied by 
equations (14), (17a) and (17b). From the relation A => A, it follows from (17c) 
tha t (AaA'X^.) = 0 VXe S, and thus (AvA') = (AaA'X = 1 , i.e. (C5) holds. Also, 
if A => B then AaB =A, so from (17c) (A'aB)(X) = B(X) -  A ( X ) .  But A'aB => A', 
and hence if A=> B, then
(A'a(A'aB)O(X) = A U )- (A /aB)(W
= A U )-(B (W -A (W )
= B U ) ,
i.e., (Av(A'aB)) = (A'a(A'aB)')' = B, and so (C2) holds.
Finally, (17a) and (17b) and the lemma proved in Appendix A imply for 
Ax, A2, ... e (P satisfying A ^  A^  Vi*j, that (vA^ XA.) = (aA |) '  (A) = EAXA), and
J i i i
thus (C6) holds.
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APPENDIX D
In this Appendix it is first shown that if (S,fP) is a regular statistical 
theory such tha t A A B e^for all A,Be¥( i . e . ,  the representative logic is a 
lattice), then
(AaBXV + (A'aBXA.) < BO.) (Dl)
for all A,Be P^/ Xe S. Equation (20) of the text is then obtained in the case 
where (S,20 is also local, as a consequence of (Dl) and equations (19).
To prove (Dl), let C: = AaB; D: = A'aB. Then C,De T  by assumption, 
and C => A => AvB' = D', where equations (9c), (10c), (14) and (17a) have been 
used. Thus from (7b) C => D', and hence by equation (C6) of Appendix C, 
(CvD)(A) = C(A) + D(A) for all XeS.  Finally, C =>B, D=> B, and so from 
equations (6) and (lOd) it follows that (CvD)(X) < B(A) for all Xe S, and (Dl) is 
proved.
Suppose now tha t (S ,^  is local, and [A,B] is a joint experiment of the 
theory, where [A] and [B] are to be tested in spacelike separated regions. 
From equations (6), (19a), (19c), one then has A.B => A, A.B =>B, and hence 
A.B => AaB from equation (9d). Similarly it may be shown that A'.B => A'aB, 
etc. Defining
mx : = (AaBXA.) -  (A.B)(A), nx : = (A'aBXA) -  (A'.B)(A) , 
it follows from the above that m^, n^ > 0 for all Xe S. Thus,
(AaBXA.) + (A'aBXA) = (A.B)(A) + (A'.BXA) + mx + nx
= B(A) + mx + n^ ,
using (19a). It follows from (Dl) that m^ = n^ = 0 for all Xe S, and hence AaB 
= A.B, A'aB =A'.B. In an analogous manner it may also be shown that AaB' 
= A.B' and A'aB' = A'.B', proving equation (20) of the text.
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APPENDIX E
In this Appendix, equation (21) of the text is derived for classical 
statistical theories. The proof is based on the derivation by Fine (1982) of an 
analogous result for classical distribution functions (see §5.4).
F irst, from equations (15a), (15b), (15c), one has for propositions 
A,B,C,De £P, Xe S, that
0 < (AaB'aCOCO = (AaBOOO -  (AaB'aCXM
= MX) -  (AaBXM -  (AaCXM + (AaBaC)O.) ,
i.e., using (6) and (9c) also,
(AaB)(A.)+(AaC)(X.)-A(X) < (AaBaCXW
= (AaBaCaDXW + (AaBaCaD'XW 
< (BaD)(X) + (CaD'XW 
= (BaDXW + C(W -  (CaD)O.) ,
and hence
0 > (AaB)O.) + (AaCXX) + (CaD)O.) -  (BaDXX) -  A(X) -  C (U  (El)
Replacing A by A', and swapping B and C in (E l), one obtains 
0 > (A'aCXW + (A'aBXX) + (BaD)CO -  (CaDXX) -  A'(X) -  BO.)
= C(X)~ (AaC)(X)+ B ax- (AaB)(W+ (BaDXW- (CaDXAJ- 1+A(W-B(U
i.e.,
(AaB)(X)+(AaC)(X)+(CaD )(^H B aDXX)-A(X)-C(X) > -  1. (E2)
Inequalities (El), (E2) are just the content of equation (21) of the text, where 
the propositions A,B,C,D are identified with Aj, An , B ^B j respectively.
It may be noted tha t the derivation of (El), (E2) relies only on the
properties
A 'e  , (E3)
(AaBaCaDXX,) + (AaB aCaD'XA,) = (AaBaCXX) ,- (E4)
for all A, B, C, D e fP, Xe S. (E3) and  (E4) are  w eaker th a n  conditions (15a), 
(15b), (15c), and  hence the  form al Bell inequa litie s,(21), in  fact hold for a 
la rg e r  class of s ta tis tic a l theo ries th a n  the  class of classical s ta tis tic a l
137
th eo ries .
138
REFERENCES
1. G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, Ann. Math. 37, 823 (1936).
2. S.P. Gudder, Stochastic Methods in Quantum Mechanics (North 
Holland, New York, 1979), chapter 3.
3. H. Primas, Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, in: 
Lecture Notes in Physics, Vol. 14 (Springer, Berlin, 1981).
4. E. Beltram etti and G. Cassinelli, The Logic of Quantum Mechanics 
(Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, 1981).
5. See, for example, the review by J.F. Clauser and A. Shimony, Rep. 
Prog. Phys. 41, 1881 (1978).
6. J.F . Clauser, M.A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R.A. Holt, Phys. Rev. 
Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
7. M.J.W. Hall, Found. Phys. to be published.
8. J.F. Clauser and M.A. Home, Phys. Rev. D. 10, 526 (1974).
9. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982)
10. L. Accardi, in: The Wave-Particle D ualism , edited by S. Diner et al. 
(Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984), p. 297.
11. I. Pitowsky, J. Math. Phys. 27,1556 (1986).
12. See, for example, A. Kolmogorov, Foundations of Probability (Chelsea, 
U.S.A., 1950).
13. See, for example, K. Kraus, States, Effects and Operations, in: Lecture 
Notes in Physics, Vol. 190 (Springer, Berlin, 1983).
14. J.S. Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966), §V.
15. A. Shimony, M.A. Home, and J.F. Clauser, Dialectica 39, 97 (1985).
139
BIBLIOGRAPHY
L. Accardi (1984) The Probabilistic Roots of the Quantum Mechanical Paradoxes, 
in: The Wave-Particle Dualism, edited by S. Diner et al. (Reidel,
Dordrecht, Holland), pp.297-330.
A. Aspect and P. Grangier (1984) Experiments on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Type 
Correlations with Pairs of Visible Photons, in: Foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics, edited by S. Kamefuchi et al. (Physical Society of Japan, 
Tokyo), pp.214-223.
L.E. Ballentine (1970) Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358.
A. Barchielli, L. Lanz, and G.M. Prosperi (1984) Statistics of Continuous 
Trajectories and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, in: 
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, edited by S. Kamefuchi et al. 
(Physical Society of Japan, Tokyo), pp. 165-179.
J.S. Bell (1964) Physics 1, 195.
--------------- (1987) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
E. G. Beltrametti and G. Cassinelli (1981) The Logic of Quantum Mechanics
(Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, USA).
F. Benatti, G.C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini and T. Weber (1988) Nuovo Cim. 101B, 333.
G. Birkhoff, and J. von Neumann (1936) Ann. Math. 37, 823.
D. Bohm (1951) Quantum Theory (Prentice-Hall, New York, USA).
D. Bohm and B.J. Hiley (1989) Rep. Phys. 172, 93.
L. Bombelli, J. Lee, D. Mayer, and R. Sorkin (1987) Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 521.
P. Busch (1986) Phys. Rev. D 33, 2253.
C.H. Caves (1987) Phys. Rev. D 35, 1815.
140
C. H. Caves and G.H. Milbum (1987) Phys. Rev. A 36, 5543.
J.F. Clauser and M.A. Home (1974) Phys. Rev. D 10, 526.
J.F. Clauser and A. Shimony (1978) Rep. Prog. Phys. 41, 1881.
R.K. Clifton and M.L.G. Redhead (1988) Phys. Lett. A 126, 295.
L. Cohen (1988) Found. Phys. 18, 983.
J.V. Corbett (1988) Phys. Lett. A 130, 419.
R. Cox (1961) The Algebra of Probable Inference (John Hopkins, Baltimore, 
USA).
A. Datta, D. Home, and A. Raychaudhuri (1987) Phys. Lett. A 123, 4.
--------------- (1988) Phys. Lett. A 130, 187.
E.B. Davies (1976) Quantum Theory of Open Systems (Academic Press, London, 
UK).
D. Deutsch (1983) Phys. Rev. Lett. 50, 631.
B. d'Espagnat (1971) Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Benjamin,
Menlo Park, USA).
M. Ferrero and E. Santos (1986) Phys. Lett. A 116, 356.
A. Fine (1982) Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291.
B. de Finetti (1974) Theory of Probability 1 and 2 (Wiley, UK).
D. Finkelstein (1969a) Matter, Space and Logic, in: Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science V (Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland), pp. 199-216.
--------------- (1969b) Phys. Rev. 184, 1261.
--------------- (1972) The Physics of Logic, in: The Logico-Algebraic Approach to
Quantum Mechanics II, edited by C.A. Hooker (Reidel, Dordrecht, 
Holland), pp. 141-160.
J. Finkelstein and H.P. Stapp (1987) Phys. Lett. A 126, 159.
141
G.C. Ghirardi, R. Grassi, R. Rimini and T. Weber (1988) Europhys. Lett. 6, 95.
G.C. Ghirardi, R. Rimini and T. Weber (1980) Lett. Nuovo Cim. 27. 293.
--------------- (1986) Phys. Rev. D 34, 470.
A.M. Gleason (1957) J. Math. Mech. 6, 885.
N. Graham (1973) The Measurement of Relative Frequency, in: The Many-World 
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, edited by B.S. de Witt and N. 
Graham (Princeton University Press, USA), pp.229-253.
RJ. Greechie (1971) J. Comb. Theory 10, 119.
S.P. Gudder (1968) J. Math Mech. 18. 325.
--------------- (1979) Stochastic Methods in Quantum Mechanics (North-Holland,
New York, USA).
M.J.W. Hall (1987) Phys. Lett. A 125, 89.
--------------- (1988) Int. J. Theor. Phys. 27, 1285.
--------------- (1989) Found. Phys. 19, 189.
M.J.W. Hall and T.S. Santhanam (1989) Phys. Lett. A 135, 235.
G. M. Hardegree (1977) Found. Phys. 7, 234.
C.A. Hooker (ed.) (1979) The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quantum Mechanics 
I and II (Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland).
M. Jammer (1974) The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (Wiley, New York, 
USA).
J.M. Jauch and C. Piron (1963) Helv. Phys. Acta 36, 827.
H. Jeffreys (1961) Theory of Probability, 3rd edition (Clarendon, Oxford, UK).
M.P. Kläy (1988) Found. Phys. Lett. 1, 205.
A.N. Kolmogorov (1950) Foundations of Probability (Chelsea, USA).
142
K. Kraus (1983) States, Effects, and Operations, in: Lectures Notes in Physics. 
Vol. 190 (Springer, Berlin).
--------------- (1987) Phys. Rev. D 35, 3070.
T.D. Lee and L. Wolfenstein (1965) Phys. Rev. B 138, 1490.
G. Lindblad (1987) Phys. Lett. A 126, 71.
G. Ludwig (1985) Foundations of Quantum Mechanics I and II (Springer, Berlin).
D. Malament (1977) / . Math. Phys. 18, 1399.
A.R. Marlow (1978) Orthomodular Structures and Physical Theory, in: 
Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory, edited by A.R. Marlow 
(Academic Press, New York, USA), pp.59-69.
W. de Muynck (1986) Phys. Lett. A 114, 65.
J. von Neumann (1955) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA).
R. Omnes (1988a) J. Stat. Phys. 53, 893.
--------------- (1988b) J. Stat. Phys. 53, 933.
--------------- (1988c) J. Stat. Phys. 53, 957.
V. Pankovic (1988) Phys. Lett. A 133. 261.
M.H. Partovi (1983) Phys. Rev. Lett. 50, 1883.
C. Piron (1989) Helv. Phys. Acta 62, 82.
I. Pitowsky (1986) J. Math. Phys. 27, 1556.
H. Primas (1981) Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, in: Lecture
Notes in Chemistry, Vol. 14 (Springer, Berlin).
S. Pulmanovä (1980) Found. Phys. 10, 641.
H. Putnam (1969) Is Logic Empirical? in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science V (Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland), pp.216-241.
143
H. Reichenbach (1956) The Direction of Time, edited by M. Reichenbach 
(California University Press, Berkeley, USA).
E.J. Squires (1988) Phys. Lett. A 130, 192.
E. Squires and D. Siegwart (1987) Phys. Lett. A 126, 73.
V.S. Varadarajan (1985) Geometry of Quantum Theory, 2nd edition (Springer, New 
York, USA).
C. Zeeman (1964) J. Math. Phys. 5, 490.
